GERMANY AND FRANCE.
IT is very difficult to understand clearly the attitude which Prince Bismarck is just now assuming towards. both Russia and France. He has professed in all his. recent speeches to desire peace so long as peace can be- maintained. He has expressly asserted that Russia's policy in the Balkans is no matter of German concern,. unless, indeed, Austria, in resisting it, should be so defeated. as to be in danger of losing her position as a Great Power._ He has also asserted that he seeks no quarrel with France,. although he is not afraid of one, and is well aware that France will make one, should accident or alliances ever place the opportunity in her hands. "Leave me alone," he has said to both Powers, "and. I will leave you alone." These assurances, moreover, must, one would think, for the present be sincere. The Emperor Frederick still lives, is. still master within his dominions, and is almost of necessity determined to maintain peace during the remainder of his, time. The Chancellor can hardly be acting in total in- dependence of his Sovereign, and is certainly not acting contrary to his orders or his will. The Prince, moreover,. must know that the chance of an alliance between France and Russia is just now at its highest, and he has always. avowed that such an agreement would be a terrible menace- for Germany, who, notwithstanding her alliances, her in- creased Army, and her magazine-rifle, would be almost over- matched. All his efforts, he says, since 1870 have been directed to prevent that very coalition. Nevertheless, he. is at this moment giving acute provocation both to Russia and to France. He has, it is believed, arrested a project for raising a large Russian loan, greatly needed at St. Petersburg, and is about to place a prohibitory duty upon the import of Russian corn, which he alleges ruins the German wheat-growers by its competition. As the duty, however, is to be differential, it is at Russia he is striking, not at the consumer of wheat. His journals, moreover, are complaining once more of Russian attacks, and declare that Russian hatred cannot be soothed by any kindnesses whatever. It is, however, towards France that his conduct is most remarkable. Alleging that the French foment discontent in Alsace-Lorraine, and keep up the idea that the State may again cease to be German, he has sanctioned passport regulations which almost prohibit Frenchmen from entering their old provinces. Not only must they carry passports vis(2s at the German Embassy in Paris, but, under pretence of submitting the names to the Government of Strasburg for personal inquiry, the passports are detained for twelve days. A resident in Nancy, therefore, having business to do in Lorraine, only a few miles off, has to procure a passport, to send it to Paris, to wait for it twelve days, and to receive it back, a process which in all will occupy at least three weeks. Moreover, when he has obtained his visa, and enters Alsace-Lorraine, he must, if his visit lasts more than twenty-four hours, obtain a separate permission of residence, which is by no means granted as a matter of course, and which must be renewed every two months. The old passport system of the Continent was irritating enough, but it never entailed such delays as these, which seem to be specially directed against business men. They are absolutely useless as against spies, for the French Foreign Office, if it needed spies or agents in its old provinces, would find them among the Alsatians in Paris, who, of course, as German subjects, have no need of pass- ports, and can return home at will. It would be simpler to prohibit intercourse altogether, as the Chinese did ; and, indeed, Prince Bismarck contemplates that possibility, for in the North German Gazette of May 29th, after declaring that the consolidation of the re-acquired State is prevented by the French incitements to a war of revenge, and that German lives are not safe in France, he uses this extraordinary expression :— " The fact that Germany's moderation and caution have had no good results causes no warlike feeling in the country, but nevertheless it is desirable that the intercourse between the two nations should be restricted. It will, therefore, not be regretied if France, by taking counter- measures, keeps Germans from visiting France, as dan- gerous international frictions will thus as far as possible be avoided." Nothing like the idea contained in those sentences has been heard of in Europe since Napoleon's "Continental Policy" broke down, nothing so penetrated either with alarm or hate. It comes to this, that in the Chancellor's opinion, nothing can keep the two nations from each other's throats except a system of non-inter- course, which, if it were only decently logical, would include an immediate withdrawal of the Embassies from each other's capitals. What can be the meaning of such a policy, which must irritate not only France, but the people of Alsace-Lorraine, whose most important business interests are thus roughly interfered with ?
The explanation offered by the Paris correspondent of the Times, that Prince Bismarck has to ask for money for a new rifle and for gunpowder of a higher explosive power, and is getting up a scare in order that Parliament may vote the grants, strikes us as singularly far-fetched. Rifles do not cost all that, and if they did, when did the German Parliament ever refuse any sum demanded for military equipments ? It may have been necessary to get up a scare when asking for more men, for to call out mature citizens who had hoped to have done with barracks disorganises society ; but an Empire without a debt can buy weapons without being tricked into the necessary expenditure. The new rifle, moreover, even if it is adopted, cannot be ready for three years, the machinery for making it not being yet set up ; and Prince Bismarck is certainly not looking forward to a war to be commenced at the expiration of three years. There must be a graver and more pressing reason than this, and only two occur to us which offer at all an adequate explanation. One is that Prince Bismarck is trying to provoke the French into some action that even the Emperor Frederick could not pass over, in order that the war which he thinks inevitable may come quickly and while he is in the full vigour of his powers. That, however, is not probable. The illness of the Emperor will hamper Germany even in war-time--at least, so long as all supreme orders must come from him—and if the Prince had meant provocation, he would have taken very different steps. The passport regulations are extremely annoying and injurious to trade, but there is nothing in them which affects either the honour or the pride of France. They may annoy statesmen and worry men of business, but they will not fire the popular heart. They existed in all States once, and France can, if she pleases, employ them to keep Germans out of Paris as a measure of retaliation. The more probable explanation is that the Prince has convinced himself that the present discontent with the Republic is genuine, and that there is real danger of a military dictatorship. As that would mean war, he roughly reminds all Frenchmen by a measure about which there can be no diplomatic discussion, that Germany is watchful, that she is convinced of the hatred of France, and that she is ready to defend herself. He, in fact, without interfering visibly with the prospect of a dictator- ship, and so perhaps making it popular, impedes it by showing, as far as he can without openly intervening in the internal politics of France, that it means war. This explanation, moreover, would account for Herr Tisza's needlessly bitter speech to the Hungarian Parliament, and his prophecy of disturbances in Paris, which was followed, it is said, by a prediction, uttered in the lobbies of the House, that war would certainly arrive next year. Without assuming, as the enemies of the great Hungarian did, that he had been requested by Prince Bismarck to say this, we may fairly assume that it would not have been said with- out the Chancellor's approbation. If that is the case, a revolution in Paris is expected at Berlin, and as its con- sequence—war. Even this explanation, however, leaves it doubtful why the German Government should have hampered its own trade, or subjected its Alsatian subjects to endless annoyance, without gaining for itself the smallest advantage. The French Government will know what is going on in Alsace, whether its agents carry passports or no; and as to incitements to rebel, it would be better to prohibit one Paris newspaper than a thousand commis-voyageurs. The one thing, however, which a Continental ruler, however able, can never learn, is the utility of letting things alone. He must, if he wants trade, make trade regulations ; and if he wants quiet, send policemen to shout until it is secured.
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