THE DECLARATION OF PARIS OF l856.*
"A. HISTORY of the surrender of the maritime rights of Great Britain by the Declaration of Paris and an argument for their resumption by a repudiation of that Declaration" is the sub_ title of this volume. Mr. Bowles has always maintained a keen interest in questions of international law, and his opinions on this particular matter have often been heard in the House of Commons. The present work is an able and ingenious defence of an attitude which is becoming more common among specialists in maritime warfare. It may be said at once that a large part of the argument is irrefutable. Mr. Bowles gives an excellent sketch of the history of the international law on the point, prior to the Declaration, and he proves conclusively that the Declaration was obtained by Lord Cowley and Lord Clarendon in an unauthorised and informal way. It contained four provisos, two of which are commonplaces of international law and have never been seriously questioned, and two—one abolishing privateer- ing and one declaring that a, free flag made free goods except contraband of war—which are the object of Mr. Bowles's attack. America refused to sign the Declara- tion, and Russia refused to subscribe to the no-privateering clause, in spite of the condition made by Great Britain that the signatory Powers should subscribe to the whole. In the later chapters Mr. Bowles analyses the position of the United States with great clearness and justice. The United States refused to be a party to a Convention whereby she would be precluded from resorting to her merchant marine for privateer- ing purposes if she became a belligerent. But the recognition of the rights of neutrals for which she had always contended was effected by the Declaration, and so she reaped the fruit without-accepting the burden. In the event of a European war it seems clear that the greater part of our carrying trade would be transferred to American bottoms. And trade, when once alienated, has often an ugly trick of not returning; and, In any CaSe, a bond-fide transfer of merchant vessels might take place which would seriously weaken British shipping. In the four years of the American Civil War seven hun- dred and fifteen United States vessels were transferred to the British flag, which made Adams write : "The United States commerce is vanishing from the face of the ocean." Mr. Bowles also quotes a formidable array of opinions against the Declaration—e.g., Bismarck's "We must see how we are to get rid of this rubbish "—and he points out that if we are to withdraw, which could be done by a diplomatic Note to the signatory Powers, the withdrawal to be honourable must take place in time of peace. His general propositions, again, on the value of the capture of property in war, and the import- ance of insuring our carrying trade under all circumstances, seem to us sound and indisputable.
With the second of his two criticisms we are, on the whole, inclined to agree. To insist upon the neutrality of enemy's goods carried in neutral bottoms may not un- reasonably be represented as to disdain the most cardinal lesson of our naval history, and at the same time to shut the
• The Declaration of Pans of ISSO. By Thomas Gibson Bowles, MX, London : Sampson Low, Marston, a lid Cu. [103. Ed.)
door upon what is the speediest and most merciful method of warfare. "The object of war," says Mr. Bowles, "is not to depopulate a nation, but to reduce its Government to sub- mission, and no victories in the field are of any avail except in so far as they tend to bring about this result." And besides being a most effective method of warfare, it is the most judicial and dispassionate. The captor must take the vessel and her cargo into port for trial and judgment by the Prize Court, with the certainty, if he has made a mistake, of having to pay costs and damages. "The capture and confiscation," he says, "of property at sea is the one operation of warfare which is subject to calm, unimpassioned judicial decision before the act itself is completed." And the capture of private property means prize-money for the men, which Lord Dundonald thought the leading motive which a seaman had in fighting. But Mr. Bowles is an intemperate arguer, and often spoils a good case by overstatement. For one thing, he seems to exaggerate the famine in France during the Napoleonic wars, which was in the main a famine of luxuries ; and again, grant- ing that France is now largely fed from abroad, supposing that some day we have to face a European combination, what is to hinder her from importing food-stuffs overland from Eastern Europe ? We may be sure that in any alliance such a contingency would be considered. But Mr. Bowles ie prone to another fault besides intemperance in argument. He seems to lack a sense of historical perspective, and to be unaware of changed conditions. The first of his criticisms is a case in
point. He advocates what is practically a return to the old sys- tem of privateering by letters of marque. With all that he says
about the respectability and legality of privateering we agree.
He points out that a privateer was, equally with vessels of the State Navy, subject to State regulations, and for the observance of such rules it was usual to ask that a sum of money should be deposited as security. Again, all that a privateer could do was to bring property into port to be adjudicated on, and unless it was declared lawful prize, he acquired no claim to it, and might possibly have to pay heavy damages. But in war- fare under modern conditions the only effective privateers would be vessels of first-class speed and equipment. The ordinary merchant vessel would now be useless for any serious purpose, and the swift liner would alone be possible. The system by which the Government has a right to utilise such liners in case of war as part of the Navy seems to us the modern equivalent of privateering, which the Declaration of Paris can never touch. , But what is perhaps the most unsatisfactory thing of all
in regard to the Declaration of Paris is its partiality and a
uncertainty. As things stand we ourselves are bound, but we are not certain that other Powers are, for in international law universal acceptance is the only approach to sanction. Why, then, should not our Government give formal notice to the Powers that we withdraw from the Declaration of Paris, but at the same time invite the Powers to a conference in order, if possible, to arrive at a universal agreement as to the question of neutral rights ?
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