2 JUNE 1928, Page 4

Jugoslavia and Italy -

IT seems to be almost impossible for the Belgrade -I- Government to produce a calm in the relations of Jugoslavia with Italy, and the whole story of repeated failures is a perfect illustration of the fact that even a simple political object is unattainable if a Government has to deal at home with discordant groups which persis- tently prefer the lesser to the greater cause. The way to settle relations with Italy is simple, because it is obvious that Jugoslavia has kept Italy waiting too long for the ratification of the Nettuno Conventions. It would be easy enough to remove that grievance by ratifying the Conventions without further delay ; but although M. Marinkovitch, the Jugoslavian Minister for Foreign Affairs, sees this plainly enough, the Croats and Dal- matians instantly set to work to make his position impossible directly he proposes ratification. They place their own cause—that of never making any concession to their Italian fellow-citizens or neighbours—above the cause of that general national security which could ,be achieved and would certainly turn the jog-trot of Jugo- slavia towards prosperity into an exhilarating canter.

To understand what is happening now it is necessary to look back to 1925. In July of that year the represen- tatives of Italy and Jugoslavia signed certain Conventions at islettuno which solved various matters in bitter dispute. Parents were to be allowed to choose schools for their children, the methods of land expropriation were to be determined and the enrolment of labour was to be regu- lated. Italy quickly ratified the Conventions, but Jugo- slavia held back. If the Belgrade Government had then signed a series .of regulatiOns' which are mostly economic, and would conveniently have reduced chaotic conditions to something like order, the relations of Jugoslavia with Italy would haVe been much better thin they are noW. Italy's Comment on the refusal of Jugoslavia was to tighten her connexion with Albania. She negotiated the Treaty of Tirana, and Jugoslavia was thrown into a paroxysm of excitement at the spectacle of her powerful neighbour establishing what amounted to a Protectorate over the "country which Jugoslavia had herSelf tried to cultivate as a collaborator and sympathizer. In Noveni- ber of last rear Fiance did what she could to restore confidence in Jugoslavia by concluding a Treaty with her. This Treaty might have served, as it was intended to do, to smooth jangled nerves, but the Jugoslays, unfortun- ately, jumped from the extreme of depression to the extreme of exultation and waved the Treaty in Italy's face. Signor Mussolini had then a fresh comment to Make. He announced a further Treaty between Italy and Albania, which was produced so quickly that it could hardly have been negotiated intentionally as a response to the Franco-Jugoslav Treaty, but may, nevertheless, have been ratified in a hurry for that very purpose.

Matters remained dormant, but unsatisfactory, till the end of last week, when M. Marinkoviteh unexpectedly declared 'that the Jugoslav GovernMent would ratify the Nettuno Conventions after all. The Government's majority would apparently enable it to do thii. But mark what happened. M. Raditch and M. Pribitchevitch immediately rushed off to their constituencies to stir up Croatian and Dalmatian resentment. The Balkan 'cor- respondent of the Times in a most interesting message analyses the arguments on both sides. He says that though everybody had taken it for granted that the Con- ventions would be ratified some day, the objectors hold that. M. Marinkoviteh ought to have used them as a lever to-obtain guarantee§ against further- Italian penetration in Albania. They think that the whole question could have been reopened, to the advantage of Jugoslavia, and they describe N. Marinkovitch's straightforward device of ratifying what was already signed as a " humiliating surrender." They think that to extract no guarantee from Italy is weakly to submit to the alleged Italian policy of isolating Jugoslavia. All this shows that they are blind to the fact that Italy has been. given pretexts for an anti-Jugoslavian policy which should have been most carefully kept out of her hands. They unfailingly confuse cause and effect. Our own sympathies are largely with the Jugoslays, and always have been, but it is exasperating for their friends to see them dashing the cup from their own, lips...

M. Raditch is an incalculable and dangerous politician. When his name first became well known here he was a Republican revolutionary ; in his next phase he was a Monarchist exhibiting all the proverbial enthusiast of a convert. He joined the laSt Government of M. Pashitch, and never lost an opportunity of attacking the Conven- tions and Italy as the guileful author of thein. His invariable theme was that the clauses designed to make life tolerable for the Italians and residents' in Dalmatia were a threat to the Croats. Although he soon left the Government he has, been quite as successful as a private member as he ever was as a Cabinet Minister in making the Nettuno way of settlement impracticable. A trail of violent riots and anti-Italian demonstrations has followed the provocative speech-making of. M. Raditch and M. Pribitchevitch. . They, know the trick of this sort of thing only too well. The old incantations always stir up the racial broth :— " Double, double, toil and trouble, Fire burn and cauldron bubble."

As for the motives of M. Marinkovitch, it is said that what weighed with him most strongly in his determination to ratify the Conventions was his wish to satisfy the British bankers, who will not grant a loan to Jugoslavia until there is a fair chance of peace on the Adriatic littoral. Another motive was his desire to enter the orbit of the non-aggression pact between Italy, Greece and Turkey. Surely these are sane arguments. The loan is badly needed, and the bankers are right to hold off till the interest of their money seems to be as safe as pos- sible. So again in the case of the alleged Italian bullying of Jugoslavia—would it not be better for Jugoslavia to turn gamekeeper instead of being, continually accused by Italy, even though unjustly, of acting as a poacher in Albania ?

To sum the whole matter up, it is useless for Jugoslavia to bewail her dangerous and detached position so long 'as she gives Italy- excuses for putting into operation against: her an isolating policy. It is at least' satisfactory to know that the Belgrade Government sees the truth, and' we sincerely hope that it will be strong enough, in spite of M Raditch, to ratify and enforce the Nettuno Conven- tions, which; so far as we can judge, are an epitome of social toleranee and economic good sense.