1 JUNE 1944, Page 18

The Red Army

The Russian Army. By Walter Kerr. (Gollancz. 7s. 6d.)

MR. KERR in this book satisfies a good deal of our natural curiosity about the Red Army. The best part of his book consists of the impressions he formed of the Russian soldier and of the Russian military organisation while he was acting as the Moscow cor- respondent of the New York Herald Tribune. He is a shrewd and. sensible observer, and puts down what he has seen in clear and readable prose. What is the Russian soldier like? Mr. Kerr answers that question first by describing the making of a young friend of his, Gregor, into a soldier. We are told of the hardness of the training, the lowness of the pay and the stiffness of the discipline: Gregor as a recruit was paid only 10.40 roubles a month. .When he became a corporal his pay was raiseji to 13o roubles a month, for he was now on the way to becoming a skilled worker in his new trade. The rigidity of the Red Army's discipline is like that of our Brigade of Guards ; "officers and men were forbidden to appear in theatres, cinemas or other public places in unpressed uniforms, with unpolished buttons, in felt boots, in felt capes, or burkas as they are called, in fur boots, in padded or padded pants, unshaved or with hair uncombed." American though he is, Mr. Kerr can see. in this iron discipline the realism of the Russians, who refused to compromise with indecision or complacency.

What sort of men are the new Soviet commanders? Mr. Kerr tells us a good deal about the men who hive been promoted to high command since the war began. He met many of them, in- cluding General Malinovsky, but his search for information was handicapped by the strict security regulations. His general picture of the new leaders is that "they are all about five feet seven inches

tall, all of stocky build, all, loyal to Stalin, all polite, all easy-going, authoritative, sometimes curt., always disciplinarians." They are all members of the Party ; Mr. Kerr is emphatic about the impossibility of the senior officers in the army ever turning against the Communist Party.

Why do the Russians use such large numbers of cavalry? Mr. Kerr discusses this question in a most interesting chapter. His general conclusion seems to be that the cavalry are really mounted infantry. Their horses are there to give mobility, but the troops go into action dismounted. There is evidently, however, considerable difference of opinion within the Red Army as to the value of cavalry. Many of the generals, including Zhukov himself, had been brought up in the cavalry tradition and favour the horse for sentimental reasons, but Malinovsky said quite bluntly that the horse could not compete with the motor ; " if we had more trucks we would have used less cavalry."

What is the truth about the political commissars? Mr. Kerr sets out concisely the history of their office down to its abolition in October, 1942. The commissar's principal duty had been to ensure strict fidelity in the army to the Stalinist line. The office was abolished as a result of the first war against Finland, for the initial failure in which the commissars were, probably rightly, blamed, but revived again to watch over morale in the vastly expanded army that was mobilised to meet the German. invasion. Now the corn-

• missars have become rather political education officers, although many of the best of them have been transferred to the operational command of troops. That is how Mr. Kerr answers some of the more obvious questions about the Red Army. The answers to many more can be found in his book, which everyone interested in the Russian Army—and who is not?—should read.

S. H. F. JOHNSTON.