2 MAY 1857, Page 12

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

A CO1JE.SE OF ACTION FOR THE NEW HOUSE.

IF our representative institutions are on trial, so are the individual representatives, the Members of the present House of Commons. How far the present House is formed of good or bad materials we shall soon see : if the Members really know their own powers and opportunity, they will be able not only to show strength sufficient to reestablish a dominant power in the country, but to recover both the authority and credit of the House to which they belong. At the worst, they can scarcely be frightened by a device which was all-powerful with the late House. If they press hard on Ministerial apathy, reluctance, or weakness, they will be told that "Her Majesty's Government must be carried on," and they will be threatened with a subversion of our executive institutions if they press some unwelcome truth upon the Treasury-bench. Her Majesty's Government always is carried on. On one occasion, not a hundred years back, there was some little difficulty in the "carrying on," but how? Through the division of parties in the House of Commons, there was no one which possessed an absolute majority ; the consequence was that, by analogy of a common rule, the right to form an Administration devolved upon the largest of the minorities which held together, the minority of which Lord Derby was the leader. It happened, unluckily, that the most prominent men in that minority were, with some few exceptions, not well suited to executive offices ; that the party, as a body, had committed itself to persevere in a policy which was completely out of date ; and that therefore, acting with feeble instruments, it was pledged to an impossible course, which the majority of the House would unite to obstruct. In order to prevent the business of the departments from being carried on independently of the House of Commons or in despite of that power, it became requisite that the several sections of the more Liberal parties should unite : and what was the result? The several sections of those parties, "waiving minor differences," did unite. They made that concession, however, in a manner which was to a great extent onesided. So little recipocrity was shown, that those in the new Government who were most devoted to official interests succeeded in carrying their own views on political topics; and such statesmen as most approximated to the Radical party notably Lord John Russell, were set aside, while the most departmental of all the statesmen, Lord Palmerston, assumed the conduct of affairs. The incidents of the war favoured the Executive in putting off the ordinary amount of Parliamentary interference. The interregnum, however, is now over; the pleas by which it was protracted cannot be renewed during peace; and with political interests revived, it is impossible that Parliamentary questions should be suspended by the old cry ; for unless the new House of Commons is to place itself in a rank infinitely below the last, it will cease to be controlled by a threat which may be called leading the House of Commons on the" Old Bogy" principle. Of course her Majesty's Government will be carried on. There never was any real apprehension on that head. The true nature of the apprehension was this. If certain conditions were to cease, we might find it difficult to king together, in the responsibility and irksome labours of office, gentlemen of a particular rank and standing in the country. What then ? Certain social and political consequences might ensue from the difficulty of continuing the series of super-genteel Cabinets ; but we are not quite sure that the interruption would amount to a revolution. At all events, we do not recognize the formation of Cabinets " Dei gratia." If Governments can no longer be formed by gentlemen of that stamp, it must be because gentlemen of a particular rank and standing suitable in principles for the actual day are not forthcoming ; and the fault will lie -with that class, not with the country at large or with the House of Commons. We do not incline, however, to any fear of that kind. If the offices be vacant, the candidates will always be sufficiently numerous, and the choice equal to the best that the country can command. Casting aside, then, any fear of the Old Bogy to which gentlemen on the Treasury-bench sometimes allude, we may tae our stand upon a very practical and homely principle, namely, that no Government professing to be formed of leaders of the Liberal party has any right to render its own existence incompatible with the progress of Reform. One season may be better than another for a Parliamentary Reform Bill—the date is always a matter of fair question ; but unless the Liberal party is content with the actual state of our Parliamentary arrangements,—which it evidently is not,—a Reform Bill must be impending : a sincere Reformer must always be anxious to effect the work as soon as possible ; the Ministry which represents the Reform party would most especially be anxious to get forward with the work, and to disarm popular agitation by putting the cause of the agitation out of the way. In a negative sense, even the present Government acknowledges the duty; for it professes to be ready to give what it shall be made to give. Its wishes do not go with Reform, but it disclaims being incompatible with Reform if the Liberal party has made up its mind on the subject.

The question of Reform, therefore, in any of it branches, is not a Ministerial but a Parliamentary question. We have to ascertain certain matters of fact,—how far are the present Members of the House of Commons sincere in their Liberal professiona ; how far are they competent to fulfil their pledges ; how far are they in harmony with the country at large ? If the House of Commons really represents the British public, there can be no doubt of the practical results which it will attain with the least possible delay. No doubt, they labour under one very comprehensive difficulty, in the fact that Members of the House of Commons are not, generally speaking, well grounded in the practical details of the subjects brought before them. Take, for example, the important class of questions relating to improvement in the law: there are many lawyers, and luckily lawyers are the leaders in Law-reform ; but the lay Members scarcely understand the subject so clearly as to lend their support with intelligence and resolution ; the lay Members therefore can easily be used as • a drag upon the professional Law-reformers and those who stand by them.

Still there are some subjects which are so perfectly matters of fact that they can be understood without going into technical

details. Of such a class is reform of the Army : it is not neces sary to understand even the manual exercise, still less platoon firing, evolutions, or eastrametation, in order to decide upon the general merits of a plan for improving the organization of the Army. A competent knowledge of history, a sympathy with general English feeling, information as to the state of preparedness in foreign countries, are sufficient data for judging of any wellconsidered scheme that may be laid before the body of the English Representatives. Again, it is the duty of the House of Commons not to supply the Executive with money unless it knows what the Executive is doing especially in matters that concern trade, peace, and ex penditure. To know, therefore, what the Executive is doing in the relations with Foreign Governments, is an essential duty of the House of Commons. " Her Majesty's Government must be

carried on," but it is the business of the House of Commons to know how it is carried on with reference to the interests of the

people represented by the Members. Should the Ministry be contumacious, the very motion to appoint a "Select Committee on Foreign Affairs" would bring the whole matter to an issue. There are some subjects upon which the House of Commons is capable of deciding independently of the Executive, and in fact of issuing its instructions to the Executive. It is quite a modern innovation to wait upon the central Government for the initiative in all practical matters, and in certain things in which the Exe cutive is the last to feel the real impulse of public requirements. Let us take a very humble example. This great metropolis at the present moment is labouring under the most serious disorders in the conduct of its building-improvements, the distribution of its traffic, the rearrangement of its streets, the completion of its drainage, and even the supply of healthy water. Everybody ad mits the crying necessity ; there is plenty of money to be had ; the general characteristics of every improvement are plain: yet all is hindered because powers sufficient are not given to the mu nicipal representatives of the residents ; and the central Execu tive, which jealously retains the chief power in its own hands, will not undertake the responsibility of stirring in it. Downing Street, in fact, is above the business of the Board of Works, and yet it will not issue its licence for the Board of Works to go on with its own business. But the Metropolis is not entirely depend ent upon the municipal representation, which is half-given and half-denied. It already has its organs in the House of Commons. Taking Middlesex along with the two cities and the Metropolitan boroughs, the whole Metropolis may be said to command a force of twenty Members in the House of Commons. There is a great agency which the Metropolis possesses in the Representative Chamber. No reason exists why, upon Metropolitan affairs, those twenty Members should not act together—should not act for the local interests of their constituents. The fault is in the constituencies if the Mem bers are laggard at their duty, or betray it to curry favour with the Executive ; and if the twenty Members could be brought to act together, London would not be slow to attain every advantage that could be attained by a constituted municipality for the whole metropolis. Twenty such Members, acting together with resolute decision, could dictate to the central Executive.

We will take another and a humble section of that class of measures which pass under the name of Parliamentary "Reform." There is one matter upon which public opinion appears to have made its conclusion,—that is, while a large part of the public positively incline to the Ballot, the opponents are growing feebler in their denial. It is said that there is a definite number of Members pledged to the measure : now are they sincere ? If they honestly mean to carry out their pledges, they will of course act together in asserting and enforcing their demand ; and if they are sincere they can succeed. Besides those who are distinctly pledged, several other Members in the House of Commons are wavering, and are prepared either to relinquish their opposition or to transfer their votes. The first point to be ascertained is, how far those new Members honestly intend to carry out their pledges ; and we do not know any man who could better muster them for that purpose than Mr. Berkeley. If he find them loyal and firm in their purpose, most unquestionably they can dictate the Ballot to the present Government and the present Parliament.

If the House of Commons were thus to exercise a recovered power, it would soon find other ways in which it could use that power; it would regain the confidence of the constituencies and of the country at large ; the specific details of a new Reform Bill would not be long without distinct utterance ; and a distinctly-claimed Reform Bill, supported by a House of Commons conscious of recovered power, could not be put back by any cry that "Her Majesty's Government must be carried on."