MOSCOW EXCUSES
OF the four participants in the Moscow Conference, Mr. Marshall alone has so far given a considered verdict on the proceedings, though Mr. Sevin has promised the House of Commons an account of his activities at an early date. The Secretary of State's survey was comprehensive and illuminating, though marked, like a short statement by Mr. Bevin at Moscow, by an approach to optimism for which there is no visible basis. To claim as an advance the fact that " critical differences were for the first time brought into the light and now stand clearly defined, so that future negotiations can start with the knowledge of exactly what the issues are that must be settled," is plain nonsense. So far from this happening for the first time, it has been protested again and again after each abortive conference that,-tven if nothing has been achieved, " at least the positions have been defined." They have. They were defined again at Moscow, and very depressing the definition is. It is to be hoped that Mr. Bevin will attempt no such palliation of failure. In the course of the Conference itself he observed sharply that the par- ticipants had been talking for weeks and settled nothing. That is still true. They talked for seven weeks, and at the end had settled nothing worth recording. Decisions which it was impera- tive to take were not taken. Differences which it was essential to bridge remained unbridged. The best hope of some future suc- cess lies, not in the hollow pretence that this was not really failure, but in admitting frankly that it was, diagnosing the causes and searching ceaselessly for some new road to agreement next time. It is not too soon to begin that process now.
No very searching diagnosis, indeed, is needed. There is nothing very subtle about M. Molotov's technique and rarely any room for doubting what he is driving at. His concern is with interests of Russia herself and her satellites. Mr. Bevin and Mr. Marshall can justly claim that theirs is with the interests of Europe, and, so far as Europe's interests may require it, with the interests of Germany. Yugoslavia seeks reparations from Austria and the annexation of Austrian territory. Despite the fact that it had been decided at Yalta that Austria should pay no reparations, M. Molotov, as a matter of course, supports his protégé. Poland protests vociferously, in the face of proposals by Britain and America, that her western frontiers, on the Oder and Niesse, are irrevocably fixed for all time. M. Molotov, as a matter of course, supports his protégé. Russia having, in her own interests real or supposed, ignored consistently the article in the Potsdam Agree- ment which stipulated that Germany should be treated as a single economic unit, and exploited her eastern area for her own benefit regardless of the interests of the rest of Germany, demanded at Moscow that Four-Power; control of the Ruhr should be estab- lished, and that meanwhile coal from the Ruhr should be sent her as reparations. At the'same time, as so often before, M. Molotov denounced the economic fusion of the•British and American zones, as making for the break-up of Germany. Mr. Bevin's comment on the policy whereby one Government made a monopoly of its own zone while trying to get a hand in the affairs of other zones would not have been excessive if he lad framed it in language much less moderate.
In all this the causes of the failure of the Moscow Conference stand out plain as pikestaffs. To state them is not to condemn Russia. She has her own ideas and her own points of view, and has a right to them. If we hold the view that she caused the breakdown of the Conference through consistently opposing the three other Powers, she is entitled to contend that what was wrong was that the other three consistently opposed her. What vitiates the argument is that, as has been said, Russia was playing through- out for her own hand or her satellites', while the British and American Ministers were constantly manifesting their concern for the larger interests of Europe. With that Russia makes no pre- tence of identifying herself. Even as an occupying Power in Germany she creates the maximum of isolation. One of the most serious difficulties at Moscow, according to Mr. Marshall, was " the fact that the Soviet-occupied zone has operated practically with no regard to other zones, and has made few, if any, reports of what has been occurring in that zone." Where co-operation is all but indispensable, both inside and outside Germany, co-opera- tion is regularly withheld. The motives behind all this can only be surmised in part. That Russia had no desire for the Moscow Conference to succeed is plain. The difficulties she made about an extension of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and the conclusion of the Four-Power Treaty of guarantee against Germany, proposed first by Mr. Byrnes and now again by Mr. Marshall, can be explained on no other assumption. Russia, manifestly, is in no hurry. Her interest in delay can, again, be matter only for speculation. It may conceivably be, as is sometimes suggested, the idea that failure may discredit Mr. Bevin and Mr. Marshall in their own countries. It may be the vain hope that both of them will give way rather than argue for ever. It may be that the Russians are anxious to temporise till they possess atomic bombs—not, of course, from any desire to use, or even threaten to use, them, but on the theory that a negotiator who has not such a weapon is at a disadvantage with a negotiator who has.
However that may be, Britain and America have no alternative but to go on as best they can without Russia. This month the new European Economic Commission meets at Geneva— with Russia absent. In Germany the British and American zones will be administered as one economic unit, in as close co-operation as possible with the French zone and virtually none at all with the Russian. That work must go forward unimpeded ; Russia's asso- ciation with it will always be welcomed, but Russian non- co-operation cannot be allowed to become a Russian veto. For- tunately, there is substantial agreement between Britain and America on the methods to be pursued, though a number of minor differences hinder effective action. Both are opposed to the Russian conception of a strong Central Government for all Germany (on the ground that it could too easily be converted into an autocratic and aggressive instrument), and both favour giving the maximum power consistent with practical considerations to the Lander, or States.
That policy will be followed, and is being so far as it can be in the British and American zones, but the absence there of a central authority is being increasingly felt. The enjoyment of large powers by the several Lander may lead to division and contention in economic matters, where full co-operation over the whole of the two zones is essential. Britain and America do not intend to turn the economic fusion of their two zones into political fusion, in the form of a Western German State ; General Robertson made that clear, if it needed to be made clear, on Tuesday. But every obstacle to full and effective economic fusion must be removed, resolutely. Meanwhile, in the larger field, we must continue to live on hope. Two committees are once more at work on Austria's destiny. Nothing at Moscow was more disappointing than the failure to make any progress towards the conclusion of an Austrian treaty—the result of Russia's obdurate support of Yugo- slavia's untenable claims at Austria's expense and her own untenable reparation claims, also at Austria's expense. However, Mr. Marshall reports that Generalissimo Stalin believes compromise to be pos- sible on all main questions. The Moscow discussions hardly suggest that. But if it be so; and compromise does not mean jettisoning principles, the Ministers can begin to prepare for the next round.
Previous page
