ENIGMA IN FRANCE
By ANTHONY NUTTING, M.P.
WILL de Gaulle succeed? Although a recent visit to Paris has helped me to understand some features of the French political situation, I am still little nearer than before to an answer to this question. Certainly there is much to be said both for and against the possibility of a Gaullist revival. As the Figaro put it the other day in an article that threw a much-needed light on the political scene, one can readily understand the desire for a strong Government after the events of 1946. France has, it seems, never fully recovered from the moral hangover that followed General de Gaulle's spectacular resignation in January last year. Deprived suddenly of the man whom the years of occupation had caused it to deify, the man who, since the liberation had been not only the head of the Government but also head of the State, the country found itself overnight " abandbnne a lui-meme " without a leader and without a stable constitution. The next moment it was plunged into a series of parliamentary elections and plebiscites, the outcome of which has been a party system and a constitution, which have never functioned satisfactorily and are unlikely ever to do so. Can it be wondered at, therefore, that a movement having as its head a national figure of de Gaulle's supremacy, and as its battle-cry " Unity above Party " should make a considerable appeal?
It is perhaps difficult for us to understand the full extent of the paralysis which results from the party system in France today. For one thing, that system is infinitely more rigid than in this country. In former times—and particularly before 1914—the French deputy depended for his re-election on his electors. Hence he cast his vote primarily in the interests of his constituents and only secondarily in those of his party. Now, however, with the system of electoral lists, the deputy depends for his re-election on the party putting his name on their list. His first thought must, therefore, now be to seek and hold on to the favour of the party bosses by always voting with them whatever the circumstances. This, in itself, makes agreement by
compromise almost impossible. •
But far worse than this is the difficulty of trying to work a coalition of three parties, one of which is diametrically opposed to almost everything which the others wish to do. In foreign policy, in colonial policy and on domestic issues the Communists have shown the bitterest opposition to the views of the Socialists and the M.R.P. Over Indo-China they walked out of the Assembly; over Madagascar they walked out of the Cabinet. "Crise gouvernementale " has once more become almost a regular once-weekly newspaper headline. And the result—a general paralysis of government.
In these conditions one can scarcely wonder that many French- men, especially professional men of the middle-class and young men who fought in the war just ended, should feel profoundly sick of party politics and should want to see the present unworkable system replaced by a government which is above party and which can govern effectively. To this extent, therefore, the tide is favourable to de Gaulle's movement. This is the credit side. But the debit side is no less full of items. And first among these seems to be the General's own political ineptitude. Nowhere is this better demon- strated than in his refusal to commit himself to any specific pro- gramme or plan of campaign. There are those who believe that to shroud the aims of the movement in mystery makes it a more attractive and exciting project and increases the number of adherents. But I find it hard to believe that the logical French mind will in the main react that way. What is more likely is that this haze of mystery, this refusal to divulge plans or methods, will lend weight to attacks and insinuations from the Left designed to show that de Gaulle is in fact waiting for a comp d'etat to be followed by a dictatorship, and that all his talk about government being above party really means government by one party. That this line of attack is scoring points is shown by the fact that moderate circles amongst both the Press and the parties seem somewhat sceptical about the whole project, and somewhat fearful lest, by supporting it, they might create just the very type of regime that it cost them four years of occupation to destroy.
Besides this, de Gaulle's repeated claim that he is not aiming at a new political party does not encourage one to believe that here is something with a definite purpose before it. For it can be of little practical use to rally " all men of good-will " who believe in national unity as a means of altering the present chaotic political situation by constitutional methods, if it is not Mended that the resulting associ- ation should fight as a party at the next General Election. It is no use thinking one can change the present system by wishing it away. So once again the French are left in doubt, while the propaganda of the Communists and Socialists respectively tells them that the General is aiming at a change by non-constitutional means or that the whole thing is a damp squib, a movement without purpose or method.
All this seems to demonstrate as clearly as anything hitherto that complete lack of political dexterity which is peculiar to de Gaulle— a .man. with an idea, but without the method of putting it into effect. What is mere, he scarcely appears to have coadjutors capable of supplying this need. With the possible exception of M. Soustelle, the Secretary-General of the movement, none of them are held in great esteem as politicians. Some of them would even seem to be more of a hindrance than a help. For there is not a little anxiety lest a return of the General to the helm of affairs would bring back certain of his henchmen whose administrative records between 1944 and 1946 were anything but brilliant.
Such are some of the conflicting factors in the scene that now surrounds the enigmatic figure of the man who today still stands in prestige head and shoulders above any of his compatriots. What will the outcome be? Will he stage a coup d'etat? Is he waiting for the Government to go the way of so many of its forebears and resign several times in quick succession? Or is he simply unable to find an effective way to give effect to his ideas of a government above party? While the present mystery surrounds the movement no answers to these questions could be other than the wildest of guesses. Still less can one be certain whether he intends that his movement shall always remain above politics and merely seek to influence the parties in the direction of unity, or whether he means to enter the political arena and join forces with the parties of the Right and Centre against the Socialists and Communists. The latter alternative must certainly depend upon the attitude of the M.R.P., not to mention the Radicals and others. .And at the moment the M.R.P. are steering well clear of any entanglement with de Gaulle's movement. Moreover, it is surely unlikely that M. Bidault, after the sensational rise to popularity of his party in 1946 and after his own recent diplomatic successes, would very readily agree to being the mainstay of a Ring Wing bloc in opposition to the combined forces of the Left. Unless there were a big swing in the voting, the result of such a contest would almost certainly be an overwhelming victory for the Left and the total submergence of the Socialists in the Communist Party. This would truly be the worst of both worlds. Before any such contest could result in a victory by the Centre bloc, de Gaulle must split the Socialists. But at present this does not appear a very likely development.
Such then things stand today. It is a truly French political impasse —a sterile administration hamstrung by party differences, an economic situation in which, though momentarily stabilised, nobody has any confidence, a people grown sick of political bickering and economic disorder. A movement arises, a great name at its head, a great ideal as its watchword. Within a fortnight it claims a million members. Truly are these the conditions which breed dictatorships. Hitler, Napoleons I and III, all owed their rise to this type of political and economic mess. And.one certainly cannot rule out the possi- bility of a dictatorship from either the Left or the Right. But some- how it seems more likely that, perhaps for a year or so, the French situation will follow the pre-war pattern ; the parties will continue to bicker, governments will come and.go, and General de Gaulle's movement, at any rate in its present form, will achieve relatively little.
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