Germans and Rearmament
By ROBERT POWELL
Bonn, April 28th. THE attitude of the average man in the Federal Republic towards the problem of rearming and participation in the European Defence Community has greatly surprised most people abroad, who expected the German to be true to the accepted Prussian type, and to rush to accept the chance of being a soldier once more. That this is not the case is due to a number of understandable reasons, which are based upon the abnormal experiences of this country during the past two gener- ations. The catastrophic defeat in the Second World War has left its effect, not only in ruined cities and empty homes but also in an inner confusion which makes fundamental decisions almost impossible. Germany is now paying for two lost wars in less than forty years. In consequence the German feels that nothing can be more terrible than a lost war. He is not a conscientious objector on moral grounds. He thinks in this fashion: if it came to a third world war, the Western democracies would probably win in the end; but what would happen to Germany in the mean- time ? He assumes that his country would be overrun by the U.S.S.R. and that thousands of Germans would be carried off to forced labour in the East. It is little consolation, he adds, to be assured that after years of untold suffering he or his children would again control the Fatherland.
If there is to be German rearmament, then for what purpose ? Are the Western Powers and their future German allies think- ing in the same terms about the ends to be achieved ? These questions are asked in political circles here, in view of the fear that the inclusion of the Federal Republic in the European Defence Community could mean the end of hopes of settling peacefully the Germans' two major problems today. Will such a development help or hinder the reunification of the Reich and the later return of territories beyond the Oder-Neisse Line ?
Chancellor Adenauer consistently maintains that only through the closest co-operation with the West can such a position of strength be built up that the Soviet Union will agree to negotiate on these issues. Other German politicians— especially the Social Democrats—disagree with this point of view. Often, too, sentiment rather than logic is the decisive factor. In the background is always the fact that the Soviet Zone is predominantly Protestant, and the possibility that Germans may have to fight against Germans. It is also forgotten abroad that among the younger generation of Germans—those between twenty-five and forty years of age—there is a strong antipathy to "things military.' Not only have they already experienced war, but they will probably be called upon again in case of need. They returned from prisoner-of-war camps with a contempt for the General Staff, because of its blind obedience to Hitler, which has not been removed by the writings and speeches of many ex-generals since that time.
There are, of course, exceptions—former high-ranking officers who appreciate the arguments that militarism will rise again, and that it will kill any democracy there may be in this country unless the new military force is reconstructed upon quite different lines. (The fifteen ex-officers who have expressed their opinions in Armee ohne Pathos, for example, appear to have no doubts about the necessity for revQ1utionary changes which would create, for the future, a soldier-citizen army. But it remains to be seen whether such progressive ideas will win through.) The excessive speed with which the last moves towards German rearmament are being completed is also responsible for the hesitant, if not hostile, attitude of the average German. Events are moving far too quickly for him. After having been told for years that he would never again be allowed to carry arms, and with former German generals still imprisoned for war crimes, the German is now informed that only through his being rearmed can European civilisation be saved. He frankly cannot grasp it.
The manner in which the rearming offer was made has had significant repercussions. It was made at the beginning of the Korean War. In the excitement of that time the German was made to see his importance for the West, but not that he him- self belonged to the West so that in helping that civilisation he was helping his own country. In these circumstances the German was prepared to stress his price for such co-operation, especially since the Western Allies continuously emphasised to him the importance of "democracy," "human e etc. This was understandable, but unfortunately it ignored theissues still left unsettled at the end of the war. Within a few weeks the General Treaty to replace the Occupation Statute for the Federal Republic will be initialled. This is to be welcomed. But it remains to be seen whether the atmosphere of haste in which it is being completed will not leave with many Ger- mans the impression that Gleichberechtigung (equal status) mainly means the securing of German rights with as few corres- ponding duties as possible.
An important psychological .factor which must also be mentioned is that the people of the Federal Republic have not been prepared for such a revolutionary change as is involved in rearming. While it is obvious that much of the work of preparation done in committee had to be secret, many opportu- nities of keeping responsible German circles informed of what was going on were not taken. Chancellor Adenauer (he is also Foreign Minister) has too often played a lone hand where closer co-operation with his Cabinet would have been advan- tageous (His recent retreat on the Saar question is due as much to the opposition in his Cabinet as to what Paris had to say in the matter.) • The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag has also complained for months that it was never told essential facts nor given authoritative interpretations of developments at the moment when it could have a decisive influence on discussions between the Chancellor and the Western Powers.
With the Social Democratic Opposition the situation has been much worse. Instead of a common platform being adopted in foreign policy, there have been continuous bickerings between the Chancellor and Dr. Kurt Schumacher, which have only con- founded the public. Whether one approves or disapproves of Schumacher's viewpoint, there is little doubt that any observer here who takes the trouble to investigate German opinion for himself knows that Schumacher has been nearer to the majority of Germans in this rearming issue than has been the Chancellor.
Even today it is doubtful whether Dr. Adenauer could get much more than a simple majority in the Bundestag for the ratification of a treaty of rearmament and membership in the E.D.C.—irithout large concessions in other fields by the Occu- pying Powers. The S.P.D. knows this, and challenges him either to hold new federal elections on this issue or at least to make such ratification subject to a two-thirds majority such as is demanded for any change in the constitution. Whether the fact that, following last week's developments in the South-West State, the Coalition parties have lost control of the Bundesrat (Senate) will bring any changes remains to be seen.
It should be said in conclusion that, generally speaking. German objections to rearming are mainly psychological, that they are not traceable to resentment against the Occupation, nor to pacifism of a moral kind, but to a fear that rearming means that West Germany may again suffer the hardships of occupa- tion by the U.S.S.R. during the early stages of a war, and to doubts as to whether rearming will enable Germans to bring about a reunification of Germany and to regain territories now occupied by Poland. But that is another chapter in European history.
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