Philosophical Imagination
Dominations and Powers. By George Santayana. (Constable. 425.) HUMAN beings, who are otherwise quite used to doing two things at once (talking and drinking ; travelling and enjoying the view), when they turn to reading are apt to demand something which engages them in a single activity. And when a book invites us to turn its pages and enjoy its separate scenes, and at the same time gives hints of a firm structure which encourages close study, we are apt to be suspicious. But when delight and instruction are both at a high level and avoid the suggestion that the union is synthetic, we are Sometimes prepared to accept them together. This, I think, should be our attitude to Dominations and Powers, which is a book of this elusive and provoking sort. The casual reader, then, may turn its pages and find in them a collection of essays. Each of these hundred chapters is a finished example of the imaginative subtlety of thought and expression which we have long ago learnt to expect from Santayana. His manner has always been to explore images rather than analyse concepts; to meditate rather than argue. And there is so much individuality about the performance that it must be counted an achievement to have escaped all these years the nemesis of writing a parody of himself. His themes here are the varieties of human behaviour, the ambivalence of human enterprise, the hindrances and servitudes we sniffer, the " false defiances of fate " and illusory escapes, and the freedom we at once enjoy, and seek. In this reading we shall observe also his loves and hates, his prejudices and predilections. Life is neither a journey nor a feast, but a predicament and a dream, to be meditated upon with- a com- bination of sympathy and ironic detachment. In his earliest writings Santayana displayed an effortless sagacity which was open to the suspicion of being precocious ; in age the dazzle may be diminished, but the wisdom is still apt and has not grown garrulous. Here he disclaims a creed, a message or the power of prophecy ; his attitude is at bottom aesthetic ; and his sympathy lies with whatever exhibits "harmony and strength, no matter how short-lived." Longevity is a vulgar good, and consequently " the folly of the enthusiast may sometimes be wiser than the wisdom of the world."
But if this manner of reading the book scarcely needs recom- mendation because it will come easily to anyone who opens it and will have its immediate reward, there is something else which must be pointed out lest it escape notice. The book is not, in fact, an anthology of miscellaneous reflections strung together on the thin thread of an arbitrary attitude to the universe. It is an intellectual structure, a vertebrate-and well-considered philosophy. It is true that the articulation is not obtrusive, and it is true also that the title of the book is not a very explicit signpost to the structure ; but not to have detected the articulation is to have missed the proper quality of the book.
Santayana's affinity is neither with Plato nor Hegel, both of whom make their appearance, however (and though Hegel is recognisable he is barely recognised). His affinity is with Spinoza. Indeed, though there is nothing crudely derivative about his thought, to explore its convolutions is like exploring a modernised version of S oza's ethical and political philosophy. The human individual a pears first as " primal Will," and in this appearance his activity is in relation to the world as " natural." To escape from this genera- tive order of activity is impossible ; it is our fate as animals. But in relation to their fellows the activity of human beings bifurcates into militant and rational modes. In the militant order of activity the wilfulness of the will is expressed ; " the source of militancy lies in " the indecision or self-contradiction of animal Will in purl- suing distractedly incompatible goods." In the rational order, on the other hand, activity is animated not by a finished ideal of conduct, but by a harmony of conduct when it is appropriate to its circum- stances. And here, in relation to political activity (which is always generative and may be either militant or rational), there is an echo of Burke—" all sound reforms must be massively generative movements and not thinly militant strains "—and an even more distinct echo of Coleridge.
Writers in this tradition have a habit of bringing the argument up to a certain point and often, to this point, carrying conviction. But if is a point of uncertain equilibrium, and many questions remain unanswered ; the analysis of "-circumstance " and " expedience " is left incomplete. It is disappointing to find Santayana, travelling this route with such acuteness of observation (and so much engaging talk by the way) and breaking off at the familiar point. But of the power and subtlety of the attempt there can be no doubt. Dominations and Powers is an achievement of philosophical imagination such as we have become unaccustomed to in these days of minute dissection.
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT.
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