2 NOVEMBER 1974, Page 6

Political Commentary

Postponing the decision

Patrick Cosgrave

Like many another current affairs programme, on both radio and television The World This Weekend last Sunday devoted some time to a discussion of how long Mr Heath, the most unsuccessful leader of a major party in modern times in Britain, as well as the one who has betrayed most election pledges, would be tolerated by his colleagues as leader of his party. More interestingly — for the seedy self-interest which now characterises Mr Heath's every action can hardly much longer remain a subject of preoccupation to anybody not especially interested in morbid psychology — the programme asked whether the Conservative Party has lost both its will to govern and its confidence in its own capacity to do so. This second question was answered by neither of the two interviewees — Lord Boothby, an ex-Tory, and Mr John Selwyn Gummer, one of Mr Heath's favourite acolytes, who lost his seat at Lewisham in February.

It is a pertinent question, the answer to which can become fully apparent only over the next few months, as the Tories marshal what it would be generous to describe as a pitifully inadequate political armoury in the House of Commons. I will come to tactics in a moment, but a horrifying indication that the fundamental answer to the question may be positive comes from the behaviour of Mr William Whitelaw over the period since the first election defeat of 1974. Now, Mr Whitelaw has demonstrated a truly staggering loyalty to Mr Heath: he is, in my view, too honourable a man to have, as some of his critics suggest, devised his loyalty as a Machiavellian ploy to help him secure the succession. The poor fellow appears, rather, to have been carried away. And he is all too likely to find that Mr Heath will end up as the albatross round his neck in a subsequent leadership struggle.

But regard for a moment his view of matters after the February defeat, And his view now. I remember taking real heart — as I know many Tories did — when Mr Whitelaw, in an emotional speech in his constituency, accepted the verdict of the people in February. However right we were certain we were, so his argument ran, it is the people's business to decide; and if they decided against us we were probably wrong. He did not, of course, say that he and his colleagues and his party were wholly wrong — that would be an unreasonable obeisance to the popular will. But, like the Tories in 1945, he evinced a willingness to sit down and think it all out again.

Not so Mr Whitelaw last Saturday. Then, in the course of renewed pledges of loyalty to Mr Heath, Mr Whitelaw gave it as his view that events would prove the Tories right down to a jot and a tittle. In time, such was his message, a grateful electorate would throw open its arms to receive back the party and the leader who embarked on a suicidal incomes policy, spent non-existent public money with rakehell abandon, and put the nation on a three-day week. Mr Angus Maude used to say wisely of that curious authoritarian streak that runs through the Labour Party, that Socialists would never forgive the British for living in sin with the Tories. Mr Whitelaw, we know, is too generous a man to prepare other than a fatted calf for the people when they come to their senses, but Mr Heath? It is hard indeed to imagine an electorate, two out of three members of which appear to dislike if not ' detest the man, ever giving him a chance to strut the stage once more. (Incidentally, I

would like very much to see Mr Heath show his letters of support as openly to the press as did Sir Keith Joseph. The young functionary, Mr Roger Martin, who told the Daily Mirror of the flood of tear-stained messages of loyalty pouring into Smith Square is a man who once had to be rebuked severely in these pages — when we published all the documents concerned — over a certain failure to discharge his duty in correctly answering an important question on the EEC).

The distressing thing is that the instinct to criticism of self, however shallow it may have been in March, seems altogether dead now. Now the Tory Party has placed itself in an opposition posture which invites, expects, hopes for, a national Armageddon. It is a dangerous position for any opposition to be in; for one twice discredited in one year it could be fatal. It should be remembered, too, that Mr Wilson and his lot are far more cunning nowadays than they were in 1970. They will, if the Prime Minister has anything to do with it, struggle along trying to do a decent job: Mr Benn may attempt the construction of a new Jerusalem, but Mr Wilson is more likely to show himself doing his honest best. Be sure that should the ultimate fatality occur for the Conservatives, and Mr Heath lead them at another election — as, make no mistake about it, he is fully determined to do — Mr Wilson would slaughter him, as surely as he will every Tuesday and Thursday in the House of Commons in the new session. And he would do so principally because the electorate would divine, correctly, that Mr Wilson is a much nicer chap than Mr Heath, while the latter has no compensatory benefit in the form of a serious economic policy.

Not, of course, that Mr Mr Wilson is likely to be unpleasant to Mr Heath — at any rate, not more often than his tongue runs away with him. For he knows that Mr Heath is his single most precious political asset. He must do everything he can to keep Mr Heath in his position until he introduces a referendum bill on the EEC, because Mr Heath is probably the only Tory leader (about Mr Whitelaw in his present mood I am not wholly sure) who would lead or try to lead the Tory party into suicidal opposition to the principle of giving the people a voice in their own future. And Mr Wilson must, of course, hope that, in his next general election campaign, he will again be confronted by the old rival whom he detests. And what, for heaven's sake, is Mr Heath going to offer, day by day, in the new House of Commons? The twin pillars of his election campaign were a national government and a willingness to jettison most of the policies he had so recently adopted. As time goes by the reiterated questions of the campaign — who will serve in your national government? what policies will you drop, or for that matter, keep? — will become more insistent. And there can, in the nature of things, be no answers, for there is no figure of substance outside his own party who would join Mr Heath in a national government; and there is a limit to the number of U turns even he can make.

Mr Gummer, in the radio interview to which I have referred, was, of course, full of praise for Mr Heath. (He was not quite as fulsome as Mr William Elliott MP, an obscure party functionary and creation of Mr Heath whose encomium suggested that the loser possessed a refulgence which would cast an archangel into shadow.) He also observed that there was not so Much need to change policy, because the Tory pa_ No position was far less critical than in 1945. 1•1° greater mistake could be made: the Tory Part); is far worse off than it was on the morrow 0; that defeat. In 1945 it had Churchill; it had Butler; it had a group of probably the most brilliant young men ever assembled by political party to help think out its policies; any it had the immediate encouragement of such a giant as Lord WooIton joining its forces. No'' all is distraction and, though there are clever, young men about, none whom Mr Heath woulc, :invite to join him possess the calibre 01 Macleod, Powell and Maudling. But, the stricken reader may ask, can getting rid of a leader make all that much difference t° so parlous a situation? And, the unhappy Ton' backbencher may add, are any of the others any better? (As it happens I think either of the main challengers possessed of far greater potential.) The answer to both questions is in the affirmative. The Conservative party is far more leader-orientated than either of the other two and a leader who has spent nine Yea,r5 making sure he stays leader has enormous more power and influence in discharging that task than a Liberal or Socialist could even beg° to imagine. To change the leader therefore, offers the possibility of — no, it is the only AO); of — wholly altering the bias and direction ° the machine. To get the Tory party back it anything like recognisably formidable shape 3 change of leader is a sine qua non. As to contenders it is never possible to bF wholly certain about anybody's capax imperil; Lord Avon looked perfect and, though he Wa't often wise in his judgements, he turned 01.1 badly. Baldwin was a complete surprise as choice, and he had almost no experience; yet, ,b; was one of the greatest political leaders of 0 , century. I can recall no time, save when Loru Butler was rejected, that any one of the possible, successors to a Tory leader in peacetime Wad indisputably the pre-eminent man. There nee therefore, be no difficulties about settling eloW'. with a successor and a clean sheet. The consequences of inaction could het terrible. Of course, the Heath men Warn desperately to postpone any decision. some of Mr Heath's enemies would like hir11,:,, stay on, so that his progressive and inevitarn,,, humiliation can deny him a martyr's crota/n.r, large number of backbenchers want time ,we think. None of these arguments really quicker the party shows it still has the abilitY1_,' take action to save itself, the sooner it will be 0_1: the road to recovery. I believe this self-eviden truth will become ever more apparent as tis; new session progresses. If it does not then — Nicholas Wooley may well have been correct asking whether the Conservative Party has 10 its will.