POLITICS
Chancellor Kohl says he wants a flexible Europe. But he does not mean it
BRUCE ANDERSON
he most interesting recent political development has gone largely unnoticed. It has nothing to do with corporal punish- ment, inflicted by or on Mrs Shephard. It has no electoral resonance, though that could change. An apparently technical debate is taking place on Europe, with much purblind stumbling among the small print, but great issues are at stake. The out- come could determine Britain's future rela- tionship with the EU.
With every passing month, it is increas- ingly obvious that nothing was settled at Maastricht, which was only Quatre Bras. Waterloo has still to be fought. The battle of Maastricht did check the federalists' ambitions, while enlargement made their task harder. Institutions devised for a tight little grouping of six nations whose political elites share the same goals cannot cope with a community of 15. Jacques Delors once said that he could run a Europe of 12, but not one of 15 or 16. But enlargement did not lead the federalists to renounce their goals; they merely sought another route.
They have now found one. It is called flexibility. To Anglo-Saxon ears, this sounds encouraging, implying a Europe of variable geometry, with individual states who wish to integrate with one another making bilateral or multilateral arrange- ments without placing any obligation on the others. That is one definition of flexibility, and the very use of the term has alarmed the palaeo-federalists, especially in Brus- sels. Jean-Luc Dehaene has been complain- ing that flexibility would make federalism impossible, thus proving two points. The first is that John Major was right to prevent him from becoming President of the Com- mission; the second, that he does not understand what a devious game the Franco-Germans are playing.
It has been clear for at least a year that the French and Germans intended flexibili- ty to be the big idea at this year's Intergov- ernmental Conference (IGC), and a paper published last week gives an insight into their thinking. Its keynote phrase was `enhanced co-operation': flexibility is a means of achieving that goal. Far from marking the end of the federalists' dreams, it is merely their latest tactic.
The intention is clear: to allow the origi- nal six, plus anyone else who cares to join them, to move towards federalism/political union without being impeded by vetoes from the slower-minded states. Not even Chancellor Kohl believes that a Europe of 15 could federalise as one — let alone a Europe of 20 or 25. The trains to ein Europa will have to travel at different speeds. But there is still only one destina- tion. Herr Kohl would like a Europe in which the inner core controlled the institu- tions of the EU, including the budget. This inner core would, in practice, be signed up to a single currency, and would also arro- gate the right to make decisions on mone- tary policy. These would be binding on any other state which wanted to trade freely with the EU. So the members of the outer core would be confined to a sort of Euro- waiting-room until they felt ready to embark. They would not be allowed any say in the running of the railroad.
This Teutonic version of flexibility is about as flexible as the German sense of humour is funny. The present British Gov- ernment has made its position clear. By `flexibility' it means arrangements which are open to all and agreed by all. Flexibility should not be allowed to compromise any state's rights under the Treaty of Rome including opt-outs. Any decisions on the budget or the commission should be taken by the EU as a whole. Rarely has a word been used with such diametrically opposed meanings as flexibility will be in the forth- coming Euro-debates.
The British Government enters those debates with twin advantages: a limited agenda and the power of veto. In the mid- Eighties' IGC, we wanted the single mar- ket. The price was the Single Act and quali- fied majority voting. In 1991 we wanted enlargement; the price was Maastricht. All we want now is less of the same and, indeed, we will not let proceedings com- mence until we get it. At Maastricht, John Major negotiated an opt-out on the social chapter. Since then, the Commission has tried to claw it back by health and safety directives. Mr Major will insist on restoring the integrity of the British opt-out before the IGC moves on to other business. Most of the rest will be furious. But if they want their IGC, they will have to give way.
Then the serious negotiations will start on flexibility. We may not be alone in opposing the Franco-German position. It would certainly be unacceptable to the Danes, and probably also to the Swedes and the Finns. But most of the rest seem to have a different anxiety. They cannot bear the thought of being excluded from an inner core, with all the loss of face involved, but they are not sure how their domestic public opinion would react to all this inflexible flexibility.
The British have one further advantage: time. Herr Kohl is desperate to conclude the IGC by next June, because he fears that otherwise, it would become muddled up with the preparations for EMU, with dam- aging political consequences in France and Germany. He would like to present a deal to his electorate as a quid pro quo for fudg- ing the Maastricht convergence criteria. The French are already planning fancy footwork to reclassify their national debt, and the Bundesbank is growling. The Chancellor may well intend to use political sentiment to overrule the Bundesbank, as he did over the monetary consequences of reunification. But he cannot afford to let the train timetable slip.
This is where the Labour Party might be helpful to Herr Kohl. The Germans no longer expect Britain to sign up to a single currency in 1999, and as long as they can prevent us from devaluing to win trade advantages, they do not much care. But they do know that the British election will take place during the endgame of these IGC negotiations. They would be happy to offer a deal to an incoming Labour Gov- ernment, resolving all outstanding issues, political and economic. We will understand your problems with the pound, Herr Kohl would say, but you will see the sense of dropping John Major's absurd objections to my flexible Europe. There is no reason to suppose that Premier Blair would find this unacceptable; he has always been a federal- ist, albeit a closet one.
It is hard to foresee the course of the next few months' negotiations. But there could be political opportunities for Mr Major. The right sort of row with Europe would play well, as long as Ken Clarke allowed it to. But the greatest political price for the Tories would be a clumsy intervention by Herr Kohl; a widely-publi- cised late-night loss of temper with Mr Major: 'Why should I bother with you any- way? I'll get what I want from young Blair.'
Oddly enough, Peter Mandelson is not planning to use 'Vote Labour: the Germans want you to' as a campaign slogan. But the Tories may be able to do it for him.
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