M R. HENRY NORMAN contributes to Thursday's Times a very interesting
letter on the chances of intervention in the war, the various circumstances in which it might take plaice, and the risks involved as regards this country. Though in many particulars we do not find ourselves able to agree with Mr. Norman, we hold that the general note of warning sounded by him is one to which the British people must attend. We have repeatedly asserted that whichever way the contest goes, the results will tend to be injurious to us, or at any rate that no good for us can possibly come out of the contest, and nothing in recent events has inclined us to change our view. We stand to lose in any event. If Russia wins, we shall find our path full of perplexities owing to our obligations, real or sentimental, to Japan. If Japan wins, we shall, on the other hand, as an Asian Power, be confronted with anxieties and difficulties which, though less immediate,. will be even graver. A Japanese victory will in the end mean China for the Japanese,—that is, China, with all her vast resources, directed by Japan. But if Japan is able to " run " China, we may see the rise of an Asiatic naval Power formidable enough to threaten our present command of the sea in Asiatic waters. Hitherto we have only had to reckon with European rivals in considering the problem of naval supremacy. It will be a very different matter if Japan organises and officers a great fleet for China, and directs the policy which will control that fleet.
But though we agree with Mr. Norman in thinking the outlook one which demands the greatest possible cir- cumspection on the part of Great Britain, we cannot say that we are entirely convinced by his forecast of the course of the war. "It cannot be realised too soon," says Mr. Norman, "that the war can have but one ending. It is out of the question for Russia to be defeated by Japan. Such a defeat would be the destruction of Russian prestige for generations ; it would be a national humiliation too colossal to be even thought of by Russia. If the war must endure for years, if the last Russian regiment must be mobilised, if the last rouble must be spent, if even vast international complications must be faced, and whatever losses or sacrifices must still be suffered, the end will be the same. Russia cannot and will not accept such a defeat. Let any Englishman reflect what would be his attitude under corresponding circumstances in his own country." In the abstract, no doubt, this view is the correct one. Theoretically, it is inconceivable that Russia can allow herself to stay beaten in the Far East ; and we admit that she must strain every effort, and be prepared to fight for ten years, rather than yield to Japan. We also admit that if Russia is only dogged enough she will win in the end owing to her great reserve of strength. Yet, in spite of this apparently invincible logic, we are still unable to feel certain that things must go as Mr. Norman predicts. We think it likely, but not certain. Our reason for doubt is the fact that the prediction of ultimate Russian victory is based on the assumption that all the conditions will remain as they are now. But can we feel sure that all the conditions will remain stable during the next few years ? We do not consider any immediate political revolution to be at all likely in Russia ; but is it certain that no political changes will take place ? An outbreak of rural discontent on a great scale, induced by bad seasons or high taxes, an attempt at revolt in some of the discontented provinces of the Empire, the rise of a Mullah among the Mahom- medan tribes of Central Asia, a wave of discontent among the soldiers,—any one of these, or some similar but now entirely unforeseen incident, might greatly modify the course of events. Again, any great change in the Near East might exercise a momentous influence on the war. Suppose that the Sultan were to die and the Turkish Empire to be thrown into confusion. In that case not only would the various Balkan States be tempted to occupy portions of the Turkish Empire, and in doing so to fight among themselves, but the temptation to other Powers, and especially those interested in the Asian possessions of Turkey, to use the opportunity for aggrandisement would be very great. In the circumstances we have suggested, what would happen in Asia Minor and Syria, Tripoli and the Greek islands ? Could Germany, urged on by her traders, resist the temptation to push her claims in Asia Minor ? Could France take no note of what was happening in Syria ? Could Italy and Austria refrain from action ? Could Britain view the fate of Arabia with indifference ? But in this conflict of interests Russia could not allow herself to be forgotten. Yet if she were still engaged in a death-struggle in the Far East it might be impossible for her to claim her full share in determining the destiny of Turkey. But Russia could not abandon her claims in regard. to Constantinople and Syria because of a Japanese War. In order to make good her claims in respect to Turkey she might be prepared to suffer the humiliation' of making peace with Japan before she had become victorious. We do not, of course, suggest for a moment that such happenings as those just set forth . are im- minent. We merely use them to show how certain circumstances by no means impossible in themselves can be thought of which would prevent Mr. Norman's logical conclusion of the war taking place. Another circumstance which might conceivably force Russia to make peace in the Far East in order to have the power to 'protect interests in Europe which she would deem absolutely vital would be the death of the Emperor of Austria. That event may conceivahly be followed by a period of perfect tranquillity, but it also may be followed by a struggle between the Teutonic and the Slavonic elements in the dominions of the Hapsburgs in which Russia would feel herself vitally interested. If the two events—i.e., the deaths of the Austrian and Turkish Sovereigns—occurred near each other, Russia would have a great opportunity for asserting herself as the protector of the Slav race, and would probably be willing to sacrifice any Asian interests in order to have sufficient power to take up such a position. Here, again, we are only dealing with hypotheses, for the Sultan and the Emperor of Austria may both reign for another ten years. We merely use their cases as examples of how the normal course of events on which Mr. Norman bases his prediction of ultimate Russian victory may be upset. No doubt Russia must win in the Far East if she cares for victory there beyond all other conceivable con- siderations. But it is possible that other interests will emerge for which 'she will care more. These and kindred possibilities Mr. Norman leaves out of sight. He has concentrated his vision too exclusively on one aspect of the situation.
We find ourselves far more able to agree with Mr. Norman in his warning as to the dangers of interven- tion. He notes that if Japan is beaten in the end on land, and if Russia is able to send another fleet to the Far East, there will be a strong demand here and in the United States for intervention in favour of Japan. He also notes—what is undoubtedly true—that the United States would be unable to help in such intervention. Germany, on the other hand, though able, would be un- willing to intervene, and would instead throw her weight on the side of Russia. Needless to say, France would not. do anything that was disliked by Russia. "Now, it may be stated without hesitation," says Mr. Norman, "that Russia will not accept intervention in any shape or form, and that until she is victorious she would regard anything beyond the mere offer of mediation, which she would politely decline, as an unfriendly act, and would at once direct her own course accordingly. What, then, would be the position of England ? The answer is easy : she would stand alone, face to face with Russia, with the direct possibility of war under conditions where there would be practically nothing for her Navy to do." Mr. Norman goes on to point out that, in spite of this obvious fact, the Japanese, should they need intervention in their own interests, would never forgive us if we did not accord it them. They would feel that they were left in the lurch by us. "It is a lamentable probability that the result of the Anglo-Japanese alliance will be that of all nations we shall in the end enjoy the smallest share of the good- will of the Japanese people."
But though we note this risk, we hold, as does Mr. Norman, that it would be most foolish for us to be deflected from our proper path of absolute neutrality by any such considerations., We must, of course, carry out our Treaty of Alliance with Japan to the letter, but more we need not and must not do. There is no obligation on us to intervene to save Japan from Russia, should Japan come to need such intervention, which, however, we are far from thinking likely, even if Japan should fail to beat Russia on land. All we are bound to do is to come to Japan's assistance if she is attacked by two Powers. That we shall do ; but we have never promised to save Japan from the consequences of her policy towards Russia. In our opinion, we should have nothing to do with intervention. The two Powers must fight their battle out, and possibly the results will not in the end prove so sensational as the contemplation of the struggle at this moment suggests. Stalemate is a quite conceivable solution.
We cannot close our article without expressing our earnest desire that Mr. Norman may prove justified in his hope that the rearrangements of national interests which must follow the end of the war may afford an opportunity for securing a better understanding between Russia and Britain. As our readers know, we have always desired an understanding with Russia, and have always held that there is no reason why it should not be brought about, since there is no essential conflict of interests between ourselves and Russia. She does not challenge the command of the sea.
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