A new policy for Ulster
W, ith Mr Airey Neave's unveiling of a new Conservative policy on Northern Ireland — one that gives top Priority to security, even at the expense of political discussion — the long-heralded end of bipartisanship has arrived. Hitherto, in the lengthy saga of Ulster's troubles, the two main British political parties, while frequently criticising one another' s tactics, have agreed on the essence of their strategy. Both have, above all, sought agreement between the two Ulster communities, and have tried to bring about an arrangement whereby Mr Fitf s Catholics and Mr ?vest's Unionists could sit together in government. So III1Portant has such an agreement seemed to West11), linster politicians, even after the collapse in 1974 of Mr Faulkner's power-sharing executive, that they have encouraged the greatest circumspection in the Triployment of the security forces. in stressing security at the expense of every other c°,...nsideration — to the irritation of the whole of the s"LP, and even of some Unionists — Mr Neave 1.)Pears to have been moved by two considerations. t:irst, the success of the Strategic Air Service regiment South Armagh has, he thinks, exploded the proposfsgon that there is no military solution to the conflict. eond, the steady escalation of violence in the province, Combined with the great offence given to ordinarLy members of the public by the apparent freedom With Which known Catholic and Protestant terrorists 0
_Perate, both suggest that public morale depends on a
renewed military effort and indicate that those entering into a Catholic-Protestant coalition would be severely endangered by the gunmen opposed to them. en8, ur, for all its commonsense, Mr Neave's policy
ls some serious risks. First — as the recent pro
ce-Ial eumgs at Strasbourg show — the Dublin govern
ment in an election year, however tough it is likely to be with the IRA at home, seems certain to continue its attitude of protective ambiguity to the same organisation in Ulster. It is an ambiguity compounded of vocal condemnation of the Provisionals and strident criticism of the Army, but it has hitherto been tolerated because of the importance attached to the LondonDublin axis. Second, any industrial action by the Unionist community designed to show their strength will, quite apart from its general irresponsibility, indicate to many that a stronger emphasis on security without a genuine political settlement will exacerbate rather than remove tensions, for the Catholics are likely to take out on the Army resentment quite reasonably felt against Mr Paisley's and Mr Baird's strikers.
The balance of the argument, however, must be very much in favour of Mr Neave. Certainly, Mr Roy Mason has been a fat more effective Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that his unhappy predecessor, Mr Merlyn Rees. He is hard where Mr Rees is soft, and'even the toughest of Northern Ireland politicians have found that he is no pushover. That such a man has nonetheless been able to make no headway whatsoever is a clear indication that the policy he is trying to implement is inadequate. Moreover, it is the first duty of a civilised state to protect the lives and property of its citizens and, when the normal means of providing such protection — the police and the apparatus of the law prove inadequate, to take such measures as are necessary for the task. Whatever the difficulties that still stand in the way of settlement between Ulster politicians, there can surely be little excuse for failing to take the steps required to extirpate terrorism
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