RUSSIA TO - DAY AND TO - MORROW.*
M. Mu.ruKov, who used to be the leader of the Russian Constitutional Democrats, otherwise known as the " Cadets," delivered a series of lectures in America and has gathered them here into a volume. As his political creed implies, he is a man of moderate temper and -he has certainly treated very judicially the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary move- ments which culminated in the present Bolshevist regime in Russia. He recognizes in the defeat of General Wrangel the end of the White counter-revolution. On the other hand, he recognizes in the great famine, which is not yet over, the definite decline of Bolshevism. He believes that nothing can now stop that decline and that the tendency will be towards some conventional kind of democracy. No doubt, as he says, there will be many vicissitudes, and he fears a great deal of incidental demagogy, but he foresees the ultimate rise of a new Russian unity.
We remember very well how surprised Englishmen were when they read reports from Russia that M. Miliukov had accepted Bolshevism. The reports were over-statements. This book makes M. Miliukov's position clear. He never approved of Bolshevism, and is, indeed, quite incapable of approving of it, but, knowing more than foreigners could know at that time, he did not believe in any of the White counter-revolutionary enterprises. He perceived that Koltehak, Denikin, and Wrangel were fighting a forlorn hope because they never had in their hands the materials of success. All he could hope for when he had come to that conclusion was that Bolshevism should be in a sense tolerated until it could be, gradually and painfully, turned into something else. That end must be reached, however, by political means and through the bitter teachings of experience, but not by the aid of unpractical " patriot " armies.
Naturally, he regrets the failure of the revolution of 1905: He implies that if the Emperor had insisted upon the continu- ous working of the Duma some sort of more or less orderly progress would have been possible from that time onwards. The failure of the revolution of 1905, however, made a further revolution inevitable. When that further revolution came in 1917 it was at first what might be described as a national revolution ; it seemed that the revolutionaries would be contented with the overthrow of the reigning House or, at least, with compelling the Emperor to set up self-governing institutions.
But between March and November, 1917, there was a very rapid change. In those few months nationalism turned into internationalism. The Communists emerged and made Russia stand for visionary and sterile principles, which could never warm the blood of any ordinary human being. M. Miliukov's explanation of why this contortion was possible is most interesting. Probably in any other country but Russia it would have been impossible, but in Russia a gradual political evolution meant an expense which the vast mass of very poor people were quite unable to bear. If a great change came at all it had, he thinks, to come in an anarchical manner, for there has never been either social or mental cohesion in Russia. The result was the imposition upon Russia of the conceptions of fanatics.
The only conscious motive underlying the acceptance of the Bolshevist coup d'ifat was the feeling that nothing that could possibly happen could make things worse. Men in that frame of mind naturally agree to experiments, however pre- posterous. It must be understood, nevertheless, that though Lenin wished his experiment to be called Communism, he never arrived at Communism. There were too many forces, more or less inert in themselves but formidable in the mass, opposed to him. M. Miliukov says :—" Communism is an • Russia To-day and To-morrow. My Paul H. Miliukov. London : Macmillan, 19e.
international doctrine ; Bolshevism is a Russian achieve- ment." The peasants at all events noted the distinction. Their cry was " Long live Bolshevism, but down with Communism ! " Bolshevism gave them the land, but Com- munism theoretically took it back for collective use. For a short time they were satisfied with what the Bolshevists did while loathing the very idea of what the Bolshevists wanted to do. Communism in any case could only have been the last stage of the revolution which Lenin proposed. It depended upon bringing all other countries into the revolution, and that has mercifully proved to be impossible. To state the facts in this way is merely to assert what a realist Lenin has proved himself to be. He has always adapted his pro- gramme to his situation. He was never embarrassed when he was forced to change his arguments or even when quite contradictory arguments appeared in his diplomatic documents and propaganda.
M. Miliukov satisfies us least when he writes about the attempts of the Allies to help the 'White counter-revolution. He admits that the reactionary policy of Koltchak, Dcnikin, and Wrangel was largely to blame for the failure, but he equally blames the Allies for giving insufficient help. He says that the White movement, far from weakening the Bolshevists, appreciably strengthened them. But this is the whole argument for the decision of the Allies to cease sending troops to Russia. However good the intentions of a foreign coadjutor may be he is regarded, quite naturally, as an invader when he lands in the country where he wants to render help to one party in the State. It is always the same story. Even the party that is being helped turns against the " invader." That happened when Englishmen tried to help the victims of the Jacobins in the French Revolution. The more troops we had sent to Russia the more hostility we should have created, and we were wise to cut the loss when we did. We should have expected M. Miliukov to be a little more understanding about the reasons which compelled us to change our policy.
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