THE DUTY OF THE MODERATES.
THE formation of a Moderate Liberal Party in Parliament, if it becomes necessary to form one, will be very delicate work ; and it is fortunate that its leadership, should occasion require, will fall to a man like Lord Hartington. His foibles, as well as his qualifications, will help to keep him in the right path. A sincere Liberal, who on points such as the enfranchisement of the land and the necessity of kindly im- partiality in dealing with Ireland, goes as far as any Radical, he has a disdain for detail and an aristocratic tenacity of traditions, both of which will assist him in maintaining an attitude of friendly alliance with the Liberal Party. He is incapable of carping, or of confusing great things with small. He will neither slip over to the Tories, from whom he is separated by every prejudice as well as every conviction of his mind, nor will he take up that attitude of a malignantly candid friend towards which the seceders from any party always gravitate. He and those who follow him will heartily support Mr. Gladstone's Administration from outside, mode- rating, where it is possible, its necessarily Radical action, and only resisting it when it betrays a Socialistic tendency, when it shows a disposition to rash experiment in Ireland, or when it is indispensable, in face of some new or gigantic proposal, that the verdict of the whole people should be taken upon their own affairs. That is a most difficult attitude to preserve ; but it is a possible one, if the Moderates will adhere strongly to their leader, and will remember that they are not to be a Fourth Party, or even a separate group, in Parliament, so much as a wing—the "Right wing," in modern political terminology—of the great Liberal army. If they forget this, they will either be compelled to join the Tories, and so be submerged in a host with which they have no real sympathy, or they will be so separate that they will cease to influence the Liberals, and run the risk at the next Election of being deserted by the constituencies. That has always been the Whig risk since proprietary boroughs ceased to exist ; and it will, if they are not both frank and cautious, be the danger of the Moderates also.
It need not be a danger, however, if those who decline to join Mr. Gladstone's new Administration will only thoroughly apprehend their position, which is not to be that of a new party, but of a body of officers to whom the country can turn whenever it is alienated by ultra-pro- posals, without ceasing, when it turns, to be in essence Liberal. It is an alternative Government which the Moderates should offer, not an alternative Party ; and they should seek support not by manceuvring, still less by factious opposition, but by steadily appealing to those • ideas which have induced themselves to secede, and which, unless Englishmen have wholly changed, are sure, in moments of reflection, to command a wide response. There must, for example, be a great mass of Liberals who, while solicitous that Ireland should be treated exactly like Great Britain, are utterly opposed to any tolerance of anarchy or any separation of the three Kingdoms. Their view should be clearly expressed and patiently explained ; and if it is, as we believe it is, that of the people, the people will rally to those who express it, and who at the same time understand the deep dis- like of Englishmen for a senseless policy of mere repression. They will adhere to such leaders, if they are convinced by them, quite fast enough, as they did under similar circumstances to the Peelites, and Pall the more readily if they see that the Moderates are neither seeking office nor desiring in any degree to arrest the steady march of the Liberal Party towards neces- sary or even hopeful reforms. They will feel that such men are Liberals, though they are not carried away by dreams, and will by degrees turn to them with that mingling of hope and reliance which, in a country like this, is power. They will look to them for moderate counsels, for firm administration, and for resistance to those currents of sentimental feeling which years ago, when Mr. Plimsoll carried his Bill by an out- burst of enthusiastic philanthropy, we pointed out as the most ominous symptoms in an otherwise healthy democracy. Soft-headed Liberals are the most dangerous Liberals ; and as England is not by nature soft - headed, the leaders who steadily and patiently show that men may
be Liberals and yet hard-headed, are sure of ultimate appre- ciation. They need not care about influence at first. The current will rush on for a time ; but influence will accrete to them all the while, and will grow like a hard embankment in the sea, never visible till it rises above the water, but then never invisible or inoperative again.
Taking this view of the Moderate Liberals, we do not care greatly, for the moment, to count their numbers. Whether they turn out to be twenty or seventy does not really matter. They will not even wish, far less try, to rule for them- selves until an army has formed behind them ; and that army can only be supplied by the nation, and will range itself as readily behind a few as behind many. Indeed, at first fewness will be an advantage, for it ensures at once unity, consistency, and that tolerance of minor error which is essential if the Moderates are to support a Government in which they have no part. A crowd always grows excited, and can hardly be induced to tolerate ; while a few men, all sober- minded, can be made to see that any Government, be it what it may, must, except when first principles are at stake, be allowed to take its own course, and even to commit occasional errors, without savage criticism. It is not the business of Moderate Liberals to obstruct a Budget, or resist a Bankruptcy Bill, or worry over details of patronage ; but to support the general party until great occasions arise, and then, if they distrust the policy offered them, to compel the country to see that the policy is untrustworthy, and why. Their votes ought to be as secure on ordinary occasions as those of the Members for Birmingham, and they themselves ought only to be separate when great principles or national interests are obviously at stake, and when men must either be themselves, or do them- selves the greatest of moral wrongs.
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