THE INVASION OF EGYPT.
AS we write on Friday news comes that contact has been reached between the Turkish Army invading Egypt and the British force. It is conceivable that not long after these pages are in our readers' hands we shall hear of what may prove a decisive action. Dilatory tactics are not possible in desert warfare. You cannot hang about in waterless plains of sand and rock. You must push on to your objective or your troops will die of thirst. Unless, then, the Turkish force encountered by our troops in the region of El-Bantara was a mere reconnoitring party, the Battle of the Canal will eoon be fought. Though very little information has leaked out in regard to the Turkish, or rather German, plan of campaign, it is not difficult to guess the line of advance. The physical conditions of the desert make it almost certain that the main course of attack will be by the El-Arish route—the route which almost all invaders, or at any rate almost all Turkish invaders, of Egypt have followed. It was by this route that Napoleon some hundred and fifteen years ago advanced to Acre, and this was the route by which he led back his 12,000 infantrymen. Again, it was by this route that Ibrahim Pasha, in the " forties," brought his army into Syria, and by which, when, like Napoleon, he was stopped by British sea power at Acre, he withdrew it to Cairo. This road to Egypt has been used time out of mind by caravans and travellers during the winter season—the period when the wells have most water in them. For example, it was this road that Kinglake used to pass from Turkey into Egypt, as described in Bathes. Since his time Messrs. Cook have constantly sent tourists by it, provided they were willing and able to endure the wearying inconveniences of camel-riding. The track is too waterless for horses. The route has been described as the coast route, but this merely means that it runs parallel to the coast. It is not a coast route in the sense that it is within sight of the sea, though at one or two points it is possible that ships with big guns might land a lucky shot or two, provided that they did not draw too much water, and so could get fairly near to the coast-line. But though the Turks' main advance is no doubt being made by the El-Arish route, it also seems certain that an advance will be made through the Sinai Peninsula from Ma'an, the nearest point on the Hedjaz Railway. On this route the water difficulties are great. The wells when they are reached have a plentiful supply of water in them, but the distances to be travelled before they are reached are very long. In all probability, then, the advance from Ma'an is intended rather as a distraction or feint than as a serious line of attack. It is further reported that a third Turkish column will move parallel to the El-Arish force, but some twenty miles south of it. It is worth while to consider some of the difficulties which the Turks must encounter in their attempt to cross the desert, defeat our forces, and then cross the Canal, or, rather, carry first the line of defences on the east of the Canal, and then that on the further side. The most serious problem before the invader, as we pointed out last week, is the water difficulty. An army seeking to move through the desert is always haunted by the thought which inspired the famous exchange of confidences between the Governor of North Carolina and the Governor of South Carolina : "It's a long time between drinks I " The way to surmount this difficulty, and the one adopted by tourist parties and also by Napoleon, is, while moving as rapidly as possible, and so cutting short the waterless hours, to carry on the backs of camels sufficient water to avoid dying of thirst. It must be noted, however, that though this proved possible for Napoleon's 12,000 soldiers, it does not follow that it will prove possible for an army of 90,000. It may be objected that what by proper organization can be done for 12,000 men can be done for about eight times that number. You have only to repeal your organization eight times over, and instead of using, say, 3,000 or 4,000 camels use 25,000 or 30,000. Unfortunately, however, for the invader things are not quite as simple as that, and for this reason. In the fist place, it takes a long time to collect 30,000 camels. Next, an army of such large dimensions as one of 90.000 men must march on a much broader front than an army of 12,000. This means that in order to supply the troops with water the water-carrying camels at the wells en rose
must go backwards and forwards to the desert wells, which presumably would be in the centre. To take enough Syrian
water for the whole journey would be impossible There- fore the water problem does not merely alter in degree. It alters in kind. To the march due west must be added, in case of the main advance, the camel marches north and south to and fro. But just as there is a last straw to break the camel's back, so there is a last mile to wear him out. Even, then, if the wells are not drunk dry, which we will presume, the watering of the right and left wings of the main column must prove, we will not say an insurmount- able difficulty, but a very great augmentation of the difficulties presented to the German Staff of the invaders. There is one more point to he mentioned in regard to the water problem. Wo filled up all the wells a couple of months ago! No doubt they can be dug out, but the delay will not be agreeable.
Let us assume, however, that these difficulties will all be overcome, and that so perfect is the German organization that, though the Turkish troops may be on short rations, they will never really want for water. The next difficulty is the moving of the artillery across the desert. That small mountain guns will he dragged along we do not doubt, but how the bigger guns are to be got through is a very hard problem, even if the Germans are employ- ing motor traction for their cannon. The desert, of course, is not by any means all soft sand like the seashore ; but even if a rocky track can be discovered, it is almost certain that there will be places to be crossed in which the sand is soft. At the very best the Turkish Army cannot hope to find itself in the position in which the Germans always like to fight— namely, that of those who possess a superiority in heavy artillery. Let us suppose, however, that the Turks will struggle through the desert and come to a point some ten or twelve miles from the Canal. They must then deploy their line for attack. With such numbers this means that they must extend it for fifteen or twenty miles at the very least. This accomplished, they must with all speed attempt to carry the lines of trenches which guard the Canal, and are held by troops who, we venture to say, are quite as good fighting men as the Turks, to put it at the lowest. Our experiences in France and in Belgium have made us familiar with the difficulty of carrying trenches rapidly. Though by a system of sapping continued for several months the Germans have been able to get their trenches close enough to those of the Allies to allow of carrying them by rushee, they find it by no means easy work. What they take one day is generally taken back the next day or the day after by a counter- attack. Neither side makes rapid progress at this kind of warfare, and if there is any advantage it is certainly not on the side of our enemies. But slow fighting will not suit the Turks, though it will be pleasant enough for ns. Our men, well supplied with water and ammunition and gune, can afford to wait. The Turks, haunted always by the thought of what is the fate of those who linger in the desert, cannot attempt to dig themselves in and approach the enemy in correct military form. No matter what plight they may find themselves in after their arduous desert march, they must hurl themselves on our trenches and attempt to carry them by instant assault. No doubt in war miraculous surprises are always possible, but we are sceptical of any miracle so amazing as this.
Let us not forget in this context that there will not only be plenty of well-served artillery behind our trenches, bat the great trench of the Canal will have on it gunboats and other craft carrying artillery equal or superior to the biggest guns which the Germans have yet been able to bring into the field—artillery capable of raining shells upon the Turks before they can make any impression on ns by their Own fire. Whatever• else they do, they will not bring twelve- Inch guns through the desert. What makes the matter worse for the Turks is that the guns thus moving on the face of the waters can change their positions with a rapidity per- mitted to no form of land artillery. . They will not only be invisible. They will be mobile in the fullest sense of the word. But even if by some mischance, say by a marvellously organized night attack, the Turks were able to drive our men out of the trenches on the eastern side of the Canal and force them to cross it, we very much doubt whether they could even then accomplish their design. They would have a second line of defences to carry on the reverse side of the Canal, and in order to take these they must cross the Canal by some sort of bridging. Their intention apparently is to fill thousands of sacks with sand and hurl them into the Canal till they have made a mole on which to cross. No doubt that is a possible operation, but it is not an easy one for troops which are being shot at all the time from the other side of the Canal, while hovering over their heads are aeroplanes dropping bombs upon them and upon the camels bringing up the water, which will be found even more essential than fresh supplies of ammunition.
We shall be told, perhaps, that we have forgotten that the German General Staff must have foreseen these difficulties quite as clearly as we see them. It will be suggested that they must have some plan for getting over them which we have failed to grasp. In a word, we shall be told that wo must not assume that the German military chiefs are altogether devoid of sense. We agree. Some excuse is necessary for criticism which assumes that the able brains of the German General Staff are at fault. Out explanation is that, though the Germans thoroughly under- stood the difficulties in front of the Turkish invading army, they thought these difficulties would not in fact be encoun• tared. The Germane, we believe, are acting on the assumption that if the Turkish Army can only be got within eighteen or twenty miles of the Canal, a mutiny amongst the Egyptian troops in the rear of the British, and also a general rising of the native population, will at once take place, and thus make our position on the Canal untenable. If this is the gamble upon which the Germans are relying, they will find themselves very greatly mistaken. Admitting that the Egyptian Army, composed as it is entirely of Mohammedan troops, cannot be expected to be pro-British in sentiment, and admitting that secret Turkish emissaries have been steadily at work amongst them, we still do not believe that the sowers of discontent have made any headway, or that there is any risk of mutiny. If the Egyptian Army had been asked to undertake the work of repelling the Turks, there might have been a danger of a pro-Turkish movement in the ranks. Since, however, we fully recognize that it would not be fair to the Egyptian Army to order them to fight the Turks, they will, we are convinced, remain quietly in their barracks and canton- ments. As for the civilian population of the Delta rising behind us, there is no fear of that whatever. German gold lavishly employed may conceivably raise a squalid riot in Alexandria or Cairo, but such riots if they occur will be put down by the police without difficulty. If mutiny and insurrection take place in Egypt, they will only take place after a great Turkish victory. They will not take place before the action in the field is decided. Here, in our opinion, is the essential miscalculation made by the Germans—a miscalculation which has led them to under- take the hopeless task of crossing a waterless desert, and then of attacking a well-held line of entrenchments.
We admit, however, that what we have written is open to the objection that we are destroying the Turks and their German leaders on paper, and that this is an easy but a very useless task. We will, therefore, say no more for the present. The event will show whether we have or have not miscalculated.
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