IMPERIAL CONCENTRATION. T HE grumbling against the Government because they do
not do something strong in China, and because they allow Russia to have her own way at Pekin, goes on as loudly as ever. So widespread, indeed, is this dissatis- faction with the Government because their foreign policy has not been more vigorous in regard to Russia, that Sir William Harcourt uses it as one of his chief weapons of attack. Though it is notorious that Sir William Harcourt is not in reality more, but less, Jingo than the Government, be is constantly holding their supposed weakness up to public odium, for he evidently believes that it is the winning card just now. In a word, the country has, for the moment at any rate, got "the Empire in danger" on the brain, and thinks it has somehow suffered a terrible loss because Russian influence has been extended at Pekin. We confess to viewing this restless and perverse state of public feeling with some alarm. We are not Little Englanders, but Imperialists, and hold that it is the business of England to occupy the habitable waste places of the earth with her surplus population, and to take over and rule the inferior races of mankind. We rejoice to think that the courage and energy of our ancestors secured us so great an Empire, and we would not only maintain every inch of it against all corners and all risks, but we would from time to time give it a reasonable and wise extension. We fully admit that Empires which cease to grow and develop are ripe for dissolution, and we gladly welcome the acquisition of new spheres for our energy. We are not, that is, the least afraid of empire or timid about expansion, and most sincerely adopt Tennyson's prayer that our greatness may not fail- " Through craven fears of being great."
But in the pursuit of empire, as of all else that is human, it is very possible to fail from excess of zeal,—or rather from substituting for the true zeal a weak and irresponsible craving for mere bigness, and from failing to distinguish between strength and size. As it seems to us, the great political need of the hour is not Imperial ex- pansion, "no matter where and no matter how," but rather Imperial concentration. What is the object of taking great provinces unless you mean to develop and make use of them ? We want not merely to colour the map red, but to get all the advantages, political, material, and moral, which come from the possession of a mighty Empire. For the last few years we have been steadily, and, as we think, quite rightly, acquiring vast tracts of territory. What we ought to be doing now is developing and rganising those tracts. Unfortunately, however, the stem work of development is not nearly so attractive and exciti g as sticking up flags, or telling other nations that we do not mean to let them take this or that place because, though we do not want it for ourselves, we do not like to see other people there. Imperial concentration is out of favour because it means quiet, dull, and hard work,—not acquisition, but development. It is all the difference between founding a new business enterprise and carrying it on. Take the case of Nigeria. We entirely agree in the wisdom of taking the Hausa States under our control, and would have fought France rather than have relinquished our just rights there. But having got Nigeria, surely it would be much better to work at its development than to provoke war with Russia, for fear Russia should some day become too strong. At present the Imperial energy of the nation is in danger of evapo- rating in an attempt to drive Russia back in China, just as fifty years ago a large part of it was spent in keeping Russia out of Turkey. In our opinion, that energy would be infinitely better employed in making use of places we have already got, but have hitherto failed to use to the best advantage. First among these we would put Nigeria. Next in importance, or possibly even more important, is Egypt. We are just about to restore the Soudan to orderly government. From Dongola to Fes- hoda we shall almost at once be in possession of a vast territory, which will be well worth developing, especially in. the direction of Kassala, where the mountain slopes are most fertile. Even in Egypt itself there is an infinite amount of work yet to be done. Internationalism cannot, of course, be swept away in a day, but by steady pressure and concentration we shall at last get complete control. When we have got a free hand from the Delta to the Lakes, and have developed to the full the resources of the country, Egypt will be one of the most desirable depen- dencies in the world. Surely it is worth while to stop bark- ing at Russia in order to attend to so important a business as this. It is the same with East Africa and Uganda. If when the railway reaches the Lakes we have the energy and foresight to develop our new kingdom, and do not ignore it all in our anxiety about, say, the designs of Germany on some South Sea island which we might have had any day these hundred years, and have always rejected as useless, we shall be doing true Imperial work. In China itself there is a vast field for the carrying out of the principle of Imperial concentration. If we are told by those competent to offer advice on the point that the valley of the Yangtse is a region which we ought to possess, then by all means let us take steps to register our claim in the most marked manner possible, and to inform the world of our inten- tions. To do that would be far more Imperialistic in the best sense than merely to play the part of the dog in the manger to Russia. If, indeed, any part of Southern or Middle China is considered to be vital to our interests, let us take steps to secure it at once, even at the risk of a conflict with Russia, but do not let us merely issue Jingo defiances or talk of the supineness of the Government because they have not fought Russia in order to vindicate our prestige at Pekin.
The place where the greatest need for Imperial concen- tration exists must be named last. India—including, of course, Burmah—is still comparatively undeveloped, and the need for British capital is great and real. It is, we believe, a fact that men who can offer good and sound, security have in India to pay 10 per cent. for a loan. In England men with money to lend are eager to lay it out even at 3 per cent. Before we go to war with Russia and waste, say,£300,000,000 because of the occupation of Port. Arthur or because of the possibility that under Russian auspices we shall not be able to do good trade with Manchuria. —i.e., in order to prevent any risk of our being injured in the Chinese market—surely we ought to make the best use of our Indian markets. If we spent on Indian railways and other public works the money which the extremer Jingoes want us to expend in a war with Russia we might get much. greater benefits for our trade. No doubt the currency difficulty greatly complicates the problem in India, but even making allowance for that, we make, from tbe com- mercial point of view, comparatively little use of India. and Burmah. But till we have used our surplus capital in India, is it not foolish to be too sensitive about rumours that Russia will prevent the employment of English capital in China ? We are not, as we have said, in any sense against the expansion of the British Empire, but rather regard it as a duty to be fulfilled. All we ask is that the whole of the national energy should not be exhausted in acquiring new place, but that some of it should be kept back for developing what we have already got. "Prudent expansion and steady concentration," these should be our watchwords in regard to the Empire. The business that stands still and does not expand never prospers, but the same must also be said of the business which opens new branches anywhere and everywhere,—the business which in search of new sources of profit forgets to make proper use of those already in hand.
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