Middle-East War by proxy

Patrick Seale

,President Sadat has still not achieved hiss clear war aim of overthrowing Colonel Gaddafi, the dangerous opponent on his western flank. There can be no doubt that last week's four-day flare-up between Egypt and Libya was not just a boiling-over

of tensions, a random eruption into physical violeme of the longstanding violence over . the radio.waves, but a deliberate strategy by

• Cairo to bring about a change of regime in Tripoli.

It has so far failed, and the outcome of the first round has been inconclusive, but this cannot be the end of the affair. The ceasefire must be judged extremely fragile, and it may be expected that, while Gaddafi looks to his defences, Egypt will with equal

vigour continue probing for his weak spots. The fascination of this clash, as of so many in the Middle East, is its wider impli

cations. We are witnessing not simply a squabble between the bruised vanities of two minor heads of state, but a contest

involving in widening circles the regional balance of power and the interests Of the superpowers. Egypt and Libya are fighting . not only on their own account, but a war by proxy.

Since the October war of 1973, the United States with its local friends and

allies, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt, has campaigned to eject Soviet influence from the area and snuff out centres of radicalism.'

• The rebels of Dhofar in southern Arabia have had their come-uppance; the Marxist Aden regime is yielding to the seduction of :Saudi petro-dollars; the Lebanese radicals iand Palestinian guerrillas have had their • teeth drawn; Somalia is freeing itself from • Soviet dependence; and from one end to the other of the Arab world, 'moderation', conservatism, pro-Western postures have become increasingly the rule.

In this picture the piece which refuses to fit is Colonel Gaddafi of Libya. This was not always the case. In the early years of his regime, 1969-1973, he was unmatched for militant anti-communism, encouraging Sadat to expel his Russian advisers and indeed playing a decisive role in thwarting a communist takeover of the Sudan. He enjoyed in return the protection of Egypt and the United States. But since his dispute with Sadat, dating back to the October war — a war which Sadat waged to open the door to peace with Israel, a notion Gaddafi cannot accept — he has moved ever closer to the Soviet Union. In Libya, Russia has found naval and air facilities to replace those it lost in Egypt, a valuable local ally for its African adventures, and a rich market for weapons paid for strictly in cash at a rate of some two Pillion dollars a year. Gaddall has now turned to Russia for the intelligence cover which only a superpower can provide, to protect him against the onslaught which the 'conservative' regimes have been planning against him for a year and More. Egypt and Sudan, with discreet Saudi backing, appear to have agreed that the Arab world would be a better place without him. That this view enjoys American support may be 'judged from the State Department's accusation last May that Libya had become a haven for international terrorists. The United States, which sees Gaddafi as the principal opponent of its Middle East policies, has consistently refused to upgrade diplomatic representation to ambassador level.

Little wonder that the Colonel in Tripoli, with his long exposed Mediterranean coastline, his immense empty country, his tiny population of little more than two million, and his tempting oil revenues of ten billion dollars a year, has been showing signs of nervousness. But why did Sadat and his backers choose this particular moment to strike? What was their plan? And why has it so far proved ineffective?

The timing of the attack seems to have been determined by three main factors. The first is the struggle now hotly waged for the security of the Red Sea which the new Arab superpower, Saudi Arabia, means to preserve as an Arab lake, closed to hostile forces. At the moment attention is focused on the two guerrilla wars being fought on Ethiopian 'territory: that of the Arabbacked Eritrean rebels in the north and that of the Somali-backed insurgents in Ogaden in the south. Facing this two-pronged assault, the Marxist military junta in Addis Ababa relies on support from the Soviet

Union — and from Libya (with Israel making an .unlikely third partner). To topple Gaddafi at home would clearly have an immediate impact on the Ethiopian imbroglio.

A second reason for striking now was the conviction of his enemies that his political base at home would not withstand the shock of an armed attack. Gaddafi has undoubtedly been having problems with his officer corps. His original twelve-man Revolutio,' nary Command Council has shrunk to five. One defector from it, Umar al-Muhayshi, possibly Gaddalls cleverest rival, has been given political asylum in Cairo where Sadat is evidently grooming him for a takeover.

A third reason for the timing of last week's strike may well have been the need to act before these Soviet and Cuban defence measures could become effective. These measures are intended not only to ensure Gaddafi's personal safety, but in a wider sense to redeploy Libya's defences from the northern seaboard — the premise was that an attack would come from the sea — to the eastern frontier.

In recent months Western embassies in Tripoli have come to believe that an assault on Gaddafi would take the form of a diversionary military operation in the deep desert close to the Sudan or Chad or, of course, Egypt, whose troops have been dug in on the frontier since the summer of 1976. The object of such a diversion would be to draw Gaddafi's own forces into battle, leaving the cities of Benghazi and Tripoli vulnerable to an internal putsch, perhaps supported by seaborne guerrillas.

If this indeed was the scenario, it has not unfolded as planned. Far from rushing his soldiers to the scene of action, Gaddafi has relied on his air defences, called up his reserves, reinforced rather than depleted the units guarding the capital, and appealed to the world as the victim of aggression. There has been no hint of an uprising. On the contrary, Libyan opinion, even groups critical of his policies, has rallied patriotically around him.

Gaddali's failure to rise to the bait perhaps accounts for the inconclusive end of this first round. A more powerful reason has been the Algerian intervention. Although Yassir Arafat has grabbed more headlines in his attempts to mediate between Cairo and Tripoli, the crucial intervention came from President Boumedienne of Algeria, who shuttled between the two warring states and brought them to the present uneasy ceasefire.

. But Algeria is not an impartial mediator. It has thrown its considerable weight squarely behind Libya, whom it must protect from Egyptian hegemony if the balance , of power in North Africa is not to be tilted against itself. At the decisive Bournedienne-Sadat interview last Sunday. which silenced Egyptian guns, it may be assumed that the Algerian president delivered a stern warning to Egypt, not only on its own account but on behalf of the Soviet Union. Thus a war by proxy was settled — for the moment at least — equally by proxy!