MINISTERIAL SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.

SOMI of our contemporaries have been disputing on the subject of the Marquis of NORTHAMPTON'S Bill, without exhausting the question. The Morning Herald has attacked the measure be- cause it goes to remove one of the securities for the purity of the elective system ; the Courier has defended it, and successfully, from this charge. But neither of the disputants seems to have ad- vanced beyond the surface of the matter.

We are told that the necessity of a member vacating his seat, and going back to ask his constituents if they still choose to have

him, was a wise provision for the prevention of corruption. If it was wise, it ought to have been effectual; and if it was effectual, corruption ought to have been prevented. But corruption, even

the grossest, has not been prevented ; ergo,the device was neither effectual nor wise. It is ludicrous to see the solemn earnestness with which the Herald deprecates the removal of what has been a

security for "the purity of our representative system." The

Courier has hinted, that this language is something like cant; and well it may say so. The Herald is, on the whole, an honest

as well as an able journal ; but in this canting age, the most honest people are apt to cant without intending it. Liberality may cant, if she do not take care, as well as Bigotry, and do her cause no good by it. To use a sounding phrase, which, in the circumstances, has no meaning, but yet operates on the as- sociations and prejudices of unreflecting listeners, is to cant. It is the great rhetorical figure of the age. All men cant ; and even

the best of causes, the cause of freedom, suffers from the canting of its supporters. Now, when the Herald, with the history of this

country before its eyes, talks of" the purity of our representative system," does it not use words without meaning—words which have long helped to tickle the ears of the people into an acqui- escence with a system which is, in truth, a mass of corruption?

' The provision sought to be abolished by Lord NORTHAMPTON'S Bill, can have had no effect in preserving a purity which has had no existence. We shall now have purity of election; and it is

very plain that that blessing is so effectually secured to us, that Members, chosen as they will be by the free voice of the People, may safely be allowed to sit to the end of the Parliament without fear of consequences. If the People, who now really have the power of choosing for their representatives the best and worthiest of the land—men of tried integrity of principle, as well as abil:t/ and experience—are so blind to their own interest as to abuse so precious a privilege, they will deserve to suffer for their folly. But of this there is little danger. The electors consist of the most intelligent classes of the community; and the men chosen by them will not be disposed to turn against them and betray their in 'Wrests, because they have been found qualified to exercise the most difficult, laborious, and responsible functions of the Govern- ment. The supposition is absurd. The necessity of the Ministers of the Crown having seats in

Parliament, is too evident to require illustration. Without it, pub- lic business, (luring the session, could not be carried on for a week. But this necessity, under the existing rule, has produced much in- convenience. Individuals, of great value to the State as Ministers, have found themselves unable to obtain a seat, except through some borough under the direct influence of the Treasury, or of some private individual ; and thus a Minister of State has sat in the de- grading character of the nominee of some disreputable Borough- monger. Even under the new system, a similar inconvenience will continue, whether Lord NORTHAMPTON'S Bill is passed or not. If the. Bill is passed, a person once elected will hold his seat; but a Minis- ter may find himself unable to get elected at all. The qualifications necessary to make a good Minister, or functionary of Government,. are quite different from those which would recommend a man to a. body of electors. A person qualified to be a most admirable Se- cretary of State might make but a poor figure on the hustings ;- he might be little known to any bodies of constituents ; and even those to whom be was known, though they might value his cha- racter as a public functionary, might have good reason to prefer another as their representative. But why expose such a person to the awkwardness and humiliation of such a position, and the public business to the necessity of standing still (in so far as his department is concerned) till he either is successful in seat-hunt- ing, or is compelled to resign his office in consequence of his chase being vain?

As the Legislative and Executive powers of this nation are separate and distinct, the King, in whom the one is vested, ought to have as free and full a choice of his servants in the first in- stance, as the People, who possess the other, have of their repre- sentatives. But the King could not have this power, if it de- pended on the concurrent choice or veto of the People ; and the King's choice, therefore, ought to be independent of' that of the People.

Let the functionaries of Government, then, have seats in the House of Commons, without being, in the full sense of the word, Members of it. Let them sit ex officio; and either enjoy the whole privileges of Members—that is, of voting, as well as de- bating—or only the privilege of debate without that of voting. We see no practical inconvenience that would arise from their being allowed to vote; because the influence of any of their votes —nay, of all their votes taken together—would have no effect on the deliberations of between six and seven hundred representa- tives of the People. The only effect of their attempting to carry measures against the sense of the great body of the House, would be to render themselves unpopular, and lead inevitably- to their dismissal.

It may be held, however, that the privilege of voting in the House of' Commons ought to be confined to those who are properly its Members; and the Ministers of the Crown may do all that is - necessary in the House of Commons, without voting. They may explain and defend all their measures—they may object to and oppose the measures of others; and they may then leave the de- cision to the Representatives of the People. This, indeed, appears most consistent with principle. If they were allowed to vote, it would only be because their votes could not bias the decisions of the People's Representatives. Better take the direct way of at- taining the same end. Should a Minister be elected a Member of the House, then, of course, he would sit in a double capacity, and would vote as a Representative of the People.

We do not see why a Minister, were this principle adopted,. should sit exclusively in either House. He might advantageously sit in the one or the other, when measures belonging particularly to his department, or of which he had the charge or responsibility,. came under discussion.