Prophecies of Norman Angell

FEW books of the present century have made more stir in the world than the work first issued as a pamphlet, by Sir Norman Angell, under the title, Europe's Optical Illusion, and re-issued in a more complete form in 1910 as The Great illusion. It appeared at a time when the tension in Europe was becoming acute, when growing commercial rivalry between England

and Germany was accompanied by a race in naval armaments, and " scare-mongers " were talking of the approach of war. At that moment appeared this work by a comparatively obscure but well-informed journalist, who had a head for economic facts and acquaintances among bankers. He asked a number of leading questions which were so palpably relevant to the situation that statesmen, economists and even soldiers were struck by them, and began talking about his apparently unanswerable answers.

He asked: What was the purpose for which great military preparations were made ? What were the reasons underlying the policy which all nations follow—namely, the • pursuit of power ? Did they not rest on the assumption that prepon- derance of military power" paid," in the sense that the wealth of a foreign nation could be annexed, or its trade transferred by dominant armies and navies, or its economic rivalry des- troyed to the advantage of the victor, or profitable indemnities levied upon the conquered He showed that under the inter- locked conditions of modern international finance an economic damage infficted on one great country was a damage to all ; that to conquer a foreign nation was not to increase the wealth of the conqueror ; that territory could be annexed, but not wealth ; that armies and navies contributed nothing to the security of bank balances or the flow of trade ; and that large indemnities could not be exacted.

The difficulty in the ease of a large indemnity is not So much the payment by the vanquished as the receiving by the victor."

What, he asked, would be the consequences of a situation imagined by a "fiery patriot," when a German Army began to loot the cellars of the Bank of England ? There would be a run on every bank in England. •

But, simultaneously, German bankers, many with credit in London, would feel the effect. . . German finance would present a condition of chaos hardly less terrible than that in England. . . . The German General, while trying the Bank of England, would find that his own balance in the Bank of Berlin would have vanished into thin air."

A few years later the War broke out. Bank balances, it was noticed, did not disappear—or not then. The country was absorbed in a European War for more than four years, and,

economically, seemed to be as prosperous as it had ever been. The supporters of Sir Norman Angel were declared to be dis- credited. The " impossible " War had happened.

But, of course, the author had never said that war was ,

"impossible." He had only shown, that it was impossible, under modern conditions, to gain economic advantages by it. And as we look back over the history of the last fifteen years nearly all that he said seems to us to be, not paradox, but truism. His main theses—prOphecies when first uttered—have become so palpably true that younger readers may wonder how they were ever questioned. His book, in the form in which it is now issued, contains a revised version of the original, with some omissions and textual -alterations ; • a section showing its relevance to present problems, and another section in which he exposes the misrepresentations to which his argument has been subjected.

It is a pity that he has not exactly reproduced the text of The Great Illusion as it appeared in 1910 without altering a word, but prefacing it with his own criticism of himself. That would have been interesting. The appearance of that book aroused an historic controversy, and the reader of today is concerned to know just what he said then, when the issues trembled in the balance, and whether the oracle spoke truth. As it is, his emendations have the effect of putting him right where, in 1910, he was actually in error. Here, for example, are two passages side by side, the first from the 1910 edition, -

the second from the new volume: • 1910.

asta

An extent of devastation, even Appreximating to that which Mr. Harrison foreshadows as the result of the conquest of Great Britain by another nation, is a physical impossibility. No nation can in our day by military conquest permanently or for any considerable period destroy or greatly, damage the trade • of another, since trade depends on the existence of natural wealth and a population capable of working it."

1933.

"An extent of devastation, even approximating to that which Mr. Harrison foreshadowe, as the result _of the- conquest of Great-Britain, could only be in- flicted by an invader as a. mean.; of punishment costly to himself, or, as the result of an unselfish and expensive desire" to inflict misery for the mere joy of inflicting it. Since trade de- pends "upon the existence of natural wealth and a population capable of workingit, an invader cannot 'utterly destroy it' except by destroying the population."

The fact ought not to be concealed that in the earlier edition Sir Norman wentmuch too far, and was in error. There were many over-statements of this kind. But they do not affect the validity of his main argument, or detract to- any considerable extent from the high prophetic character of his remarkable book—a book which, if it had been heeded 'iv, much as it had been commented on in 1914, might have saved the world from disaster. And his lessons are still needed. If statesmen have ceased to believe that "war pays," they

still "pursue the policies which must lead to war." And when they say that they must arm for security, he does not

for a moment plead that the danger of attack is not present. It was because he was fully aware of that danger that he first wrote his book. It is because it exists that it is incumbent on leaders of thought to create a new order of ideas—to recognize that human behaviour and human ideals are not unchange- able or unchanging, and to convert the world to a new point of view. When all the nations realize that under modern

conditions there is no national advantage to be gained by war, then they will cease to be afraid of attack or to create