30 NOVEMBER 1833, Page 11

AMENDMENT OF THE LIEEL LAW.

THE Globe of Tuesday had de following remarks upon the law concerning private libels.

" As to private libels, we should desire some one of our contemporaries, who imagine,: he has a talent for definition, to define what ought to be punished as a Mid, and how damages in libel cases shall shall be 'estimated ; and should bee of him, in his definition, to bear in mind that the tribunal which is to try the question, whether etch ease does or dues not come within the definition, is to be tried by a tribunal formed of a dozen men to- he pricked for at random among a multitude of all sorts of capacities. It seems generally admitted, too, that the mere truth or falsehood of the publication (though a circumstance necessarily to be investigated) is not he the sole test of criminality. A gross falsehood may be ignorantly and innocently put forth ; and a truth may he often stated quite

hu-

material to the public, and with no other intention or result than that of mina- ing the feelings of some innocent man."

The Globe goes on to argue, that it will be necessary to inquire how far the publication was dictated by malice; and if there is no malice in the case, whether due diligence has- been used,—as very serious injury may be done to a man's character by one who is merely careless, and free from all design to inflict pain or commit a wrong. But these questions cannot be decided-without a carotid and expensive investigation ; and then we have to determine by which party the expenses should be borne.

" But suppose just answers obtained, andn mistaken but duly diligent jour- nalist acquitted—who is to pay the expenses?. The innocent and injured man may say—" It is very true, it •appears, after this investigation, that you had no malicious motives, and used. due diligence; but bow could I know this before? I have brought witnesses here to prove the falsehood of the charge, which by your means has been circulated through a thousand channels. I have strife' red grievously, though now know you'did not intend to inyure me : am 1 to pay the expenses of the investigation? " We come to this conclu.sion after all, that the expenses.of these. investigations are the chief difficulty at present, and that by some of the improvements we have seen suggested, they-may be very much multiplied. " We do not on this account discourage an attempt to improve the lac; but we would show that the question whether it is morally proper for a man to be prompt to prosecute, cannot altogether depend on the present state of the law. No amendment of the law will be a substitute for tolerance."

From the concluding paragraph of the article from which our extracts are taken, the Globe seems anxious to persuade people, that little good will come of the endeavours which are making to improve the law of libel.

" We are convinced that the morality in the country alone can repress both evils—chat it ought to hold up as a duty both to avoid malicious statements and unnecessary prosecutions. Public men ought to weigh very carefully the neces- sity of a prosecution before they embark in one, with a care proportioned to the knowledge of the injury they may do by setting an example of the odious vice of litigiousness."

We do not imagine that we have any peculiar talent for defini- tion ; nor are we aware that much is necessary, to state simply and clearly " what ought to be punished as a libel."

We would lay it dawn as thegeneral rule, that it is libellous to pub- lish what is injurious and not true; but that either the truth or in- nocence of a statement shall be deemed a justification for publishing it. It will be said that the exceptions to this general rule must be very numerous. We thiuk not. Look at the common run of actions for private libels that are brought into oar courts, and-you will find that the prosecutor almost invariably affirms that he has been injured because his conduct has been ,falsely stated. It very rarely indeed happens'that a man prosecutes another for speaking or writing what he acknowledges to be the truth respecting him, or what, if false, does him no injury. Advantage may be taken by the prosecutor of the present state of the law, to have these ques- tions settled befsre the defendant comes to a Jury : of this unfair advantage we would deprive him, by enacting that the accused should have ample opportunity of proving the truth or innocence of what lie had published, Wore the Jury ; and that by proving either one or the other, he should be entitled to a verdict.

Cases might:occur to which the above rule ought not to apply, —in which, if the prosecutor should prove (and the onus should be laid upon him) that the publication of the truth .%`as in his particular instance injurious and uncalled for, then it should not be a sufficient answer on the. part of the defendant to prove the

truth only of his publication. - We say that the prosecutor

should make it appear' that the publication question was uncalled-for : should this latter allegation be disproved,—should the defendant make it -appear that the public character of the complainant was implicated in his private actions,—then the charge of libel should fall-to the ground. It may be extremely proper that their fellow-citizens should know much of the pSi- vete history of men who hold offices of trust, or who derive from their public station the means of injuring or benefiting so- ciety by their examples. No stockjobber or gambler should be Chancellor of the Exchequer : no drunkard, no man of lax nio- rality, should have a seat on the bench of Justice or on the bend: ofBishopss It might happen, however, that a person in private life had twenty years ago been guilty of some offence, some peccadillo, which would have lain in oblivion had not an enemy ferreted it out and given it new currency. If the publisher of this forgotten tale failed to show that any public benefit could be expected to arise from again bringing it into notice, and if' the complaieant proved that its revival inflicted pain and injury upon him, thou the defendant would be justly liable to punishment ; the amount of which would depend upon the peculiar circumstances of -the case.

Such cases as the one we have supposed would be of rare occur- rence; and we are persuaded that the rule of considering that • only to be libellous which is both false and injurious, would 'be found a safe, just, and easy one, in an immense majority of in- stances. Even under the existing law, which gives such advan- tages to the prosecutor, how few actions, as we before remarked, are brought to obtain recompense for injuries occasioned by the publication of what is true?

The G/ob3 reminds us thatthe tribunal before-whom libel cases are tried is composed of men " pricked for at random among a multitude of all sorts of capacities." This may be an argument against the trial of such actions by Juries ; but that is not the point in linable : whatever description of men are to decide these questions, they will decide the better by having clear rules laid, down for their guidance. It may be that the Judges would, it: most of the cases which come into court, decide with more dis- cretion than Juries : vet actions for libel are about the last.which we should wish to see withdrawn from the decision of Juries with all their ignorance and prejudices. In the case of the " innocent and injure d man," supposed be the Globe, who sutlers grimously by a falsehood, ant has in- curred great expense in disproving. a elm go against him, we should say, beyond all doubt the-reasonable expenses of the inves- tigation should fall upon the person who committed the .injury. That he had used due diligence,•and was not-actuated by ought not to free him from alkthe consequences of having stated what is false : mind, that is the point—he has made a false anti injurious charge. It would of course be absurd to attempt to define `chow damages in libel cases shall be estimated." The-circumstances of each case must determine the amount of San:ages or punishment which a convicted libeller should pay or undergo..• Where the injury in- flicted is great, or where the malice is evident, the guilty•party should be mulcted in purse or person with proportionate severity. and vice versa: If our existing tribunals are incompetent to decide the proper quantum of damages or punishment; then:they should be reformed; but the necessity for a new libel law will remain the same, and the difficulty of framing ajust one is not augmented or

diminished thereby. •

It appears to us to be a rather unsatisfactory-mode of dismissing the consideration of this subject, to suggest in conclusion, as- the Globe has done, that the "morality in the couetry " should he looked to as the preventive of libels. It is mere idle preaohing to say that this " morality ought to hold up as a duty bet h to avoid malicious statements and nanecessary prosecutions." Of course, moral men ought to be cautious in their discourse, their wi-itings, and their example. But we want laws for the punishment of the slanderer and the defence of the just notwithstateling; and if the existing laws are insufficient, it becomes the duty of the Legisla- ture to provide better.