Up to the present moment, the Afghan soldiery, with every
advantage of position, and plenty of cannon, have done nothing. They have not displayed either skill, or perseverance, or ordinary courage. Their want of pluck, indeed, has created an impression in England that they are either disheartened, or secretly favour- able, or hopelessly disorganised, and it is broadly declared that " the Afghan war is over." That is too rapid a conclusion. It is probable that the first objects of the expeditions—the capture of Caudahar, the Shaturgardan, and Jellalabad—will be accom-
plished almost without loss, but they are not yet achieved, and it is well to wait for the few remaining days. The swift retreat of the Afghans without resistance is nevertheless perplexing. We may dismiss the notion of a plot to draw the British on, for it is beyond Afghan strategy, and there is no evidence whatever of general disorganisation. The most probable explanation is the Russian one,—that Shere Ali has concentrated all his resources for the defence of his capital ; but there is another which is reasonable. The discipline of the Afghans, which is quite new, has broken down. Share Ali, in 1859, reorganised his army on the British plan, using Sepoys who had fled after the mutiny as drill-instructors, and his " regulars" find themselves only hampered by their new ways. If this is the case, the Ameer will fight one great battle in the open, and his army will be destroyed, as every Asiatic force has been which has tried European tactics. This is a mere suggestion, but it is at least more probable than the sudden change of very brave men, who have been fighting successfully all their lives, into cowards.
