BOOKS.

THE GOVERNMENT OF M. TRIERS.* [FINAL NOTICE.) "THE movement that at Bordeaux swept M. Thiers into power was due to a concurrence of distinct streams, which only the extreme pres- sure of the hour could coerce into a temporary confluence. While Thiers was the elected of twenty-eight constituencies, and the chosen by acclamation of the Assembly, it is admitted by M. Simon that he could never reckon, even in the spring-tide of

• Le Gourernement de AL Thiers. Par Jules Simon. 2 vols. Calman Levy. 1878.

his exaltation, on the general support of a majority in the Legislature. " The number of Deputies who put their trust in him, and were ready to share his resolutions and his fortunes,

was very limited. The extreme Left was full of against him ; even in the Left proper there remained mistrust ; that he was patriotic and liberal, men knew, but they believed him to be Orleanist." If this was the sentiment amongst temperate Republicans, that entertained towards him by the Legitimist Right —very numerous in the Bordeaux Assembly—was one of downright aversion ; while we learn that already at this period, " the Orleanists, who looked on him as their necessary leader, entertained a feeling that they could not yet reckon on him." M. Thiers, therefore, was elected, because all parties at that moment felt the abso- lute necessity for postponing every other matter to the negotiations begun with the victor, and because all parties recognised in M. Thiers the aptest instrument to carry through that particular business. That an investiture which the majority of those voting it meant to be strictly limited as a mere deputation ad hoc, became converted into a tenure extending over two years, under which France was led irresistibly into a Republican form of government, was due to extraordinary personal qualities on the part of M. Thiers, notably to a marvellous faculty for imposing his will, and a quite feverish expenditure of activity. A political system which should be the effacement of every per- sonal principle was introduced through the medium of the most personal of French politicians,—the man of all others who could least bring himself to waive a point, or to defer to a different opinion from his own. This combative spirit of inveterate self- assertion has been the subject of much adverse criticism. M. Simon is, however, an ardent admirer of Thiers, and from his friendly hand we have here a striking picture of M. Thiers' almost incredible efforts to absorb in himself the whole machinery of the State :— " It is very true, M. Thiers interfered in everything. It was curious to see how ho busied himself about the pottiest details, without losing himself in them, and while keeping his mind free for largo matters and comprehensive views. Circumstantial details have boon printed con- cerning two assumed Councils,—the one consisting of heads of depart-

ments in the different offices, who came to him in the early morning ; and the other, the Council of Ministers, which met daily at eleven, excepting Sunday. There is in all this both truth and falsehood, but most of the latter. The only Council was that of the Ministers, but though there was no other Council, no regular and collective con- vocation, the President was fully occupied the whole morning.

He received tho directors of the finances, some Generals—somo intendants—some men, like General Velazd and Admiral Krantz—in whom he placed special confidence; it was a whim of his to know de- pattmental matters before tho particular Ministers, which was not always agreeable to them. Ho also would see persons connected with the police, to the despair• of his friends, who considered this to bo be- neath him. He laughed at this. 'It is through these rascals that one pulls the honest mon of business.' All despatches passed under his eyes. He insisted on knowing, minute by minute, the condition of France—of Europe—all our relations with the Chancellor, and with tho humblest General in any command of troops of occupation. As long as M. J. Fevre retained the Foreign Office, he lodged him in his own house, to have the news at once, as they came in. Afterwards ho had a lodging arranged for M. do Remusat within the pre- cincts of the Prefecture. Every day he conferred with the Home Minister and the Minister of Finance. Ho summoned to his presence the Governors of the Bank,—the great financiers. He busied himself minutely about every detail relating to the War Office, armament, equipment, barrack arrangements, and supplies of food. The Army of Paris did not make a step except by his orders. Every day he was to ho seen at the outposts. Ho anxiously troubled himself about Customs duties, this being one of his greatest passions. Two Departments alone escaped his intervention and inspection.—Justice, because it is not good to meddle in the affairs of M. Dufaure ; Public Instruction and Worship, because in respect of these two points ho relied on the prudence and competency of the Minister. Not that he was always at one with M. Dufour° and M. J. Simon. More than once ho wanted a change in the personnel of his department which he did not get from M. Dufaure. So, also, ho had no fancy for compulsory education, or for the additional estimates on behalf of

teachers. But he confined himself to objections at long intervals ;

ho always gave way with kindliness and with good grate Thanks to a strong will and the excessive lucidity of his mind, ho met all calls. Ho always seemed given up to the busi- ness and the person of the moment. Many who do not tho twentieth part of his labour have a look of being overburdened, which was never seen on him. Ho was master, not merely of his mind, but of his temper. Not that ho could control himself against provocation, or that he tried much to do so. If he was offended, or oven only bored, he did not hesitate to show it. But ho never was of a saturnine temper. During the most serious crises, ho had fits

of gaiety Without this liveliness, which came spontaneously, and set him up again in peace and spirits, he never could have sufficed for such crushing toils."

We apprehend that a more faithful portraiture of M. Thiers' manner of doing business could not well be painted than is conveyed in these words.

Although the course of M. Tillers' administration was one

correctly described by the author as that of " une marche ascendante " towards the Republic, it is the fact that while beginning with a Cabinet that comprised three avowed Repub- licans, the successive modifications made in it by him, with the view of meeting embarrassments in the Legislature, all partook of a conservative character. M. Simon alone of the Ministers named at Bordeaux retained his post until eight days prior to May 24th, and in the interval he had once for colleague a man so far from his own opinion as M. Goulard,—a politician so much of the Right, that M. de Broglie emphasised him as " our Minister." It is evident how a Council pieced together of utterly discordant elements must needs be inoperative, as regards real influence, against a strong-willed President of M. Thiers' stamp. "When M. de Broglie spoke of two conflicting policies within the Cabinet," says M. Simon, " he was in the right ; that had been the case ever since Bordeaux." When the President, in December, 1872, took M. Fourtou into the Ministry, DI. Simon

thought it right to make some observations about the irritation felt in the Left at this nomination, to which he received the following very characteristic reply :—

" Your friends believe that I do not understand men, because I make nominations they do not like, but it is they who have no understanding for political situations. I cannot do without the votes of the majority. It does vote for me, though it is hostile to me. Such results are to be obtained only by adroitness. I make advances to it that do not commit me, because I remain master of everything. We will see what has to be done when the Constitution has been voted. Meanwhile, I am not a constitutional Sovereign, who reigns, but does not govern. Do you understand me ?"

Here we have a telling illustration of that boundless spirit of self- confidence which undeniably contributed so much to M. Thiers' successes, but as certainly also to the immediate cause of his downfall. The passionate belief in his infallibility clouded the perspicacity of his intellect, and on certain occasions made him persistently blind to what had become patent for minds of the

most ordinary keenness.

An incident which greatly contributed to define the breach between the President and an important section of the anti- Republican party, was his action in reference to the motion for the admission of the Orleans Princes to all the rights of citizen- ship. The motives that actuated him in desiring the main- tenance of proscription against the members of all families that had been on the French Throne are thus stated, and it deserves notice how, in the deliberate opinion of M. Thiers, the future of France lay between the Empire and the Republic :—

" The matter was most embarrassing for M. Thiers and some of his Ministers. M. Thiers had long been Louis Philippe's Minister ; he repudiated none of his opinions and none of his friendships. Had the Orleans Princes, in their private capacities, been in -need of his devotion, ho would have freely given it. Ho did not consider an Orleanist re- storation as possible at that time, and he also did not reckon on it for the future. He often said, if the Republic fell, neither the Comte de Chambord nor the House of Orleans would be the heirs. He grow to convince himself more and more that the only govern- ment France could henceforth tolerate was a Liberal and Conser-

vative Republic The Princes said loudly that they were neither Pretenders nor men of factions ; all they asked was to return to their country, and to serve it, under any form of govern- ment it might give itself Such was their language, the sincerity of which M. Thiers did not question Neither the

Princes nor their partisans thought of recurring to revolutionary means for establishing their reryime on the ruins of the Republic. It is not in their traditions, it did not enter into their feelings, to appeal to force. They had the support of the Legitimists and Bonapartists, because every one was at ease in the matter of their intentions, and also, if the wsrd must be said, of their capacities in men, money, and popularity. For all these reasons, M. Thiers was wholly free from anxiety on the score of civil war. He knew the Orleanists would never go the length of proffering constitutional monarchy ; they would merely hold it ready against the day it was asked for. That day, in his opinion,would never come. The future of France he believed to lie within this dilemma : the Republic or Empire .... He thought, however that the Republic was too new, too pro- visional, too much questioned, and surrounded by too many enemies and perils, to support the additional embarrassments the Princes would cause by the mere fact of their presence That is what M. Thiers said to the Princes, to their friends, and to the Repub-

licans His wish was that the Chamber, without pronouncing the name of any dynasty, should maintain the existing laws of exile against members of all families that had reigned. He was

not listened to 31 Thiers was therefore beaten on the abolition of those laws of exile. . . . . . The result was a check given to his policy, and the lino he had followed created for him violent enmities, in a world full both of intrigue and intelligence."

On January 20th, 1872, in consequence of an adverse vote in reference to the Government scheme of taxes, M. Thiers sent in his resignation, which he withdrew next day, on an unanimous ap- peal from the Assembly. The incident had come too suddenly; the parties coalesced in opposition were not at that time ready with an individual to put in his place; not improbably, his experience that day of being still indispensable rendered M. Thiers even less dis- posed to recognise the ominous combinations that were growing up in formidable strength, and to confide even more in the certainty of his continuing triumphant. The situation had, however, become so acute, that a direct crisis could not be any longer much postponed.- "The different sections of the Right recognised that prolonga-

tion must serve the Republic, and that it was, at least, necessary quickly to strike some big blow, which, in impeding the progress of Republican ideas, would give the Reaction time to take counsel." At one moment, in June, 1872, an effort was

made to win over the President. A deputation of the Centre Droit waited on M. Thiers, but after an interview that lasted two and a half hours, the parties separated without any understanding. " You wish to be Conservatives, and so do I, too," were M. Thiers's concluding words. " To attain that purpose, there is only one way,—that is, to make a Conservative Republic." The three months' recess which immediately followed proved " a troublous period." Political agitation of every form and kind— Republican, Clerical, Monarchical, and Imperialist—paraded the country. 31. Simon goes so far as to say that at this period "the Orleanists and Legitimists sought to establish alliances in the political world, and anxiously sounded military commanders ;"- while the Bonapartists had on foot an organisation, " with a paid. head, a police, and quasi-official agents, of whom some were attached to the existing Administration." " M. Thiers viewed this intensified audacity not without uneasiness." Still, we are told, "the chief source of anxiety to the Government, in the midst of so many grave matters for consideration, came from the Republicans." During the recess, the more advanced section had publicly manifested their indisposition any longer to defer to the temporising influence of the President. Meetings had been announced which the Government had deemed it incumbent to prevent, and " M. Gambetta had spoken one of those resounding harangues he knows so well how to make, which was given in every journal," and in which the Right " affected to see the declaration of Socialism and Communism." Under these angry conditions did the Legislature reassemble in November, presenting the aspect of " two armies confronting each other,—the Right pitted against the Left, the Monarchy—the three Monarchies—against the Republic." Before this inflamed Assembly, M. Thiers presented himself with his memorable Message on November 13th,—a document such as he loved to compose, in trenchant phrase, out of his inner conscious- ness, as an oracular utterance of superior teaching to the C00111101) herd. " The purpose he aimed at in writing this message was to break with the exaggerated and compromising Republicans,— to draw to the Centre Gauche liberal and sagacious members of the Centre Droit, and so constitute a majority more in conformity with his own views." M. Simon not merely admits that it wholly failed of such effect, but says, " M. Thiers voluntarily precipitated the crisis by his message." As usual, he had taken no one into consultation. " Only the day before its delivery did he com- municate it to the Cabinet, when seven out of nine Ministers heard of it for the first time." After the Council, the two who were admitted to a little confidence remaining with the President, the latter said to them, " 'shall have told to parties, to France, to- Europe, my mind, and all my mind,—that is, the capital point for

me and for you. As for the success " But M. Simon adds significantly, "Nevertheless, he believed in its success much more

than his two friends He could not be brought to believe that men who had been attached to him, who had fought with him under his guidance for Parliamentary Government, would abandon him in the supreme struggle, from a spirit of party and coterie." This truly extraordinary self-reliance, in one who had so long been afloat on the treacherous sea of French politics, seemed even to become intenser as the final day drew near. It was M. Thiers who deliberately provoked the incident which, according to M. Simon, "dealt the last blow to his Government," namely, the defeat of M. de Rdmusat by M. Barodet in the contest for a Paris constituency. No sooner was the idea of his standing broached, than " M. Thiers at once was in favour of his doing so,

M. de Re'musat was indisposed thereto ; he acquiesced only grudgingly, and in deference to the wishes of his colleagues. M. J. Simon alone was strongly against this candidateahip." With his knowledge of the popular classes, he predicted that the Parisian voters would poll for Barodet (who had been maire of the just sup- pressed Lyons municipality) as the representative of a great demo- cratic principle. M. Thiers nevertheless " would insist " on M. de Remusat's standing, and relied for his triumph on the fact that as Foreign Minister he had just concluded the final convention with Germany,—a diplomatic achievement M. Thiers, with justice, was proud of. " He would not admit the idea that Paris could possibly vote against the MiLister who just had affixed his signature to the liberation of the country," and so, in defiance of prudent counsel, the Government was marched up to receive "a stunning blow."

There was, however, another point on which M. Thiers' belief in himself led him into yet more fatal blindness. He lived to the last moment in the conviction that however much parties in the Legislature might dislike him, they could not possibly get rid of him, because there was no man in France that could occupy his post at that conjuncture. How thoroughly this delusion had hold of him is clearly shown in these volumes. When the convention which shortened the occupation of France by the German troops was communicated to the Assembly, the latter passed a vote which, though nominally of thanks to the Government, virtually was one of significant discourtesy to M. Thiers. Its intention was patent. " On the day after," we read, " the various incidents of the debate were talked over at the Council. 111. Simon laughingly said to M. Thiers, ' Now you will have to say your !Punt Dintitlis,' to which M. Thiers, with a thoughtful expression, replied, ' But they have got no one.' They have Marshal MacMahon,' said M. Simon ; whereupon M. Thiers, with much vivacity, exclaimed, ' 06, as for that one, I answer for him ; he will never accept!' " That phrase, " They have no one," was frequently heard from 111. Thiers, even after the notice had been given on May 19th of the interpellation regarding his policy which, on the 23rd, was carried by a majority that forced his resignation next day. He was utterly unprepared for an event which yet good friends had clearly foreseen, and had felt it a duty to prognosticate to him. The only excuse that can be urged for his obstinate persistence not to recognise the impending event must be the circumstance that if the Marshal, who till then had never shown any disposition towards politics, had really held aloof, the coalition must have been shivered for practical results, from the absence of any other man who could have been accepted by the motley coalition at that moment as a stop-gap. "It is very certain, and a very curious fact," says M. Simon, " that had the Marshal, from some scruple, declined to lend himself to the views of the Right, the latter had no one who could have filled his place."

Here the curtain drops, and here we take leave of M. J. Simon. He has done his work well. We have heard men prominently connected with bringing about the crisis of May 24th bear testi- mony to the fairness of his narrative. Why should he not carry his labours beyond the present point? M. Thiers, though driven from office, did not cease to be a political power on May 24th. Who better than M. Simon could give us a graphic account of the thoughts and words and actions of the remarkable states- man during the remaining period of his life, a period marked by the piquant and not yet fully illustrated episode of the Comte de Chambord's abortive visit to Versailles, and by the no less inter- esting progress of intimacy between the ex-President and the great Tribune, whom once be had with all his vivacity denounced as a spirit of danger and disturbance?