TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN. THE English people seem for a moment to have forgotten what war is like, and are throwing up their caps, before the contest is over, in a most undignified way. As yet, the Indian Generals have done what little they had to do extremely well, but their work has scarcely begun. The Afghans have hardly addressed themselves to their task of defence. Either their leaders are paralysed by some division in the Durbar, threatening a Palace revolution, which is possible ; or they have decided on fighting round the capital only, which is probable ; or they are, for the time being, panic-struck by the actual advance of the dreaded Southern Power, which is the most likely of all. That Power must seem to them what Russia seems to the Roumanians. The advancing shadow of the mighty Em- pire, with which no Asiatic Prince has ever struggled successfully, has momentarily chilled the hearts of the Afghans. At all events, they, individually among the bravest of mankind, have retreated everywhere, either without firing a shot, or without serious resistance. General Biddulph, with the Western Column,though tormented by the cold, and without warm clothing for his men —an omission for which, as Hindoos cannot wear sheepskins, some Commissariat chief should be dismissed—has advanced unopposed from Quetta to Pisheen, and though all trace of him has been lost for a day or two, will doubtless reach Candahar. General Roberts, with the Central Column, has occupied the Koorum Valley and the Fort of Koorum without difficulty, and by the latest telegrams was " stripping " his force—that is, was sending back his superfluous baggage and followers, previous to an attack on the Peiwar, and possibly the Shaturgardan, the dangerous Pass which controls the entrance to Afghanistan on that side. He has moved quickly, he is doing his utmost to conciliate the mountaineers, and he deserves every credit for energy ; but as yet he has, except through a telescope, seen no Afghans, and has not reached his objective point. General Browne, with the Eastern Column, carried Ali Musjid, and the works on the ridges commanding that fort, with slight loss, the Afghans, who had twenty-two effective guns and great stores of pro- visions, when they saw themselves surrounded, flying in a panic,—an incident the more important, because they were com- manded by the Mir Akhor, the second man in the Afghan army. But that Asiatics of every country are liable to fits of panic, under which they are uncontrollable, the story would suggest a collapse of all resisting power ; but as it is, it is only a fact indi- cating nothing, except that Afghans often run away. General Browne, with the regular Anglo-Indian audacity, followed up his success, continuing his rush through the Pass with such speed, that when he emerged from it into the Dhakka Valley, on the 23rd inst., he had momentarily lost his communications, and straggling bands of brigands crossed his rear line un- molested, shooting down camp-followers, and even seizing his mail-bags, on their way to Peshawur. In Dhakka, he found the Afghan cantonment deserted, and the neighbouring villagers perfectly ready to sell him supplies, and by the latest telegrams was already advancing on Jellalabad without waiting for General Maude, who on Thursday had not yet crossed the Indus.
All this is very good indeed, as far as it goes, but it goes only a little way. Not one of the three Generals has yet reached a point at which he can remain, and secure himself for the winter, or await the reinforcements necessary for any great immediate operation. General Biddulph will doubtless reach Candahar, but he has not passed the dangerous bit of his road, and can therefore only be described as on his way to a success which his audacity thoroughly deserves. There are circumstances, that we do not care to discuss publicly, which make his apparently easy movement in- comparably the most dangerous of the three, and to shout and sing before it is finished, and he safe in Candahar and in enjoyment of the protection, as well as prestige, which the city would give him, is puerile, as puerile as it would be not to place strong supports—European supports—on his lengthy line of communications. The Indian Government obviously reposes profound confidence in the Khan of Khelat, whose singularly bold and brusque character probably justifies it ; but General Stewart is further behind than, if the Afghans were in heart, would be at all satisfactory, and soldiers will hear of supports at Quetta with relief as well as pleasure. General Roberts, in the Koorum, has, as we said, all his work to do. That he will do it, carry the Peiwar, and clear
the Shaturgardan, we do not doubt ; but it remains to be done, and /mans of triumph before it is done are but affronts to for- tune. As to General Browne, he has still to reach and capture. Jellalabad before he is in an endurable position. To camp- out in the stinking, dysentery-breeding Afghan cantonment at Dhakka, which in a month will be buried in snow, would be most dangerous, even if the Commissariat were as confident as anybody can see, from the telegrams, it is not. If Jellalabad.
has been evacuated, as Englishmen suppose, the next advance will be easy, the Hillmen having evidently made up their minds to be as friendly as they know how to be,—that is, to be.
quite friendly on all points but a little plunder, while the English star is on the rise. If, however, Jellalabad has not been evacuated, but is still defended by ten regiments, Sir S. Browne will have five days to wait for General Maude with his reserves, and will then be obliged to capture a fortified city by some sort of coup de main, so as to be in possession before the full danger of the cold sets in. All the indications point to success, for he will have ample force ; he himself is clearly a man who possesses both strategy and daring, and we take it to be certain, from the brigands' exploits, that he has succeeded in carrying on his heavy guns through the Pass— really a great feat in transport ; but if success is ever so cer- tain, it should be secured before the shouting begins. Within ten days the Armies ought to be in admirable positions for an advance in spring, if advance is to be delayed till spring, but they are not there yet. They are through the garden-gates in safety—leaving them, in one case, open,. possibly to be closed behind them—but they are not in the house ; and it is the house, and not only the gates, which must be carried.
We have spoken of the admirable positions the Armies will occupy, but it must be remembered they are admirable only if we intend to conquer Afghanistan. If we are to remain in Jellalabad and Candahar without a Treaty, the Indian Government will be compelled to extend its railways up to the Passes,—that is, to cross the Indus with railway bridges or tunnels at three points, to keep 6,000 Europeans perman- ently in garrison in Afghanistan, and to reduce the whole of the mountaineers, stated to number 100,000 men, to subjec- tion. It is impossible to leave them the power of attacking our communications at any moment. That will be a new and' most difficult task for the Indian Government to accomplish with a restless and dangerous enemy beyond the Passes, ready to take advantage of every Indian emergency. There is an idea dominant in London that with British troops on his side of the mountain, the Ameer, at last convinced that we are in earnest, will make peace, and accept his position as a British feudatory. As we are there, we hope it may be so, but we are wholly unable to believe it. Why should he make peace,. when he has not seriously tried war? Shere Ali is not the man to yield with his capital unconquered, and even if it be taken, he will probably fly to Herat, leaving the British with Afghanistan on their hands, in perpetual danger of an attack from a Pretender, who would then be the hope of all Mussulmans, and the most dangerous of all Russian agents. Shere Ali in Herat will cost us two millions a year. He has fled before in his life, and has come back again, and he may well believe that he can repeat the process. It would be necessary, before we could enjoy an orderly peace, to subjugate all Afghanistan, the work which, as we are told in all Tory speeches, the Government does not intend to undertake. For this work, no doubt, our forward position in spring would be an excellent one; but if we are not to do this, then our Armies are only advanced to points which the Afghans- can always threaten, as they could never threaten Peshawur, and which must be made safe by great works, great garrisons, and great expenditure, and even then will be divided from our true base, the sea, by the long defiles which it is considered such a feat to have traversed in the face of a few Afghans. We have not arrived at the positions yet, though of course we shall arrive ; but even then we are only at the threshold of a vast undertaking, made easier, no doubt, by the campaign just begun, but still full of most dangerous possibilities. The Tories think the two cities to be occupied great additions to our strength, but we hardly know which will be worst,—the obligation of holding them as advanced posts in a hostile country, or the obligation of advancing from them to the sub- jugation of the whole land. The good management of our Generals, so far, is quite real, and a fair subject for gratulation ; but the last thing it proves is, that India was weak while she remained behind her natural wall.
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