30 OCTOBER 1886, Page 6

THE BULGARIAN THRONE.

TWO incidents which have marked the week bring into strong relief the actual and very singular position of affairs in Eastern Europe. The dominant factors in that position are that Prince Bismarck is unwilling to give the slightest offence to the Czar, lest the irritable monarch should resolve to risk a war ; and that the Czar is determined to acquire a visible dominance in Bulgaria, and not to be content with a controlling "influence." The first factor was greatly affected by a statement which appeared in the Standard of Wednesday. That journal announced, in a way which is usually employed to indicate "inspiration," that Prince Bismarck con- sidered Russia bound to propose a candidate for the Bulgarian throne, that the interregnum could not last for ever, and that if she did not, there would be no reason for resisting the return of Prince Alexander. That statement, had it been true would have profoundly irritated the Russian Emperor, who, it is well understood, will risk anything—a general war included—rather than permit his cousin's return to Sofia. This was at once understood in Berlin, if not by the German Embassy here also ; and so greatly moved was the Chancellor by the Standard's statement, that by 11 a.m. of the same morning, an official denial of the story was in circula- tion in London. Prince Bismarck does not often take that kind of instant notice of a newspaper rumour, and his energy on the occasion shows with what vigilance, and even fear, he watches against any occurrence which may induce the Czar to strike up an alliance with France, and risk a European ex- plosion. The other incident is the despatch of two war-vessels to Varna, to protect Russian subjects and Consuls against aggressive treatment. As nothing has occurred at Varna to justify such a step, that is a mere menace, intended, first of all, to encourage Russia's partisans within the entrance port of Bulgaria • and secondly, to warn the Sobranje, whose members are assembling at Tirnova, that Russia will go any length in the way of compulsion if her demands are not accepted.

What are those demands? It is clear they are not confined to the election of a friendly Prince. If they were, the Russian agents would not repeat so persistently that the Sobranje has been illegally elected. They would wish to recognise it, in order to hurry on the election of a Prince. Moreover, it is known that on this one point the Bulgarians are not resisting Russia. They are eager for a Prince, they believe they can keep any Prince within the Constitution, and they have signified privately and publicly that they will accept any candidate whom Russia may put forward, and whom Europe is prepared to recognise. They will elect Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, or Prince Waldemar of Denmark, or Duke John of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, or anybody else whom the Czar will nominate, and be only too glad to be rid at that price of the crisis and its indefinite risks. This, however, does not satisfy the Czar. He wants, first of all, an open and public submission sufficient to satisfy his pride as supreme head of all Slavic peoples ; and secondly, such a direct control of Bulgaria as shall make it certain that his road to Constantinople will be always open. He will not permit the passes of the Balkans to be in the hands of a Prince who, however friendly, may make alliances of his own, and may deny passage to Russian troops. He demands, therefore, that before he submits the name of any candidate, the Sobranje shall authorise the Regency to place Russian officers at the head of the Bulgarian Army, and to transfer to the Czar the control of Bulgarian foreign policy. Once armed with these two concessions, the Emperor will feel safe, for no Prince could then either confederate the Balkan States, or direct his troops to resist the passage of a Russian army through the mountains so nearly made impassable by Suleiman Pasha. The Bulgarians, who are quite aware that under these conditions their freedom will be most precarious, and that their throne will not be worth having, will only accept them under the strongest pressure ; and that pressure is being applied, not only diplomatically at Sofia, but in the most direct and unmistakeable fashion at Varna. The Emperor is avoiding occupation as long as possible, lest it should compel Austro-Germany to interfere ; but he intends to prevail, whatever the consequences ; and in threatening Varna, he is not only saying so in the most un- mistakeable way, but he is making the next step easier, should he ultimately be compelled to take it. Winter, it must be remembered, does not prevent a fleet from reaching Varna, while it does prevent the free movement of an Austrian army.

It is suggested in this country that the Great Assembly at Tirnova might baffle many Russian plans by continuing the Regency, or declaring Bulgaria a Republic. The second plan is, however, nearly impossible. The Republic would not be able to manage foreign relations, which require instant decision, much courage, and perfect secrecy ; it would not be liked by the people, which desires a Sovereign as Commander- in-Chief ; and it is irreconcileable with the arrangement under which Bulgaria and East Roumelia are for the time united. Prince Alexander reigned in Philippopolis as Governor-General for the Sultan, and the Sultan could not appoint a Republic to that post. The country, moreover, is not ready for any system of the kind. We must not forget, because the Bulgarians are displaying both tenacity and ability, that they are but just emancipated from Turkish rule, that, they understand little of Constitutional compromises, and that, owing to causes too numerous to be detailed here, they are terribly open to be influenced by money. The Bulgarian who cannot be bought is considered a noble Bulgarian ; and a Prince is necessary, not only to put down corruption, but to prevent the reckless malice with which the parties are accusing each other of taking bribes. The Regents are just as much embarrassed by these difficulties as a Republic would be ; and the statement which M. Stambouloff makes to every interviewer in succession, that a Prince is indispensable, is, therefore, exactly true, and is the reason why the Russian Government either hesitates or declines to name its candidate, and so allow the confusion of the interregnum to come to an end. A Prince must be elected, or Russia will make of Bulgaria a mere dependency ; and it is the second end towards which her diplomacy is directed. Whether she can succeed without occupation is the question on which peace still depends.