THE POWERS AND THE TRANSVAAL CRISIS.
WHAT will the European Powers do if we go to war with the Transvaal ? That is a question which at the moment is being asked in many quarters. The true answer, we believe, is,—nothing. We do not, that is, believe in the alleged possibility of a combination of Powers "jumping on the back" of this country when it is engaged in a war with the Boers. The reasons for this belief are not difficult to set forth. To begin with, any of the Powers who may want to injure us must know that a war with the Transvaal does not interfere with our defensive strength. It is our Fleet, not our Army, on which we rely to protect us, and our Fleet will not be engaged in the coming war. If France did not think it worth while to fight us over Fashoda, why should she or any other Power think it would be easier now ? It cannot be seriously argued that though we could resist an invasion then, we could not resist it now, because we have sent thirty thousand troops to the Cape. In other words, if any Power or combination of Powers wished to attack us, they would not wait for a Boer war, for that event does not really modify the balance of strength in their favour and against us. No doubt when a Power is at war it is always diplomatically somewhat at a disadvantage ; and we admit that while war lasts it is considered almost a part of international etiquette that the Power engaged shall make minor concessions rather more easily. But that is a small matter. The main course of our foreign relations will not be affected by our being at war with the Boers any more than they were affected by the Afridi Frontier War, when we had, as a matter of fact, a larger number of white troops "locked up" than we shall have if war comes in South Africa.
But even if we do not insist upon these considerations, and if we suppose that foreign Powers are so badly informed as to think that a war with the Boers really makes us more vulnerable to attack, we do not believe that there is the slightest risk of any of them intervening in the present quarrel. Let us take the Powers one by one, and ask whether it is likely that they will be moved to "jump on our back" under the mistaken belief that we are at their mercy. Is France likely to engage in such an adventure ? Assuredly not. France does not want her Exhibition spoilt by war. Civil strife has done some injury to the prospects of the Exhi- bition, but there seems now a good chance that things will quiet down, and allow France to reap the inter- national harvest which it is calculated will be worth to her at least £60,000,000. When the Exhibition has just escaped one great peril is it reasonable to suppose that the French Government will voluntarily plunge into an adven- ture which, even if successful, must destroy her great Parisian fair? Besides, France has no direct interests in South Africa. If she would not fight in regard to the regions of the Nile and the Niger, is she likely to fight about those of the Orange River and the Vaal ? Were France to use her power to destroy England's position in South Africa, she must know that not she, but another Power, and one that she does not love, would be the gainer. But if France will not go to war with us over our policy in South Africa, still less is Germany likely to pose as the protector of the Boers. No one knows exactly what was the nature of the agreement made eighteen months ago with Germany, but it may be taken for granted that things were so arranged that German interests should not suffer in East Africa, but should be considerably augmented. In some form or other we doubtless agreed that she, and not England, should be the ultimate inheritor of the bulk of Portugal's East African possessions. German newspapers may blow off a great deal of steam about "a pirate Empire," but depend upon it the German Government will make no attempt to injure and emba.rrass us in our operations in the Transvaal. Russia, again, is not going to plunge Europe into war to help the Boers. Though no doubt Russia still entertains a certain suspicion as to our policy— might prove extremely disagreeable and embarrassing if a suspicion which we must admit is justified by the foolish. way in which we handled the Eastern question a generation ago, and by our recent Russophobe attitude as regards China —her statesmen know well enough that England is not now "the enemy." They realise that it is not we who bar the road to Constantinople, and that in China, though our merchants and newspapers may fuss and scream, we have no intention of preventing her carrying out her secular policy of expansion at the expense of the Chinese Empire. When we made a special and specific claim to the Yangtse Valley Russia knew that we practically left Northern China open to her policy. If one claims to guard the whole one does not ear-mark only a part as under one's protection. Russia, therefore, has nothing to gain by attacking us just now. No doubt she alone of the Great Powers could attack us successfully, for she alone can enter India by land, but that Russia should choose this moment for such an act is practically incredible. It suits neither with the aims of Russia's chief politicians, nor with the temperament of the- Emperor. The other Great Powers will certainly neither attack us themselves, nor lend their aid to any other assailant. Neither Austria-Hungary nor Italy would dream of such action. As to America, the answer is of course even more certain. It is possible that a portion of the American people may make the mistake which a portion of our people made during the war of the North and. South. Just as Mr. Gladstone declared that the North were fighting for empire and the South for freedom, so some Americans, sincere but mistaken, may imagine that we are now going to fight for empire and the Boers for freedom. They will forget the wrongs of the Outlanders, as we forgot the wrongs of the slaves, and fail to under- stand who are the people rightly struggling to be free. But we are not afraid of the nation as a whole making this blunder. A people so liberal to all new-comers, a people who in their wisdom and their justice have never tried to set up an Outlander caste, are not likely to sympathise for long with the Boer oligarchy. And, in any case, the criticism we get from America will be the criticism of friends, not of enemies. Some Americans may be misled into calling us tyrants, but if any attempt were made by the Powers of Europe to combine against us, we should never have a moment's doubt as to the part that would be played by our own flesh and blood. Even if they do not yet under- stand rightly what we did last year, and even if the Spanish- American War had never been fought, they would forbid any attempt at a coalition to injure England. The Anglo- Saxon race is not going to allow itself to be destroyed in detail. If one half is attacked by a combination of Powers beyond its strength, the other half will know and do its duty. Probably there would be no need for active inter, vention by America even if we were attacked by France, Germany, and Russia together—the combination is in reality impossible, and we only name it for the purposes of argument, or rather illustration—but the knowledge that in the last resort America would be at our side would wither any combination almost as soon as it was made. German military men may say that American armies are only badly led mobs of civilians masquerading in ugly uniforms, and that they can be safely neglected, but somehow or other we fancy that the safest form of neglect would be held to be the avoiding of any contact or conflict with the aforesaid mobs. There is yet another reason why a combination of Powers being formed to humble England is most unlikely. The Powers do not love each other so unselfishly that they want to see any one of them aggrandised by the fall of England. And yet one Power must be enormously strengthened by our destruction.—If the Powers fight us, they must count on destroying us.— Were England destroyed her next-door neighbour would rise immensely in importance,—far more in proportion than would Germany. But is there any Power on the Continent which would feel safer and happier with France in a paramount, or nearly, paramount, position ? No; Europe will not kill England, her best customer, and a Power which, at any rate, never invades, in order to make France supreme.
But though it may be admitted that Europe will not actually attack us in combination, it may be urged that Europe may combine to threaten, and that such threats Russia still entertains a certain suspicion as to our policy— might prove extremely disagreeable and embarrassing if they came at the moment of a temporary reverse. Possibly ; but depend upon it if we resolutely refuse to yield an inch to any threats they will melt away. Danger only follows from such threats when they are taken heed of. If they are ignored because the threatened Power realises that they cannot, and will not, be carried out, as we must know to be the case if we are not blind, they lose all their force. Let us never forget this. We must do, then, what is right and wise in the Transvaal without any thought as to what the Powers may intend, determined, if intervention comes, to resist it to the uttermost. That would not, we admit, be a safe attitude for a Power that was acting from motives of aggression, or with a desire to do injury to other Powers, but since our motives are neither selfish nor ambitious, it is the wisest and safest policy for England. In the end it was ruin for Napoleon to stand up against all Europe, because in his heart he meant to act the tyrant. It was the path of safety and success for William Pitt and his successors to keep doggedly on regardless of consequences, for they did not desire to enslave mankind, but merely to maintain the liberty and independence of their native land.
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