THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.
ON Tuesday Lord Lansdowne announced the decision of the Cabinet in regard to the reconstruction of the War Office. The scheme of the Hartington Commis- sion is to be adopted in substance, but with a difference. That difference is, however, rather nominal than real. The permanent official head of the Army is not to be called the Chief of the Staff, as suggested by the Harting- ton Commission, but, following the suggestion of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, is to receive the title of Commander-in-Chief. Probably this change is a good one. Soldiers feel happier when they can look to a definite personal Commander, and can hear him called by a name which they all understand. There is a, definite- ness and precision about the title of Commander-in-Chief which does not exist in that of Chief of the Staff. Though, on the whole, the modified scheme of reorganisation laid down by Lord Lansdowne strikes us as sound, there are one or two points which appear to us open to criticism. Before, however, dealing with these, we had better state in outline what is to be the new disposition of executive forces at the War Office and Horse Guards.
In the first place, there will, of course, be the Secretary of State for War, who will be the supreme head of the Army, the final will in all cases, and responsible to Par- liament for all that concerns the Army. Next to him will come the Commander-in-Chief. Here is the general de- scription of his duties given by Lord Lansdowne :—" The Commander-in-Chief, who will hold his office under the usual rules affecting Staff appointments, will exercise general command over her Majesty's forces at home and abroad, will issue Army orders, and will hold periodical inspections of the troops. He will be responsible for com- missions, promotions, appointments, honours, and rewards, and for the departments of military information and mobi- lisation, and for the general distribution of the Army. He will be the principal adviser of the Secretary of State, and will give him general as distinguished from departmental advice upon all important questions of military policy." Below him will be four departmental heads,—the Adjutant- General, the Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and the Inspector-General of Ordnance. The Adjutant-General will be charged with the discipline, education, and training of the Army, with returns and statistics, enlistments and discharges. To the Quarter- master-General will be intrusted such matters as supplies and transport, the quarters of the Army, remounts, the movement of troops, the Pay Department, and the Army Service Corps. The Inspector-General of Fortifications will be responsible for fortifications, barracks and War Office lands, and for kindred matters ; the Inspector- General of Ordnance for the supply and inspection of warlike stores and equipments, for armaments, patterns, and inventions. Next, these four great departmental officers will, under the presidency of the Commander-in- Chief, constitute a Board of War, which will discuss matters referred to them by the Secretary of State. Finally, and in order to provide for the consultative element at the War Office, on the need of which the Hartington Commis- sion dealt so strongly, there is to be established a War Office Council, presided over by the Secretary of State, and answering to some extent to the Board of Admiralty. This Council, which will meet when required for the discussion of such subjects as may be referred to it, will consist of the Under-Secretaries of State, the Financial Secretary, the Commander-in-Chief, and the four heads of the great military departments, and any other officers who may on special occasions be summoned to attend the meetings. The formation of a Council of this kind was strongly recommended by the Hartington Commission, which advised that such a Council would be of the utmost value for the purpose of securing unity of administration and the harmonious working of the several branches of the War Office in all cases in which they are collectively concerned. " A Council somewhat of this description has, in fact," Lord Lansdowne told the House of Lords, " been for many years past assembled, from time to time, at the War Office whenever the Secretary of State had occasion to seek its advice. Its meetings have, however, been held at irregular intervals and have lately become in- frequent." The discussions of the Council, of which a record would be kept, will afford, added Lord Lansdowne, " a very valuable opportunity to the advisers of the Secretary of State for a free interchange of ideas."
Such is the new scheme in outline, for, as Lord Lansdowne admitted, the final shape of the Order in Council under which the contemplated changes will take place has not yet been agreed on. Our one objection is that the scheme as laid down by Lord Lansdowne does not make it absolutely clear that there shall be a single per- manent executive officer responsible to the Secretary of State, and so to Parliament and the nation for the welfare of the Army ; to put it brutally, the scheme does not make it quite clear who would be the man to be hanged in case of a debticle like that of Sedan. The new Commander- in-Chief, as described in Lord Lansdowne's speech, is the person wanted but for one or two words incidentally let fall by the War Secretary. After speaking of the heads of departments and the Board of War, Lord Lansdowne continued :—" Each of these five officers will be immediately responsible to the Secretary of State for the efficient administration of the department entrusted to him ; each of them will have direct access to the Secretary of State, and will advise him with regard to the matters with which his own department is concerned ; each of them will in particular submit proposals for the estimates of his own department." Now, if this part of the speech was correctly reported, it would seem to mean that the Commander-in-Chief is not to be the real head of the Army, the supreme permanent official, but merely a sort of prirnus inter pares person who will as often as not have to shrug his shoulders and say, Of course, that's all utterly wrong, but it's not my department, so I can't interfere.' If that is to be the position of the Commander-in-Chief, then we would as soon, nay, a great deal sooner, have the old system, for, in theory at any rate, that provided a permanent official head of the Army. There is, of course, no objection to the heads of departments being in touch with the Secretary of State, or in their consulting with him, but to make them directly and independently responsible to him for their departments, is madness. They must be responsible to him, but only through the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-Chief, as we have again and again insisted in these columns, ought to be the official alter ego of the Secretary of State, directly responsible to him, and armed with all his powers. He should, that is, be responsible for the whole Army and for all the officers below him, as far as human responsibility can extend. We do not, of course,' mean that the Secre- tary of State is to follow him blindly, or to accept all he suggests. If the Secretary of State thinks fit, he has, of course, the right to take the responsibility of entirely rejecting the advice of his official alter ego. When he does so, the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief is pro tanto in abeyance. When, however, the Secretary of State acts, as, of course, he usually does, on official advice, the Com- mander-in-Chief and no one else must be responsible for the advice given. Only in this way can the chain of responsibility, which is absolutely essential to an efficient service, be maintained. This can be shown by a concrete instance. Suppose a gross scandal takes place in con- nection with the " warlike stores," and the matter shows official mismanagement, and the adoption of an utterly wrong system at headquarters. Under these circumstances, there occurs one of those outbursts of public feeling which, however unpleasant, are from certain points of view the only means of keeping up the efficiency of the Army. Thereupon the Secretary of State is asked to explain how so rotten a system was adopted in regard to the stores. I took,' he replies, the advice of my official advisers.' Then, says the country, the Commander- in-Chief is much to blame, and deserves dismissal. ' Not a bit,' answers the Commander-in-Chief, ' you are banging at the wrong door. The Inspector-General of Ordnance looks after these matters, and he is directly responsible for his department to the Secretary of State. I may mention, however, that at the time I wondered that so obviously absurd a system was adopted. Since, however, I was not responsible, I felt I had no right to interfere or make any remonstrances.' In this way the responsibility will be tossed about till the public, puzzled and wearied, will conclude that it is hopeless to make any one respon- sible for a breakdown in the War Office, and will relapse into a condition of sombre acquiescence in regard to maladministration. If, on the other hand, the Commander- in-Chief has a primary and general responsibility as regards all departments, then he can be made responsible for waste and muddle whenever it occurs, and the country will be able to see clearly on whom to visit its displeasure in the case of serious wrong-doing. We admit that the plan which we advocate, the plan which makes the responsi- bility of the Commander-in-Chief stretch as wide as that of the Secretary of State, and match it in every particular, is open to the charge of centralisation, but such centralisa- tion of responsibility is, we are firmly convinced, essential to an efficient administration in the Army. By all means do away with excessive centralisation as regards details, —give, that is, much greater freedom of action to local commanders and local officials generally, but keep up the centralisation of responsibility. Maintain, that is, a simple and direct chain of official responsibility of which the last link but one is the Commander-in-Chief ; the last link the Secretary of State. With this we have a fair chance of getting a good Army. Without it we never shall, except by accident. Efficiency cannot come without responsibility, and responsibility is a quality which must be concentrated, not dispersed, if it is to retain its virtue.
Previous page
