BOOKS•
FEDERALISM AND HOME-RULE.* " PaernCUS," whose letters to the Times on what is called Federalism (but ought, as he says, to be called delegation) are here republished, has a singular faculty for thinking that
• Federalism and Heine Bide. By " Pacificus." London : John Murray. [2s. Gd. net.1 things can both be and not be. He proposes a break-up of the Union into legislative groups, the pretext, of course, being the notorious congestion of work at Westminster, and at times he accepts the phrase Home-rule, but at other times he shies at it and protests against being accused of advocating Home-rule. We confess that all this is too subtle for us. The book is inscribed " to young men who see visions," and we are thoroughly in favour of visions as a means of inspira- tion; but when it is proposed to translate the visions into acts we want to be sure that the images are clear,—not blurred symbols, however beautiful and decorative. "Pacifi- cus " is certain that he is a very keen Unionist, and he dreams of a stronger Union—stronger because divided into more efficient legislative groups—becoming one day the chief harmonising unit of a federated Empire. We join with him in looking forward to some kind of Imperial Federation, but we are sure that it cannot be accomplished till the dominions over the seas have reached more nearly than is yet possible to an equality with the United Kingdom in respect of wealth and population. But even when there is a Federation of the Empire it will be essential, in our judgment, that the heart of the Empire—the central unit of government—shall remain undivided. It is incredible to us that the dominions over the seas would feel the same towards the British Isles if the latter were split into at least four divisions, each claiming for itself some integral share of the glorious historic associations which are now concentrated in the templum et arx of the single Legislature of the United Kingdom. It is our British habit to let our institutions grow by natural accretion ; to add to them as need arises. It is contrary to our genius to invent elaborate political Constitutions with a comparative finality of form—like that of the American Constitution—and every- thing handsome about them. Federalism appears to us to require far too much invention. The financial difficulties alone are overwhelming. No Federalist, so far as we know, has faced them. " Pacificus " waves them aside as matters which must be considered later; but surely everything succeeds or falls by the financial test. We shall say more of the financial question presently ; but let " Pacificus " first speak for himself. He thinks that those who are not anxious to tamper at once with the present unit of internal government in the United King- dom mistake a policy of mere negation for moderation. As he singles out the Spectator as the organ of moderation, we may be allowed to show that so far as we are concerned he is quite wrong. We are as conscious as be is of the congestion of work at Westminster, and recognise that it must be reduced in some way,—but not by what is called Federalism. " Pacificus " says in his introduction:- " The air has been full of proposals during the past few years that all the `moderate' men, as they are called, should come out and stand together, and form a new party of overwhelming moral weight. But this suggestion has evoked so little enthusiasm, and up to the present has produced so few results (beyond one or two leagues of various kinds, which meet annually—in the afternoon for business and in the evening for dinner), that we are forced to the conclusion that your `moderate' man must be a very rare bird indeed. Or perhaps the true explanation is that they are not `moderate' men so much as `negative' men—people who are chiefly moved by the desire to prevent this thing or that other thing from being done. The Unionist who hates Tariff Reform and the Liberal who hates predatory Budgets are to stand together back to back and put up their umbrellas against the storm. There is not a little pathos in the picture which crosses the mind's eye ; but you cannot make a strong party merely by exciting an emotion of pity for virtuous elderly gentlemen in silk hats and black coats, who are distressed because they can find no comfortable and con- venient shelter from the rain. It is trite that there was once a Tammany Boss ' who won a prodigious victory in the city of New York upon a single sentence which he spoke from megaphones by day and night, pasted up on hoardings, and flashed in letters of rosy light upon the clouds and the sky-scrapers : To h—i with reform!'—that and nothing more ! This was undoubtedly a victory for a purely negative creed ; but there is a certain human heartiness about it which we miss in the columns of the Spectator, and which almost rises to the level of a constructive policy."
We regret, of course, that we should seem to " Pacificus " to be wanting in human heartiness ; but human heartiness when insufficiently controlled may lead to all kinds of excesses ending in demoralisation and bankruptcy.
It is characteristic of all inventors of new bonds of harmony for the Empire that they make it difficult for us to see the harmony for the bonds. We did not know when we read the letters of " Pacificus " in the Times that he was a Protectionist. We gather from his introduction, however, that he is. He says :— " And, finally, do the Social Reformers really believe in their Hearts—those of them who have examined the problem all round— that they will ever be able to• secure the full protection of the British worker against cheap labour without some measure of protection for the British industry against foreign competition ? "
It is true that "Pacificus " asks this question without prejudice.
Like Rosa Dartle, he only asks to know; but we cannot imagine any one asking the question who recognises that Free-trade is for its supporters not an expedient but a prin-
ciple. We must now give the author's summary of Federalism as it would be applied to the United Kingdom :—
" In the Federalist idea, then, the Imperial Parliament will be the supreme authority, not only in the United Kingdom, but also, for the time being, in the Empire as well. But it will delegate a very large part of its functions to a certain number of national Parlia- ments. And here we arrive at a considerable difference of view. What is to be the number of these national Parliaments ? The Federalists are not in complete agreement among themselves upon this important point. On the one side the extreme opinion is that there are to be only two—a national Parliament for Great Britain and another national Parliament for Ireland. The extreme opinion on the other side is that there is to be a more or less arbitrary division on a basis of population; that nationality is to be ignored in favour of units more or less equal in numbers ; that there is to be a 'restoration of the Heptarchy' in England ; a division of Scotland into the Highlands and a pair of Lowlands; of Ireland into the four Provinces ; Wales alone remaining unparcelled. These are the extremes ; but if we may judge by what has already appeared in print, neither of them is regarded favourably by the majority of Federalists. The advocates of a third course propose that there should be four national Parlia- ments—a Parliament for England, another for Scotland, another for Ireland, and another for Wales. And they urge us to accept this arrangement, not so much as a compromise between two extremes, as because the division suggested corresponds with certain historical ideas of national life. They contend that the success of the Federal idea depends not at all upon equality of numbers, but upon a spiritual force, upon the intimate association of men possessing a common tradition. They admit frankly that they set sentiment above any purely practical considerations. They claim that the result under their plan will be more dignified and vital than any artificial combination into groups of counties; and that it will be a thing much safer, much less liable to schism, than a division into two. In the heptarchical ' plan they see nothing which would appeal vividly to the imagination."
This is the passage in which " Pacificus " gives us the most practical idea of what he means. It will be seen that the vision is vague. We can treat only of the broad principles which he offers us ; but what are the objections to these ? First, there is the objection that if you start dividing the present unit of government there is no logical stopping-point if sub- divisions of the proposed divisions demand separate treat- ment. As Lincoln said to the Secessionists, " On what rightful principle may a State, being not more than one- fiftieth part of the nation in soil and population, break up the
nation, and then coerce a proportionately larger subdivision of itself in the most arbitrary way ?" One might repeat those very words without their losing a jot of their force or sig- nificance if Ireland were granted a Parliament and refused the claim of Ulster to separate treatment. But the chief objection, as we have said, to Federalism is financial. Are we willing to abandon the principle that those who pay the piper
call the tune ? At present Englishmen think it worth while to pay at a higher rate for Ireland, Scotland, and Wales than for themselves because the existence of the incorporating
Union and the stability ensured by it make a sacrifice worth while. But they would not be willing to con- tinue to do this if Ireland, Wales, and Scotland called their own tunes. Suppose that Ireland were required to pay her fair share of the expense of the Army and Navy, the Courts of Law, old-age pensions, and so forth, self-government would mean bankruptcy, or else such a lowering of the standards of comfort and the rates of pay for officials that the hands of the clock would be set back by one knows not bow much. It may be said that Federalists contemplate taxation being levied and the money distributed as now. Very likely,—but we cannot ourselves believe that Parliamentary independence in any sense or form is possible without fiscal independence. All the Colonial Parliaments are fiscally independent; there is no analogy whatever to be drawn from them. We cannot get away from the obvious and natural rule,—the English taxpayer is willing to pay if he has a say in the expenditure of the money, but he will not let the Welsh nation, the Irish nation, and the Scottish nation dive their hands into his pockets if he is not allowed to control the spending of the money.
What, then, can be done to relieve the admitted congestion at Westminster ? It is quite true that government by Cabinet, as it used to be understood, has come to an end. Every head of a Department now governs according to his own sweet will ; his acts are sanctioned by the Cabinet, but are scarcely more than cursorily examined. The congestion might be relieved by Special Committees, representing Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England, sitting at Westminster and drawing up Bills which dealt exclusively with Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and English affairs. Parliament need not accept the recommendations of these Special Committees, of course, but it is not to be supposed that when every Government is anxious to reduce the press of work the Special Committees would be perversely treated. Again, Commissioners might sit at Dublin, Edinburgh, and Cardiff to deal with many subjects which are now dealt with by private Bills. There are several ways in which the excessive and growing burden of Parlia- ment might be lessened, and no blow would be struck by them at the vital parts of the United Kingdom. But Federalism means dispersion, and dispersion means weakness and decay.
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