BOOKS.

LORD OVERSTONE'S TRACTS AND EVIDENCE ON BETA LLIC AND PIPER CURRENCY.* IT is rarely that so large a volume as this appears with so apparently small a nucleus or theme for all the labours of the author both by tongue and pen are really devoted to secure the "convertibility of the note "—to establish the principle that a paper currency should be identical in value with the metallic currency it professes to represent; fluctuating as gold itself would fluctuate, not attempting to be any better, and legislatively prevented from being any worse. Of course much had to be done in clearing the ground when Lord Overstone, twenty years ago, first began to write upon the subject. Many facts or. questions, now established or historical, had to be treated disqmaitionally : for instance, the management of the Bank of England at various times, or the state of the commercial world at a given period. In the examination of Mr. Jones Loyd before the Committees especially of the House of Commons in 1840, much collateral not to say remote or irrelevant matter was introduced. Mr. Hume and others raised their own crotchets, and pressed them upon the witness,— that bills of exchange were currency ; that credit did not merely transfer .existing capital but created capital ; and so on. In fact, so much was this the case, and so often were the same ideas repeated, that the editor has shortened those parts by omissions. Still, notwithstanding the handling of these various questions, and the further subject of the difference between a bank of deposit and a bank of issue, the real pivot of the whole is the necessity of a compulsory identity between a paper and a metallic currency. If there is to be a fixed standard of value—if the promise of the Bank expressed on its notes to pay a pound sterling on demand is to be adhered to— the experience of 1825, of 1837, of 1839, shows that this great object cannot safely be intrusted to corporate discretion, but must be secured by law. This law, (the Act of 1844,) after allowing a certain vacuum counterbalanced by securities, which that act fixed at fourteen millions, compels for every note issued beyond that stun a corresponding amount of bullion to be lodged with a department of issue, whether called the Bank of England or by any other name. For every sum of gold withdrawn from the department of issue a corresponding amount of notes must be withdrawn from circulation. The convertibility of the bank-note—the certainty that he who is promised a pound sterling shall at all times receive his pound sterling—is all that the principle of Jones Loyd aimed at, and which the Act of 1844 successfully enforced. It did not attempt to endow money with magical properties, to remove the inevitable effects of natural evils, or to find a remedy for national passions or political convulsions which, among their other results, destroy large amounts of capital or suddenly divert them from their accustomed channels, producing more or less cost or difficulty to those who in great part carry on their trading operations with what may be popularly called borrowed money. If the harvest fell short, involving the necessity of paying in gold for the unusual demand for foreign corn—if a war diverted or destroyed (as regards purposes immediately productive) one, two' or three hundred millions of capital—the act could not attempt to prevent the evils that must of necessity flow from such causes, beyond removing all fear as to the convertibility of the note, and modifying the extreme severity of the pressure by early and gradual operation.

Although the difference between a bank of issue, that is a bank putting forth its own notes, and a bank of discount and deposit, discounting bills with its own capital and the deposits of its customers, seems obvious on the mere statement,—and so far as the , earlier discussions were concerned, it formed what an ontologist would call the " secondary property" of the measure —yet Mr. Jones Loyd had perpetually to call the attention of the measure,—yet in 1848 to the difference between the two : the Members could not see that the Bank's mismanagement of its own banking business, over which it had full control, was quite a different thing from the self-regulation of the issue department, over which it had then no control at all. This was the plight to which the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street had brought her banking affairs on the Saturday night before the issue of the letter of October 1847. Private deposits on Saturday 23d October 1847 £8,580,509 Available assets in notes £1,547,270

in coin

447'246 £1,994,516 Lord Overstone, however, thinks the Bank has the power of saving itself even in extrends.

"Such is the peculiar relation in which the Bank of England, from the magnitude of its capital and resources, stands towards the public, that I am rather inclined to think that the Bank could save itself at almost any point, and that the danger is rather of the extraordinary derangement which that effort would throw upon public affairs than that the Bank itself would actually stop payment. I speak with some doubt upon that point, but that is my impression.

"1540. In what way do you think the Bank would have saved itself ?— The Bank at that time held a very large amount of bills of exchange falling due daily, and the Bank might have refused to make any further advance whatever, and so have let those bills run to maturity. By this means the Bank would, day by day, have brought into its till a very large amount of money. The Bank, again, held a large amount of public securities ; the Bank might have brought those public securities into the market for sale, at any extent of depreciation. What the effect of that might have been, I can

not say ; but I think that any reflecting person, conversant with the affairs

of the Bank, and their connexion with the money-market, will a with me in saying, that the power of the Bank to save itself at the last extremity, though at the expense of the public, is prodigious."

To the celebrated letter of October 1847 Lord Overstone gives a cautious and hesitating approval. The topic turns up on various

occasions ; but the following extracts contain the pith of the opinions not only in reference to the suspension, but what is of more importance to the future legislative action on the act. "1493. You admit that the interference of the Government upon the present occasion was justifiable. Therefore, supposing this regulation of the hank to continue, would you propose that it should be accompanied with a provision giving power to interfere, or merely that it should be left to the Government to interfere upon its own authority in a case of great emergency ?—That it should be left to the Government to interfere upon its own authority.

"1494, Then, under those circumstances, you would think the Government not justifiable in interfering, unless under very particular circumstances of pressure ?—Certainly, under very extraordinary circumstances of pressure. * *

"1499. You were understood to say that you entirely approved of the letter of her Majesty's Ministers ; and that you think that it that letter had not been written there would have been YETI great confusion in the country ?

—I stated my opinion to that effect. • •

" Pressure from panic will vary in its character on every successive occasion, and require a different remedy. Issue of Evehequer Bills relieved panic,

in 1793, but would have totally failed for that purpose in 1847. The re medy, to be effectual, must, in all probability, be applied abruptly, not gnudually; and the power of issue must be unlimited, not restricted in amount. Panic cannot be effectually provided for by any previous regulation. Sup

pose all depositors throughout the kingdom through panic, simultaneously call for their deposits, what amount of notes can be sufficient to meet this

demand, or how can adequate sales of securities be effected ? Or suppose sudden insolvency of the present country issues, as in 1825. Suppose, again, after an extra issue of notes to meet panic, that panic feeling turns against the notes themselves, and gold is demanded for them. The very issue of

14,000,000/. notes on securities unrepresented by gold, and yet convertible, is a distinct repudiation of the principle of attending to or providing against panic. This, like the other provisions of the Act of 1844, is sound and safe an all cases amenable to principle ; but, no doubt, it may break down under the irregular and uncontrollable force of panic. Provision to meet the effect of panic, as distinguished from legitimate pressure, must necessarily vest discretionary power in some parties."

The purely panic nature of the confusion in 1847 will be seen from the fact that the Bank did not act upon the suspending letter after all; that the amount of money in the hands of the public was almost unexampled, so there was no deficiency of cur

rency; that the panic did not so ranch extend to the establishment whose affairs were most known, the Bank itself, as to every body else; and that the measure would not really have afforded secure assistance. There was plenty of money, but people would not part with it for fear of' losing it; yet an extra issue of notes would have been merely a postponement of the evil day to embar rassed men. The real causes of the panic, apart from the conduct of the Bank, seem to be the impossibility of presenting anything perfectly pure in practice and the prejudices and opinions then connected with the Bank. The principle of the Act of 1844 was not thoroughly carried out. This was partly from the im possibility of doing so per saltum—the fourteen millions for in stance, against which there are securities but no gold, cOuld not have been filled np without a pressure and derangement of the money-market too great for any Minister to encounter. When it was determined to remove the power of issue from the Bank of England, principle no doubt required the transfer of the business to a separate body ; but the difficulties in the way of constituting this body were too great to be overcome. The Bank, however, should have been compelled to open a separate office ; and we think

this omission to require a risible change of place an oversight: people finding only confusion in the multitude of counsellors, not exactly understanding what the Act proposed, and seeing every thing go on as before, naturally thought that things continued as they were. For fifty years the power of the Bank had really been enormous, and the mass of people supposed it boundless, magical. In popular, even in respectable estimation, the Old Lady was conceived to have the power of "making money." Then the payment of the dividends, still under the Bank roof, possessed myriads with the notion that the Bank, in some hocus-pocus way, held the capital of the Debt. In the minds of very large numbers, "putting money in the Bank" meant an investment in the Funds. These prejudices have been greatly removed since 1844, or indeed since 1847, much assisted by that shock itself and the succeeding discussions. We suspect, though, that had the public been as well informed then as it is now, the Bank would have been in a more dangerous position, when it appeared in the next weekly return, that on the 23d October 1847, they had less than two millions to pay eight millions and a half of deposits. Perhaps it was less the community than the Bank itself that was regarded in the letter of suspension. In fact, the Directors had their difficulties rising clearly before them. "Sir Tames Graham. If the Government had not issued the letter in October last, the Governor of the Bank has told us that if the pressure upon their resources had continued, it would have been open to the Bank direction to have sold 1,000,000/. of stock at that precise time : is it your opinion that that resource was available ?—Yes, I think it was. "5285. You concur in the opinion, that the Bank might have sold 4000,000/. of stock, even at that time ?—I think they might. "5288. What would, in your opinion, have been the effect, supposing they had sold it, and had been able to realize it, upon their credit ?—It is impossible for any person to say what the effect would have been; it is a matter of guess When you are dealing with a state of panic-feeling, you are dealing with that which is not, by the very statement of it, amenable to reason. The sale of such an amount of stock might have frightened the public; or the idea of the Bank realizing securities to that extent, and in

creasing the amount in the hands of the public for commercial purposes, might have produced a very beneficial effect : it is impossible to say what

would have been the result : but if the letter had not been issued, it would have been the duty of the Bank to have sold stock and tried the consequences; and I think it is very possible they might have been beneficial consequences.

" 5287. In what respect do you think the consequences might have been beneficial ?—I always consider that a panic feeling is quite sure to exhaust

itself in a little time, and that tho result of amanly perseverance in the right system is very likely indeed to break down the panic ; but at what particular stage, no person can say."

Without reference to the particular views indicated, we think the examinations before the Lords leave a stronger impression than those before the Commons. They are more definite in aim, less orotehetty in opinion, with less of "de omnibus rebus" even in their discursiveness. A great point with some of the Committee was to repeal the Act, by giving to the Bank Directors the power of issuing notes without a corresponding deposit of bullion, under circumstances of pressure—or in other words, ad libitum. It was not put in this plain way, but as to the possibility under certain circumstances of safely continuing the amount of notes in circulation during a drain for gold. 'We have before now expressed our notion that this could possibly be done, on the principle of" chancing it," just as a man might possibly throw off some latent illness by getting drunk, though if he fail he may produce fatal mischief; so that the practice could never stand as a rule. If with a full stook of bullion a drain should begin whose amount you can fix, no direct confusion may follow from. the Bank not diminishing the note circulation pad paean.: but if there is a mistake in estimating the extent of the drain, or other adverse circumstances start up during the drain, then we have the old story of 1825 and other _years over again. To expect the optional scheme to stand the drain of a war which is destroying capital (for productive purposes) by tens and hundreds of iniWons—or during commercial convulsions, and general failure in harvests, no matter whether of corn or cotton—or under such a state of minsled exhaustion and speculation as the Continent now exhibits— is mere monomania. Like most of the other principal opinions advanced under examination, Lord Overstone's ideas on this subject are scattered about. The following are front a paper ho road to the Lords Committee as a summary of previous examinations which "occasionally became irregular and desultory." "2d. Pressure is necessary as a means for correcting adverse exchanges. The degree of pressure requisite for that purpose is not an evil, but a merit, in any system for the management of the currency. The pressure of April 118471 was not fully sufficient for correction of the exchanges : any alleviation of that pressure would have been most mischievous, it would have necessitated greater pressure ultimately. No system which pretends to provide for convertibility of the notes can avoid pressure.

"3d. Any provision by law for alleviating the pressure iu its last stages will very probably have the effect of really increasing the pressure. The natural correctives are such as parties will resort to only under the apprehension of severe pressure if they do not so provide against it. But if the law makes provision for the relief of that pressure in its last stage, all parties will calculate on this, and will hope, by holding out, to avoid the inconvenience of resorting to the legitimate correctives, and to benefit by the ultimate relaxation.

"4th. The Bill is adapted to and sufficient for all cases which are amenable to principle. It is only in cases of extreme panic that special intervention is requisite. Such cases are not subject to any principle ; they cannot be provided beforehand ; the peculiar cheractor of each case cannot be anticipated. In 1703 an issue of Exchequer Bills met the difficulty, but in 1847 it would have been useless.

" 5th. Pressure, and a high rate of interest, caused by the want of suf. fcient capital, cannot be relieved by an extra issue of bank-notes. The attempt to do so can only tend to cheek the legitimate causes of relief. "0th. But, it is asked, may not pressure caused by panic be relieved by an extra issue of bank-notes ? The Act of 1844 is based upon the principle that, as regards the amount, a metallic currency is a perfect typo of currency, and that paper money is useful only on account of its economy and convenience. Metallic money will be increased by the effect of panic turning the exchanges, and thus causing gold to come in; and notes being issued against the gold which thus comes in, the paper money will also be increased. But if it is proposed to issue more notes before the gold comes in, then, in that case, it is first necessary to be well assured that the exchanges are in a sound state, and that the extra issue of paper money will not generate any new cause of derangement. How can this assurance be obtained ? Again, the knowledge that the first symptoms of panic will be met by an extra issue of notes will tend to check the resort to the natural correctives. How can one distinguish legislatively pressure from panic, and pressure from legitimate causes?" It is, however, by no means clear that if the restriction were removed the Bank would use their discretionary power very freely. The 23d October 1847 gave a fright to "the Parlour" which will not only last this generation but become a tradition., The manner in which the Directors have steered through a season of great pressure and difficulty by simply making the rate of discount bear some proportion to the value of capital, must have read a gratifying lesson. It is possible that the profits from the high rate of interest may have given the Bank clearer ideas of its public duty. We must remember too, that, thanks to Lord Over, stone and others, they are watched by a more knowing public than they had to deal with twenty or even ten years ago. The advocates of an unrestricted currency are as they were—whether the enthusiasts who discard all natural standards of value, and supersede the precious metals by some contrivance of their own, like "taxation-money," or the men who call out for an "elastic" currency to relieve "the exigencies of trade " ; but the world at large has not been standing still. The volume is a remarkable example of industry and great abilities directed to one single subject, and successfully carrying it out ; for we suppose few will deny that Lord Overstone mainly contributed to the passing of the Act of 1844, not only by the distinctness with which he presented the. prinetple--that paper

not say; but I think that any reflecting person, conversant with the affairs of the Bank, and their connexion with the money-market, will a with me in saying, that the power of the Bank to save itself at the last extremity, though at the expense of the public, is prodigious."

To the celebrated letter of October 1847 Lord Overstone gives a cautious and hesitating approval. The topic turns up on various

occasions ; but the following extracts contain the pith of the opinions not only in reference to the suspension, but what is of more importance to the future legislative action on the act.

"1493. You admit that the interference of the Government upon the present occasion was justifiable. Therefore, supposing this regulation of the hank to continue, would you propose that it should be accompanied with a provision giving power to interfere, or merely that it should be left to the Government to interfere upon its own authority in a case of great emergency ?—That it should be left to the Government to interfere upon its own authority. "1494, Then, under those circumstances, you would think the Government not justifiable in interfering, unless under very particular circumstances of pressure ?—Certainly, under very extraordinary circumstances of pressure. * *

"1499. You were understood to say that you entirely approved of the letter of her Majesty's Ministers ; and that you think that it that letter had not been written there would have been YETI great confusion in the country?

—I stated my opinion to that effect. • • " Pressure from panic will vary in its character on every successive occasion, and require a different remedy. Issue of Reehequer Bells relieved panic, in 1793, but would have totally failed for that purpose in 1847. The re medy, to be effectual, must, in all probability, be applied abruptly, not gnudually; and the power of issue must be unlimited, not restricted in amount. Panic cannot be effectually provided for by any previous regulation. Sup

pose all depositors throughout the kingdom through panic:, simultaneously call for their deposits, what amount of notes can be sufficient to meet this

demand, or how can adequate sales of securities be effected? Or suppose sudden insolvency of the present country issues, as in 1825. Suppose, again, after an extra issue of notes to meet panic, that panic feeling turns against the notes themselves, and gold is demanded for them. The very issue of 14,000,000/. notes on securities unrepresented by gold, and yet convertible, is a distinct repudiation of the principle of attending to or providing against panic. This, like the other provisions of the Act of 1844, is sound and safe in all cases amenable to principle; but, no doubt, it may break down under the irregular and uncontrollable force of panic. Provision to meet the effect of panic, as distinguished from legitimate pressure, must necessarily vest discretionary power in some parties."

The purely panic nature of the confusion in 1847 will be seen from the fact that the Bank did not act upon the suspending letter after all; that the amount of money in the hands of the public was almost unexampled, so there was no deficiency of cur

rency; that the panic did not so ranch extend to the establishment whose affairs were most known, the Bank itself, as to every body else; and that the measure would not really have afforded secure assistance. There was plenty of money, but people would not part with it for fear of' losing it; yet an extra issue of notes would have been merely a postponement of the evil day to embar rassed men. The real causes of the panic, apart from the conduct of the Bank, seem to be the impossibility of presenting anything perfectly pure in practice and the prejudices and opinions then connected with the Bank. The principle of the Act of 1844 was not thoroughly carried out. This was partly from the im possibility of doing so per saltum—the fourteen millions for in stance, against which there are securities but no gold, cOuld not have been filled up without a pressure and derangement of the money-market too great for any Minister to encounter. When it was determined to remove the power of issue from the Bank of England, principle no doubt required the transfer of the business to a separate body ; but the difficulties in the way of constituting this body were too great to be overcome. The Bank, however, should have been compelled to open a separate office ; and we think

this omission to require a risible change of place an oversight: people finding only confusion in the multitude of counsellors, not exactly understanding what the Act proposed, and seeing every thing go on as before, naturally thought that things continued as they were. For fifty years the power of the Bank had really been enormous, and the mass of people supposed it boundless, magical. In popular, even in respectable estimation, the Old Lady was conceived to have the power of "making money." Then the payment of the dividends, still under the Bank roof, possessed myriads with the notion that the Bank, in some hocus-pocus way, held the capital of the Debt. In the minds of very large numbers, "putting money in the Bank" meant an investment in the Funds. These prejudices have been greatly removed since 1844, or indeed since 1847, much assisted by that shock itself and the succeeding discussions. We suspect, though, that had the public been as well informed then as it is now, the Bank would have been in a more dangerous position, when it appeared in the next weekly return, that on the 23d October 1847, they had less than two millions to pay eight millions and a half of deposits. Perhaps it was less the community than the Bank itself that was regarded in the letter of suspension. In fact, the Directors had their difficulties rising clearly before them. "Sir Tames Graham. If the Government had not issued the letter in October last, the Governor of the Bank has told us that if the pressure upon their resources had continued, it would have been open to the Bank direction to have sold 1,000,000/. of stock at that precise time : is it your opinion that that resource was available ?—Yes, I think it was. "5285. You concur in the opinion, that the Bank might have sold 1,000,0001. of stock, even at that time ?—I think they might. "5288. What would, in your opinion, have been the effect, supposing they had sold it, and had been able to realize it, upon their credit ?—It is impossible for any person to say what the effect would have been; it is a matter of guess : When you are dealing with a state of panic-feeling, you are dealing with that which is not, by the very statement of it, amenable to reason. The sale of such an amount of stock might have frightened the public; or the idea of the Bank realizing securities to that extent, and in

creasing the amount in the hands of the public for commercial purposes, might have produced a very beneficial effect: it is impossible to say what would have been the result : but if the letter had not been issued, it would have been the duty of the Bank to have sold stock and tried the consequences; and I think it is very possible they might have been beneficial consequences. "5287. In what respect do you think the consequences might have been beneficial ?—I always consider that a panic feeling is quite sure to exhaust

itself in a little time, and that the result of a. manly perseverance in the right system is very likely indeed to break down the panic; but at what particular stage, no person can say."

Without reference to the particular views indicated, we think the examinations before the Lords leave a stronger impression than those before the Commons. They are more definite in aim, less orotehetty in opinion, with less of "de omnibus rebus" even in their discursiveness. A great point with some of the Committee was to repeal the Act, by giving to the Bank Directors the power of issuing notes without a corresponding deposit of bullion, under circumstances of pressure—or in other words, ad libitum. It was not put in this plain way, but as to the possibility under certain circumstances of safely continuing the amount of notes in circulation during a drain for gold. 'We have before now expressed our notion that this could possibly be done, on the principle of" chancing it," just as a man might possibly throw off some latent illness by getting drunk, though if he fail he may produce fatal mischief; so that the practice could never stand as a rule. If with a full stook of bullion a drain should begin whose amount you can fix, no direct confusion may follow from. the Bank not diminishing the note circulation pad paean.: but if there is a mistake in estimating the extent of the drain, or other adverse eirdunstances start up during the drain, then we have the old story of 1825 and other _years over again. To expect the optional scheme to stand the drain of a war which is destroying capital (for productive purposes) by tens and hundreds of iniWons—or during commercial convulsions, and general failure in harvests,. no matter whether of corn or cotton—or under such a state of mingled exhaustion and speculation as the Continent now exhibits— is mere monomania. Like most of the other principal opinions advanced under examination, Lord. Overstone's ideas on this subject are scattered about. The following are front a paper ho road to the Lords Committee as a summary of previous examinations which "occasionally became irregular and desultory."

"2d. Pressure is necessary as a means for correcting adverse exchanges. The degree of pressure requisite for that purpose is not an evil, but a merit, in any system for the management of the currency. The pressure of April 118471 was not fully sufficient for correction of the exchanges: any alleviation of that pressure would have been most mischievous, it would have necessitated greater pressure ultimately. No system which pretends to provide for convertibility of the notes can avoid pressure. "3d. Any provision by law for alleviating the pressure iu its last stages will very probably have the effect of really increasing the pressure. The natural correctives are such as parties will resort to only under the apprehension of severe pressure if they do not so provide against it. But if the law makes provision for the relief of that pressure in its last stage, all parties will calculate on this, and will hope, by holding out, to avoid the inconvenience of resorting to the legitimate correctives, and to benefit by the ultimate relaxation.

"4th. The Bill is adapted to and sufficient for all cases which ore amenable to principle. It is only in cases of extreme panic that special intervention is requisite. Such cases are not subject to any principle; they cannot be provided beforehand ; the peculiar cheractor of each case cannot be anticipated. In 1703 an issue of Exchequer Bills met the difficulty, but in 1847 it would have been useless. " 5th. Pressure, and a high rate of interest, caused by the want of suf. fcient capital, cannot be relieved by an extra issue of bank-notes. The attempt to do so can only tend to check the legitimate causes of relief. "0th. But, it is asked, may not pressure caused by panic be relieved by an extra issue of bank-notes ? The Act of 1844 is based upon the principle that, as regards the amount, a metallic currency is a perfect typo of currency, and that paper money is useful only on account of its economy and convenience. Metallic money will be increased by the effect of panic turning the exchanges, and thus causing gold to come in; and notes being issued against the gold which thus comes in, the paper money will also be increased. But if it is proposed to issue more notes before the gold comes in, then, in that case, it is first necessary to be well assured that the exchanges are in a sound state, and that the extra issue of paper money will not generate any new cause of derangement. How can this assurance be obtained ?

Again, the knowledge that the first symptoms of panic will be met by an extra issue of notes :will tend to check the resort to the natural correctives. How can one distinguish legislatively pressure from panic, and pressure from legitimate causes?"

It is, however, by no means clear that if the restriction were removed the Bank would use their discretionary power very

freely. The 23c1 October 1847 gave a fright to "the Parlour" which will not only last this generation but become a tradition., The manner in which the Directors have steered through a season

of great pressure and difficulty by simply making the rate of discount bear some proportion to the value of capital, must have read a gratifying lesson. It is possible that the profits from the high rate of interest may have given the Bank clearer ideas of its public duty. We must remember too, that, thanks to Lord Over,

stone and others, they are watched by a more knowing public than they had to deal with twenty or even ten years ago. The advocates of an unrestricted currency are as they were---whether

the enthusiasts who discard all natural standards of value, and supersede the precious metals by some contrivance of their own, like "taxation-money," or the men who call out for an "elastic" currency to relieve "the exigencies of trade " ; but the world at large has not been standing still. The volume is a remarkable example of industry and great abilities directed to one single subject, and successfully carrying it out ; for we suppose few will deny that Lord Overstone mainly contributed to the passing of the Act of 1844, not only by the distinctness with which he presented the.prinelple--that paper should be made identical with the precious metal it professes to represent—but by the manner in which he prepared the public mind to entertain the principle. From the nature of the contents as already indicated, there is something in the volume that is past as regards substance, much that is desultory in its form. The whole, however, is surprisingly readable to those who are interested in such questions. This arises partly from the singleness of object, the lucid clearness and the easy expression—more, we think, from the reality of everything. There is no beating the air. We are not called upon to gaze at theoretical bladders, which the instant they are pierced anywhere collapse. Nor are we called upon to listen to an exposition of principles which however important are still abstract. In Lord Overstone everything evidently relates to actual affairs and the immediate business of men.