TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEPORTATIONS.
THE deportation of the South African strike leaders by the executive act of the Cape Government raises a very large crop of questions, legal, constitutional, and political. The merits of the action of General Botha's Government we do not mean to discuss. In the first place, the South African Union has been endowed, and rightly endowed, with complete self-government. Unless, then, we are to render inoperative the principle upon which the Empire is based—the principle that the self-governing Colonies manage their own domestic affairs in their own way, and have a right to do what people in England think wrong as well as what people in England think right—we have no power here to chal- lenge the action of the South African Government. If they are only to be allowed to govern themselves as long as they do what the British public, or rather a section of it, thinks sound, then the self-governing Colonies must cease to be self-governing and become mere dependencies. Public opinion here has, of course, perfect liberty to protest and to criticize as much as it likes, but it has no right of interference, either through Executive or Par- liamentary action, or through the Royal veto, unless, of course, Parliament is prepared to try to do what George III. and Lord North failed in doing.
It may be said, perhaps, that this is not a fair way of putting it. Though we leave the South African Union to govern itself, we have a right, it may be contended, to expect that that Government will rule only by due process of law. This view, however, will not really prove helpful in the present instance. General Botba's case is, of course, that he had to deal with a revolutionary situation, that in order to save his country from anarchy and destruction he was obliged to adopt extra-legal methods, and that in doing so he had the support of the Legislature of the Union. If the Union Parliament are willing, as it is admitted they are willing, to give him an Act of Indemnity for all be has done, then his illegal acts will become legal, and no one here will have a right to challenge them. In other words, if the people of South Africa choose to manage their affairs in this particular way, and to legislate by subsequent endorsement, no one here San deny them this right, provided, of course, that they do not step outside their own area of jurisdiction. But though we do not intend to discuss whether in the abstract General Botha's Government have behaved rightly, partly because we have not all the facts before us, and partly because such discussion is useless, there are other aspects of the problem which are well worth the attention of the British people. The action of the South African Executive and the effect it has had here are full of lessons for us at the present political crisis. The first and most important of these lessons is to be found in the violence of the protests which are being made in the Radical Press and by the Labour leaders at the Glasgow Conference. These protests, or we should rather say threats of inter- ference with the internal self-government of South Africa, show us as by a lightning-flash how utterly unreal is all the present talk about Federalism, or even about Home Rule. All the schemes of the Federalists and Home Rulers and advocates of domestic self-government are based upon the notion that certain parts of the country—for the moment Ireland, but later Scotland, Wales, &c., &c.—are to manage their own affairs, "run their own show," and be free of the vexatious interference of Westminster. Now we should like to ask, if an act like that of the South African Government, committed in a country which is six thousand miles away, and one which in the matter of finance is absolutely autonomous and independent—a country, that is, which draws not a single sixpence of subsidy from the Mother Country or from the Imperial Parliament—is to be denounced as illegal and unbearable, and to be chal- lenged in the House of Commons, what is likely to happen when the Irish Parliament does something which the Labour leaders or some other section of the community —let us say our Nonconformist educationists—regard with detestation ?
If the assent of the Sovereign to a South African Bill of Indemnity is to be debated in the Rouse of Commons, as we are told it is to be, what chance is there of our avoiding disputable Irish Acts being considered under the theoretical reserve powers of the Imperial Legislature? But if such Acts are to be discussed here, where is the alleged advan- tage of getting rid of Irish affairs ? In truth, we are "up against" the ineradicable belief of the party politician that things can be and not be at the same time. The fact is that the men who talk most about local autonomy really mean it least. Their treatment of Ulster, indeed, is a signal proof of this. The Ulster people are at the moment putting forward a claim for the recognition of their right to decide their own political fate. The claim happens, how- ever, to be one which is not liked by our Jacobins. There- fore, with the calmest indifference and inconsistency, they propose to beat down this claim by the machine-gun and the bayonet. People are to govern themselves only when they are willing to do so in the way that the Jacobins think right. There is to be perfect liberty to do what the Jacobins think proper, but no liberty to do the reverse.
No doubt in the case of South Africa the Labour leaders' protests will prove wholly unavailing, for the very good reason that the Government here, which the Labour
leaders help to control, would not be mad enough to attempt to coerce United South Africa. Such an adventure is
unthinkable for Mr. Asquith. When, however, the ques- tion of interfering in Ireland arises it will, of course, be very different. There we shall not only have the physical power to interfere, but the huge subsidy which we are to pay to Ireland will give substantial grounds for such inter- ference. In a word, General Botha's State stroke, if the country will only mark it, shows the sheer nonsense of Federalism. However much we may talk about local autonomy, the whole march of events is really towards centralization and unification as opposed to autonomy.
We may establish a paper Home Rule in Ireland or throughout the United Kingdom, but at the first strain the whole thing will go to pieces and we shall learn, but very possibly only after a good deal of bloodshed, and certainly after a vast amount of expenditure, that the incorporating Union is the only way of regulating the relations between the two islands and the three kingdoms, Another entirely different, but nevertheless very im- portant, lesson is to be found in what has just happened in South Africa. Shortly, it is this. A Government who- are face to face with a revolutionary situation, and determined to deal with it promptly and in a way which will avoid bloodshed, are bound to commit what are technically illegal acts—bound to ask the nation and the Legislature to trust them implicitly while the social tie is broken, and to rely upon obtaining later indemnity for their illegal acts and for their indifference to the technicalities of the law. Indeed, we would go so far as to say that in English history, and probably in the history of other countries, no rebellion has ever been success- fully dealt with except in this way. Let us apply this lesson. It means that if our Government really intend
not td listen to the demands of Ulster, but to treat her
people as mutineers and rebels, and are determined to carry their Bill at all costs and force Ulster under a Dublin
Parliament, they can only do so successfully—i.e., without serious bloodshed—by acting upon the lines upon which General Botha acted. They must proclaim martial law, which, of course, means no law but the will of the agents of Government, civil and military, and arrest, imprison, and deport freely, thinking nothing of the legal position, but only of how to make their will dominant and their authority respected. To be specific, they must, the moment their Bill is passed, seize and deport all the Ulster leaders and break up the Ulster military organization before it has time to mobilize or concentrate, or is able to have recourse to offensive belligerent acts. This done, they must, of course, go to Parliament and ask for an Act of Indemnity for the illegalities committed by them and their agents, relying upon the Legislature giving them such indemnity because they have saved the country from bloodshed.
But now comes in the difficulty of which the present Government, as far as we can see, never thought when they committed themselves to the policy of coercing. Ulster if Ulster refusedtogounderaDublinParliament. Thelmperial Parliament would not grant them an Act of Indemnity for illegal acts committed by them and their agents in coercing. Ulster. The House of Commons would no doubt do so by- a large majority, but unfortunately for the Government it still takes two Houses to pass an Act, and the House of Lords, needless to say, would never dream of endorsing the coercion of 'Ulster by an Act of Indemnity. Acts of Indemnity to be of any use must be passed at once through all their stages. It would be idle to try to pass one under the Parliament Act with its two years' delay. During that time the Courts would have been put In motion against the Government, and their agents and half the Cabinet and their chief military and civil officers would have been convicted of illegal acts. For Zhe first time in our history the Executive Government are unable to use the tremendous weapon of an Act of Indemnity. Their only recourse would be a General Election. No doubt success here would technically not relieve them, but in effect if they were returned by a large majority the Government would be absolved. But dare a Government, or at any rate this Government, run such a risk as this? If they did not succeed, and if, as is by no means impossible, the country declared against them, they might find themselves in a position of extreme personal peril. Though impeach. ment has been out of fashion of late, we see no reason why it should not be revived, but very much the reverse. Indeed, to speak quite frankly, we should, in the case of the coercion of Ulster, followed by the condemnation of the Government at the polls and the formation of a Unionist Government, be strongly in favour of making the members of the present Government personally responsible for their illegal acts —of making them bear the full burden and punishment for what they have done.
As we have pointed out again and again in these columns, a Government who have the option of coercing Ulster by means of a General Election, and yet deliberately choose instead to use the coercion of the machine-gun and the autocratic power of physical force, will be guilty of a criminal act, and must, if they fail, expect no mercy. The notion that the Government can avoid their responsi- bility in this matter by the plea that Ulster would not accept the decision of a General Election is a piece either of disingenuousness or fatuity. In the abstract the Ulster people may not be willing to pledge themselves to abide by a General Election, but as a matter of fact everybody knows that if the. Government were successful at the polls, as they declare they would be, Ulster would feel the impact of the great popular decision just as much as the rest of the kingdom. The Ulster people might be furious at what they would regard as their betrayal by the British democracy, but though sore and deeply injured, or, if you will, revengeful, they could not but be dominated by the result. When it is a case of Roma locuta est, the world feels resistance is useless. In short, it is a mere quibble to say that a General Election would settle nothing merely because high-spirited people like the Ulstermen will not swear beforehand that they will kiss the rod if the decision is given in favour of its use. In truth, the unwillingness of the Government to have recourse to the coercion of a General Election is the most sinister sign in a desperately anxious situation. It is a proof that the Government know that they would be beaten at the polls. But this means that they are preparing to coerce Ulster when they actually know that they have not got the country behind them. That is a desperate game. To return to our point, should not we all think General Botha mad, or worse than mad, to have done what he has done if he had doubted whether his country was with him ?
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