THE NAVY ESTIMATES AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE.
UNLESS all the reports about the doings of the l) Cabinet are misleading, the plot to out down the Navy Estimates has failed. As it was never in the least likely that the Little-Navy Group would be any less unsuccessful now than they have invariably been in the past, we may confidently assume that the reports are correct. The new Estimates will be such as the Board of Admiralty can allow to be submitted to the country with a good conscience. Mr. Churchill has won his point, and Mr. Lloyd George has failed in his attack. We congratulate Mr. Churchill on the steadiness and wise restraint with which he has won this silent victory. But the significance of it would be lost if the Little-Navy Group were now allowed to cover up their defeat by saving a large remnant of attention for the financial improprieties, as they allege them to be, of Mr. Churchill's administration. There will be much in the coming Session to create bitter- ness—the certainty of a deficit in the Budget, and the magnitude of the Supplementary Estimate for the Navy— but any criticism directed to prove that this or that million has been spent without authority will not touch the central fact that an attempt has been made to reduce the Naval programme, and that that attack has not only been stalled off, but hue been roundly beaten. We do not say that the coming Estimates will provide for such an addition to the Navy as would discourage competition, and thus prove the cheapest policy in the long run, but, at all events, they will enable all who recognize the vital importance of our command of the sea to feel that the great trust committed to Mr. Churchill has by no means been betrayed. Instead of the number of new ships to be laid down being reduced to two, the original programme of four will be maintained, and there will also be some means of making good the deficieney, caused by the missing Canadian ships, for what Mr. Churchill calls " whole-world requirements."
The recent criticisms of Little-Navy men, as we have suggested, have been diverting attention from the fact that an attack was intended, not merely on the financial irregularity of huge Supplementary Estimates, but on the normal programme of the Government as it had long been understood by the country. Memories are short, and the part played by Mr. Lloyd George in his New Year interview is already being rapidly forgotten. Let us recall the nature of his attack. We do not say that Mr. Lloyd George definitely meant to place himself at the head of the Little-Navy movement. He is like the Boer rifleman who is not happy in a tight unless his pony is tethered a few yards behind him. He no doubt provided for his escape. He fired a shot at the enemy to draw their fire and see what their strength was. He was still uncer- tain as to what popular feeling there was behind an agitation for less taxation in support of the Navy. He was also flurried and angry at the prospect of a large deficit at the Treasury. His motives may not have been perfectly clear even to himself, but that he did deal a slap in the face to Mr. Churchill is perfectly plain to anyone who reads the interview. The innuendo—we might say the malice—of the language is unmistakable. For the pur- pose of a comparison between present expenditure and former expenditure he went out of his way to choose the period that would be most hurtful to Mr. Churchill's feelings. He referred to Lord Randolph Churchill, who " resigned rather than assent to the proposed Estimates for the Army and Navy." He then went on by implication to show that Mr. Churchill had failed where his father had behaved nobly, by asserting that now was the oppor- tunity for "overhauling" our Naval expenditure. There was no question here of mere criticism of the wasting of a million or two through faulty administration and insuffi- cient Parliamentary control over expenditure, Mr. Lloyd George definitely proposed a substantial change in the Naval policy to which the House of Commons had already consented. "Do you, then, consider this to be a favour- able moment for us to overhaul our expenditure on arum, moots ? " "I think it is the most favourable moment that has presented itself during the last twenty years." After talking about the "organized insanity " of naval competi- tion, Mr. Lloyd George continued :— "This is a propitious moment for reconsidering the question of armaments. And unless Liberalism seises the opportunity, it will be false to its noblest traditions, and those who have the conscience of Liberalism in their charge will be written down for all time as having grossly betrayed their trust. The new temper among tho peoples of Western Europe is a funda-
mental consideration for a Liberal Government to take into
account and sot upon. Two or three years ago the position was different. If then, or even a yoar ago, we had taken a bold and independent step towards restricting the growth of armaments, a reaction would have boon provoked which would have been fatal to any real endeavours towards economy for years to come. But this is the right moment, and it is imperative, in the highest interests of civilisation, that we should seize it."
Having uttered those words, Mr. Lloyd George went to
Algiers. An act of grosser disloyalty to a colleague, or a blow more injurious to the solidarity of the Cabinet, can- not well be imagined. It used to be the tradition—not merely a convenient tradition, but an almost indispensable one—that the Cabinet should speak with a united voice. Ever since the present Government have been in office this tradition has been ignored. The result has been wide confusion. Most Ministers give their independent views about the work of their colleagues. But Mr. Lloyd George beats all the other Ministers at this game ; he is sometimes the Minister for Foreign Affairs, sometimes the First Lord of the Admiralty, sometimes the Home Secretary, and sometimes the President of the Board of Agriculture.
We suspect that even in the matter of financial propriety Mr. Churchill will be able to make out a very good case for himself. If be cannot, it will be the business of the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer to bring him to book on that ground. No one could go further in support of financial purism than we go ourselves. The control of the House of Commons should be supreme, and consent should never be given to any expenditure before it is quite clear where the money is to come from. But this is not to say that a Department which has such a special and peculiar responsibility as that of the upkeep of the Navy should sacrifice national safety to a punctilio. So far as we understand the matter, the supplementary expenditure was all caused by needs which had been foreseen and already sanctioned by the House of Commons. For example, there was last year the overtaking of arrears in construction which had been brought about partly by strikes and partly by exceptional activity in mercantile work in the yards during the two previous years. Then, again, there was the acceleration of three battleships in order provisionally to supply the place of the three Canadian ships. Mr. Churchill had more than once pointed out that this acceleration might be necessary. We may add that such acceleration will shortly become necessary again if the Cabinet have not decided upon the preferable course of laying down ships over and above the four already pro- mised for this year. Yet again, there was an all- round increase of prices last year, and there were new seaplanes to be provided, with all their accompanying equipment. It is believed that the new Naval Estimates will be for at least £53,000,000—an increase of .26,700,000 on last year. Of this increase over £4,000,000 will be caused by the Supplementary Estimate. No doubt all the Departments are asking for more money. But even if the Admiralty alone is asking for more, Mr. Lloyd George will have to find £6,000,000 more out of revenue than he raised last year. He is, in fine, in a very unenviable position. His own profligate finance has brought him at last, in spite of the unexampled prosperity of the country, to the edge of the abyss, and he has failed in his odious attempt to save himself by sacrificing the Department on which our safety mainly depends. We trust that the Little-Navy Group, who have a just grievance against him for having fooled them, will not be slow to settle their account.
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