31 JANUARY 1914, Page 37

CAPTURE AT SEA.*

CERTAIN people in this country desire to make war at sea without hurting anyone except those actually engaged in the Naval Service. The Navies are to enter the arena, like Roman gladiators, and fight, while the nations look on and are thrilled by the accounts of the exciting incidents in battle. Will not such a policy increase the probability of the outbreak of war? Will it be possible to continue such a policy at sea when whole nations are marching to battle on land and fighting for exist- ence? These questions cannot be answered without a clear understanding of the principles underlying the conduct of war at sea, which Lord Lorebnrn seems to have inadequately set forth in his recent book, Capture at Sea. He urges that "Naval conditions in their relation to commerce are utterly changed since the time of Napoleon or Chatham." But surely there is no change in principle, seeing that now, as then, the armed forces struggle for the mastery, and the victor either invades the enemy's territory, or stops his seaborne trade, or attempts to do both. Whichever action be taken, the object is to reduce the power and resources of the enemy to carry on the war, and to make him sue for peace. It matters not whether the ships are propelled by sails or by machinery, so long as all are moved by the same means. Nor does it matter in principle whether the ships arc built of wood or of steel, whether they are armed with smooth-bored or rifled guns, whether they consist of ships moving above or below the surface of the water, so long as both sides use the same. The primary object of each side is to disarm the other.

• Capture at Sea. By Earl Lorabara. London Nehru= sad. Co. Da &I. nor.)

after which the victor can work his will on the defeated. Nor has the Declaration of Paris of 1856 really introduced any military change. The armed and commissioned merchant ship will play the same part in the future as did the privateer in the past, although the method may be different. The existing uncertainties of blockade and contraband leave the respect due to the neutral flag still largely dependent on the armed strength behind it.

Lord Loreburn does not make clear that commerce in war is carried on under the protection afforded partly by the armed force, and partly by insurance which spreads the losses over• the whole body of consumers. Does he not misrepresent the facts in suggesting that underwriters bear the losses ? Are not premiums arranged to cover losses and cost of insurance with a margin of profit ? On p. 9 it is suggested that the losses due to the earthquake fire at San Francisco fell on the underwriters, and that the same thing might have been brought about by a bombardment. If the premiums are fixed with those risks in view, surely the underwriters can have no just cause of complaint. The losses will have been covered by the premiums paid over a long period by all the people who insure. What matters the nationality of the underwriters if ultimately the consumers or general population bear the losses P Maritime capture includes three phases—viz.," enemy cap- ture," which aims at stopping the enemy's trade, "commercial blockade" and "contraband capture," which are used to stop the neutml trade with the enemy. Lord Loreburnf ully recognizes that the three phases together form a very potent instrument, but he lays special stress on "enemy capture " as being a great danger to our own shipping. He seems to forget that past war experience has shown that the risk to commerce turns on the result of the struggle between the armed forces and balances greatly in favour of the winner ; also that no paper agreement is of any value as between belligerents fighting for existence. He draws a comparison between " enemy capture" at sea and on land, much to the disadvantage of the former. What are the facts? On land, to meet the necessities of the Army, money contributions can be levied on the responsibility of the Com- mander-in-Chief, receipts for each being given, under Articles 49 and 51 of the laws of war, and requisitions in kind can be demanded on the authority of the local commander under Article 52. Supplies in kind are, as far as possible, to be paid for in ready money ; if not, the fact of furnishing is to be recorded by receipts, and the sums due are to be paid as soon as possible. The French text reads " Les prestations en nature seront, autant

The author does not appear to understand that the object of stopping the enemy's trade is not to reduce the civil popula- tion to distress, but to impair his military strength by putting a stop to the creation of the wealth required to produce, maintain, and renew the armed forces. His references on 2. 96 to Napoleon's campaign on the Riviera, to the American Civil War, and to the French Revolutionary Wars show, in the opinion of the present writer, a curiously limited view, and an imperfect understanding of the points at issue. In chap. iv. the author questions whether "enemy capture" and "commercial blockade" will be effective in stopping the enemy's trade, on the ground that the means of transport by land have much improved during the past century. But he neglects to take into account the vast increase in com- merce and in the density of the population, which have kept pace with the improved facilities of transport and increased the difficulties of shifting the trade of such places as New York or London to other routes. Moreover, the particular cases he examines are those in which a single country is blockaded by sea and is surrounded by neutral countries through which the trade can continue to enter. In such circumstances, it is not to be expected that the stoppage of the sea trade will be very effective ; but are there no con- ceivable cases in which a Continental Power may be hemmed in on the land side and blockaded by sea ? What will be the- position of the countries included in the Triple Alliance in the event of war with the Triple Entente, if the ports in the North Sea, Baltic, Adriatic, and Northern Italy are blockaded? If the right of " enemy capture " and "commercial blockade" is abandoned, what assistance will this country be able to render to France and Russia P The point was fully appreciated by the Powers at the Hague Conference, since the Triple Alliance voted for the American proposal to abolish the right to capture so-called private property at sea and the Triple Entente against it. Lord Loreburn seems to make a mistake in limiting his outlook to the case of war between this country and a single Continental Power. He forgets that the armed nations have to be clothed and fed, and that in time of war they will be more dependent than ever on seaborne supplies. He forgets that war cannot be carried on without money, and that this is chiefly derived from trade. He misses the mark in assuming that the abolition of capture at sea will reduce naval armaments. Unfortunately these depend chiefly upon the strength of the armed forces which threaten to attack, and only to a limited extent on the size and dis- tribution of the territory or commerce which will be at the mercy of the victor, to be annexed or suppressed by him as be sees fit. Sufficient has perhaps been said to satisfy the reader that he must examine with great care the case pre. embed in this book before he accepts the proposed changes. in the manner of conducting war at sea.