31 JULY 1841, Page 12

RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT FOR INDIA.

THE result of the protracted discussion on the case of the Rajah of Sattara, in the last Court of Proprietors of the East India Com- pany, is calculated to awaken serious apprehensions for the stability and usefulness of the Anglo-Indian Government. The Proprietors who supported the Rajah made statements going far to esta- blish that the witnesses upon whose evidence the Rajah was de- posed were unworthy of belief, and that the inquiry into his con- duct had been carried on in a manner not calculated to elicit the truth. All that the Rajah demanded was a fair trial. The advo- cates of the Indian Government and the Directors in the Court of Proprietors did not venture to defend the characters of the wit- nesses, or to assert that the inquiry had been properly conducted: they rested their opposition to a new trial upon the incompetency of the Court to alter any resolution of the Directors which had been sanctioned by the Board of Control; and contented them- selves with carrying a resolution declaring, not that the Directors had acted right in the case of the Rajah of Sattara, but that " this Court deems it highly inexpedient, and accordingly declines, to interfere with the responsible Executive in the affairs of Sat- tars." This resolution was adopted not only in the face of the uncontradicted statements that the Rajah had not bad a fair trial, but with the knowledge that the Indian Government had offered to allow him to continue on the throne if be would sign a paper con- taining four conditions and a preamble in which he was made to de- clare himself guilty—that the Indian Government, by offering such a high bribe to the Rajah to declare himself guilty, confessed its in- ability to bring satisfactory proof against him, and punished him, not because he was guilty, but because he had the presumption to contradict the Government and affirm his own innocence.

The deposition of the Rajah of Sattara, and the garbled accounts of the plot which was recently discovered in Kurnaul, have excited suspicions in this country that a considerable amount of disaffec- tion to the Anglo-Indian Government exists in India. The high hand with which matters have been carried against the Rajah of Sattara, showing that in one case at least just grounds for disaffection may exist, necessarily suggests that this disaffection must be more embittered and more widely diffused than the inhabitants of Eng- land can at such a distance be aware of. There are strong reasons

for fearing that much misgovernment prevails in our Indian terri- tories. It is not likely to be abated under existing circumstances. So long as the operations of the Anglo-Indian Government were confined to the districts east of the westernmost branch of the Indus, it bad a tolerably well-defined frontier, and a not altogether unmanageable extent of territory. Since it occupied Afghanistan, it has no longer a frontier. Aggression from without will be anti- cipated by constantly pushing forward its outposts. The care which the Government ought to take of the Company's internal empire will be neglected for an indefinite extension of its limits. The in- habitants will be ground down by the excessive taxe levied for the purpose of extending the empire, and a neglected and weak internal government will be unable to afford protection against the hordes of broken men converted by the taxgatherer's extortions into banditti. India will become an expensive incumbrance upon Great Britain, and will cease to afford a profitable market to our merchants and manufacturers.

How can such an issue be averted ? The Court of Proprietors admit the truth of the assertion that " it has no power to alter any resolution of the Directors which has been sanctioned by the Board of Control." Parliament is so engrossed with our domestic affairs, that even the colonists of British race cannot obtain an attentive hearing : then what chance have our Indian dependents ? It would appear at first sight, that the Directors and the Board of Control are absolutely unchecked ; that the phrase " responsible government," in the resolution adopted by the Court of Proprietors, is a word of mockery and insult.

Further reflection, however, suggests that there are means by which a salutary control may be exercised over the Anglo-Indian Government. There is in this country a strong abstract love of justice. There is a pretty numerous, wealthy, and intelligent class of the community who have a demonstrable personal interest in the well-governing of India. And there are a few men animated by ardent benevolence and possessed of considerable talents, who by long residence in India have acquired an intimate knowledge of and a warm attachment to its population. Here is a powerful force ; all that is wanted is a lever by means of which to bring it to bear upon the Indian Government, and the judicious application of that lever. The lever and the means of using it must be sought by the study of the constitution of the Anglo-Indian Government. Mere vague talking never promoted the cause of humanity and justice. The character of the depositaries of power must be studied—their accessible points ascertained, with a view to bring public opinion to bear availably upon them. With this view, the friends of India ought first of all to inquire after what fashion the Government of our Indian dependencies is constructed, in order that they may know where and how to lay hands upon it in order to turn it to their purpose. All the functions of the Executive Government of India are shared between the Directors of the East India Company and the President of the Board of Control. In practice, the President manages the business of the Board, and only on rare occasions calls upon his colleagues for assistance. The Directors appoint the Governor-General of India and the Governors of the several Presi- dencies. Their nomination is subject to the approval of the Crown ; but they have the absolute and uncontrolled power of recalling any of these functionaries. All subordinate appointments are made by the Directors ; a certain proportion of this patronage being as a matter of courtesy placed at the disposal of the Presi- dent of the Board of Control. The duty of this Board is to super- intend the territorial or political concerns of the Company ; to in- spect all letters passing to and from India between the Directors and their servants or agents which have any connexion with terri- torial management or political relations; to alter, or amend, or keep back the despatches prepared by the Directors ; and in urgent cases, to transmit orders to the functionaries in India without the concurrence of the Directors. In short, the President of the Board of Control has been correctly described as " a Secretary of State for the affairs of India, governing by means of the Court of Directors as its instrument in all matters of a political nature"; and these, since the Act of 1833, which took from the East India Company its right of trading, include all the functions of the Directors. It appears from this review that the President of the Board of Trade is the Indian Minister, and that the Directors of the East India Company constitute his bureau. In amgovernment like that of Great Britain, in which a Minister's tenure of office is in the highest degree precarious, depending not only upon the power of his party to retain the ascendancy but upon the incessantly shift- ing balance of influences in the party—and in which official aptitude is not always the recommendation of the person appointed Minis- ter—the power of a permanent bureau is extremely great. In fact, the principal officials in a bureau are in nine cases out of ten the real Ministers. This is the case in the Indian bureau even to a greater extent than in the other departments of Government, owing to the remote, unfamiliar, and complicated nature of the business which is there transacted. The persons, therefore, who appoint, and who by their influence as possessed of this power can give its tone and direction to the policy of the Directors, hold in their hands the fate of India.

The Directors are appointed as follows. They are twenty-four in number, are chosen from among the Proprietors holding 2,0001. of stock and upwards, and are elected by the proprietors holding 1,0001. of stock and upwards. The holder of 1,0001. is entitled to one vote, the holder of 3,0001. to two votes ; the holder of 6,0001. to three, and the holder of 10,0001. and upwards to four. Six Di- rectors are elected and six go out of office in rotation every year. At the time of the last Parliamentary inquiry into the affairs of the Company, it was stated there were 1,976 Proprietors entitled to vote ; of whom 54 were entitled to four votes each, 50 to three, 370 to two, while 1,502 had single votes. The appointment to the office of Director depends upon the candidate's obtaining a majority of votes out of 2,608 that may be tendered ; and these are to be obtained by conciliating the support of a voting-majority out of a body of 1,976 persons. The number of persons qualified to be chosen Directors is 1,106. The persons to be dealt with are not so numerous but that a reasonable degree of attention and painstaking might enable the friends of India to ascertain their respective biases and dispositions, with sufficient accuracy to guide them in their efforts to secure the appointment of a proper Court of Directors. It is quite true, what the Court of Proprietors was told, that it has no longer the right of interference in cases where the proceedings of the Directors have the concurrence of the Board of Control; but the Proprietors have a right at their meetings to discuss the merits of such policy, with a view to decide their choice among the candidates who offer themselves at the annual election of Directors. The only line of action by which they can insure justice to India, is to work upon the minds of the constituent body by discussions at its stated meetings and through the press, with a view to form and diffuse correct opinions of the best qualifications of a Director, and to accustom them to act upon those opinions at elections.

In the Court of Directors the Indian public has an engine for influencing the action of the Government which none of our Colonies enjoy. Every holder of a certain amount of stock is entitled to vote iu the election of Directors; every holder of a somewhat greater amount is entitled to be himself elected a Director. The steps by which the friends of India—the portion of our mercantile and manu- facturing community who have an interest in promoting the wealth and tranquillity of India—nay, the natives of India themselves—can obtain an influential hold upon the Government of that country, are plain. The means of insuring a just and legitimate action of those who have acquired what we may call the Indian franchise, is equally clear. The Directors hold the disposal of an immense amount of valuable patronage, and may avail themselves of it to secure the election of supporters of their favourite policy. This risk can only be averted by giving the utmost possible publicity to the transactions of the Indian Government, and using every means to diffuse information respecting India and excite an interest in its foitunes. By this means, proper persons will be induced to qualify themselves for giving a vote in the election of Directors, and the Company will be made to feel the necessity of resting its claims to public support upon the goodness of its government. The Deputy- Chairman warned the Court of Proprietors, that any " indiscretion" on their part " would induce the superior power to lessen that authority which the Company still possesses in the government of India." The truth is, that " the superior power" is bent upon lessening that authority ; and the only chance the Company has of retaining it is by convincing the public that its influence is used beneficially bitth for India and England. This conviction can only be produced by teaching the British public to know and take an interest in India, and by appointing for Directors true statesmen, the success of whose policy will demonstrate the wisdom and bene- volence of those who selected them.

The character hitherto maintained by the Indian Government is favourable to the experiment. Whilst we would not palliate the deficiencies of that Government, we gladly admit its right to a high rank among the most able and well-intentioned governments upon record. Faults it has had of indolence, faults of waywardness ; but its ambition has on the whole been of a generous character, and it has been eminently free from conventional prejudices. It has been singularly superior to traditionary routine, and its operations have been projected in a large spirit. The course of action adopted by the friends of India in their efforts systematically to influence the election of Directors, need not and ought not to be conceived in the narrow and peevish spirit of a mere opposition. Their object is not to become the personal rivals of the ascendant influence for power, but their coequals in counsel. That the party which holds and has held the ascendancy will view their organization with any prepossessions in their favour, they cannot expect ; but, by candid perseverance in a just and manly policy, they will in time secure, if not a lead in the Court of Directors, a voice sufficiently potential to be productive of much good to India.