Chinese allegories
David Bonavia
Hong Kong
Ir'eking's allegorists are busy again— rummaging in the annals of ancient dynasties to find parallels with the modern age. Their main message to the people (and it is obviouslY sanctioned from the highest level) Is to beware of political trends which may result in the break-up of China into politico411'nary regions after the death of Mao Tse-tung. Prestigious Communist Party organs and learned journals have chosen two main periods of Chinese history as the setting for their political parables: the early Years of the Western Han Dynasty, in the second century BC, and the middle period of Tang Dynasty, in the eighth and ninth centuries AD.
The choice of these two dynasties is of Particular significance, because they are generally regarded as having been the high Points of centralised rule and the periods of the greatest cultural flowering. In addition, they were periods when China's territorial extension and her prestige among neighbouring countries were greater than at any other time. The parallel with China in the 1970s is clear. The country's international Prestige is well established, but what she regards as her territorial integrity is under challenge from Russia, Taiwan and even Vietnam. National culture has gone through a Period of renewal—whether for better or f.or Worse is a matter of debate. The economy Is fairly stable and moderately prosperous.
Rut disunity and possibly break-up loom e, n the horizon as political feuding at the InShest levels coincides with the rapidly de
lifling of Mao, and China's !ntellectuals seem to be brooding over the ,Idea that 'we have been here before'. The ‘-hinese find nothing strange in discussing their current problems obliquely, through tiLebates on the history of past ages. This has "een their practice for more . than two Millennia, during which they have considered their country to be in a state of lost grace and of yearning for the restoration of a InYthical golden age. That idea has been thoroughly exploded by the Communist historians, who point out that from the aPpearance of Peking Man some 500,000 ears ago, until the modern period, China "a5. undergone transition from primitive 1OseletY, through slave-owning society, eudalism and a somewhat rudimentary eaPitalism, to the present stage of socialism. It is hard for the Westerner to grasp that 'i.v!Ien the Chinese talk about feudalism in a Istorical context they regard it as a generally ,i,3rogre55ive' factor, because it liberated .Lhina from the slave-owning period before third century sc—just as Western Marxists consider that capitalism 'liber
ated' society from feudalism. However odd it seems to hear Chinese Communists, with their passion for agrarian reform, praising the 'emerging landlord class' of the Han Dynasty, this is the basis of the recent allegorical discussion of China's fate after the death of Mao.
With regard to both the Han and the Tang dynasties, they seem obsessed by the idea of enfeoffed local rulers and military commanders eroding the authority of the central government. The main elements of the problem, as seen in Peking, are ideology, economic control, resistance to invasion, and the rooting out of traitors in the ruling group. The modern parallel is obvious.
Less straightforward is the question of identifying historical personalities with those of today. Here the allegory must not be followed up too closely, because the historical image of rulers equivalent to Mao is a composite: all strong and successful rulers who imposed central control and opposed Confucianism are Mao. All proConfucianists, are Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Teng Hsiao-ping, and all the other hetes noires of the contemporary political myth. 'He who is not for me is against me,' Mao's historians proclaim on his behalf. On the other hand, certain individual references can be seen as hinting at the role of modern personalities. Wang Hung-wen, the roughly forty-year-old Shanghai Commissar who shot up to the number three place in the party leadership in 1973, is clearly symbolised by the mention of a Han Dynasty official called Chia Yi. This historical figure is described as a youthful reformer who was 'opposed and denounced as a young man who was just beginning to learn but who wanted to gain power and make trouble'.
The reference to suppression of advice from young officials is a national issue today, in which the treatment of Wang by the now disgraced Vice-Premier Teng is seen as only a symbolic instance. Teng is regarded as representative of an entire layer of older party officials who dislike the so-called 'helicopter promotions' of young cadres like Wang. There also seems to be a fleeting reference to Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, in the mention of the Empress Lu of the Han Dynasty—a brutal, ambitious and intriguing woman, who stirred up the whole question of legitimacy by granting feoffs to her own relatives rather than to those with the dynastic surname of Liu. This is a particularly vexed question in modern China, where a number of Mao's relatives hold important posts. But it is indicated in the current-day accounts that Empress Lu's contribution was on the whole a positive one.
Again and again the historians return to the theme of economic control. In the ancient dynasties, this was to a large extent effected through the government tax on salt. Nowadays it depends on the party's control of grain supply. In both cases, the establishment of a firm economic rein is seen as a prerequisite for stable rule. But it is regionalism and centrifugal tendencies that worry the party most, and the propagandists cite as a particularly •negative' example the Tang Dynasty system of appointing allpowerful governors in outlying provinces. There is a clear implication here that the modern regional commanders—many of whom have sway over areas bigger than several West European countries put together—may establish the type of 'independent kingdom' said to have existed in Szechwan Province before the Cultural Revolution.
Most intriguing of all are references to the control of the Tang palace guard by eunuchs who isolated the ruler. Is this a hint that all is not well with the political loyalties of the security troops guarding Mao in his garden residence in the centre of Peking?
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