31 MARCH 1939, Page 18

Commonwealth and Foreign

WHAT IS WRONG IN BELGIUM ?

By MARC SOMERHAUSEN

IN October, 1936, foreign correspondents streamed in to Brussels to watch the " March on Brussels " which M. Leon Degrelle had planned in true Mussolini fashion. M. van Zeeland's Government prohibited the Rexist demon- stration, and the foreign newspapermen were robbed of their story, for nothing happened. Two years ago M. Degrelle asked one of his lieutenants to resign and decided to run for Parliament. M. van Zeeland took up the gauntlet, and, though he had never taken any part in active politics, decided to defy the Rexist leader. Again the world Press was tense with excitement. Was Fascism going to triumph in Belgium by a' sort of Nazi plebiscite? On the evening of April 11th, 1937, the world learned that M. Degrelle had been defeated by a four to one majority. The Rexist party since that event has fallen on evil days. Several Senators and M.P.s have resigned, and an even larger number have refused to stand in the present election. M. Degrelle him- self has publicly prophesied that his Party will lose a third of its parliamentary representation.

One effect of the Rexist Party's mushroom growth in 1936, when it won 21 of the 202 seats in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies was to make it possible for M. Spaak, the first Labour Premier of Belgium, to hold office ; for the Rexist Party grew at the expense of the Liberal, and especially of the Catholic Party, who for more than fifty years had held a predominant position which .they now lost. Not unnatur- ally the break-up of the Rexist Party seemed to offer the Catholics an opportunity to recover the support they lost in 1936. Their problem was to find a suitable occasion to overthrow the Labour Prime Minister and to bring the Coalition of Labour, Liberals and Catholics to an end. The die-hards of the Catholic Party nearly brought about the fall of M. Spaak on two occasions on the question of recognition of General Franco. The Labour Party Congress twice refused to accept de facto recognition, but in order to avoid a dissolution on that issue the Labour Party executive finally agreed to send an envoy to National Spain—a decision that was ratified by the Labour Party Congress.

Seeing that the Conservative wing of the Catholic Party was determined to bring about a dissolution, the Liberals tried to turn the tables in their own favour by exploiting the Maertens affair. The appointment to the Flemish Academy of Dr. Maertens, who had been engaged in treasonous activity against the Belgian State during the last War, was made the occasion for a demonstration by a section of war veterans. The Liberals, who have always shown a lack of understanding for the Flemish point of view, suddenly decided to withdraw from the Government Coalition if Dr. Maertens was not dismissed. Though few in numbers the Liberals represent important banking and industrial interests. Their attempt, however, to force a dissolution on this issue met with no sympathy within the " Catholic Bloc," who decided that, having failed to bring about a dis- solution over Spain and now over the Maertens affair, they would accept a two-party Government with Labour.

It was the turn of the Socialists now to try to admit the Liberals. They decided that since the bourgeois parties were increasingly determined to have a dissolution the Socialists ought to force it on an issue which particularly concerned the Labour Party, and they accordingly allowed three of their members to enter a Cabinet headed by the Conservative Catholic Senator Pierlot. When M. Pierlot advocated a five per cent. reduction in wages and salaries the Labour Party felt that the unavoidable issue for dissolution had arisen. King Leopold tried to patch up matters, but in vain, and eventually he had to sign the dissolution decree a year before the normal time for general elections.

" Down with Maertens " is the cry that unites Liberals, Walloon Catholics, the remaining Rexists and the super- patriotic Communists. " No deflation " is the Socialist slogan. The electoral campaign will be brief, for two weeks before the poll electioneering had only just begun and there were few posters about. Changes in Parliament will probably be small. An increase of half a dozen Liberals, and as many Rexists fewer, are safe prophecies. Will the Socialists lose to the Communists? Will the Flemish Catholics lose to the Flemish Nationalists ? Prophecy would have been easier a fortnight ago, but Hitler's latest move will certainly have a sobering effect on the average Belgian voter. The Flemish Nationalists used to show great sym- pathy with the Slovak autonomists, but " independence under German occupation will certainly not appeal to any Fleming. There are no aspirants for the role of Dr. Tiso even amongst the most radical Nationalists. There is a Flemish organisation built up exactly on the Nazi model. It is the " Verbond der dietsche national solidaristen" (Union of Dutch National Solidarists), known briefly as " Dinaso." They advocate an authoritarian and corporate State; they have set up a militia, and obey their leader van Severen with military discipline.

In recent years the Dinasos have repudiated the idea of Flemish autonomy and have realised that the partition of Belgium would mean its invasion. M. van Severen now advocates a customs union and a military alliance between Belgium and Holland, which would to some extent restore the post-Waterloo Netherlands, whilst maintaining the two dynasties. Although ten years ago he represented the Flemish Nationalist Party in Parliament he now fiercely attacks his former Party because of its separatism. The necessity of a united Belgium is now recognised among both democratic Flemings and those with authoritarian leanings. Legally the Flemings have attained complete equality since the War, and now have their own university, regiments, and municipal and provincial governments in their own areas. The administration of justice in the northern half of Belgium is exclusively Flemish. The upper classes in Flanders, however, are still largely French-speaking, and this helps to explain a certain inferiority complex among Flemish intellectuals.

The economic development of Flanders on the other hand proceeds more rapidly than that of the Walloon part. There is some fear of Flemish hegemony among the French- speaking Belgians, and federalist tendencies are noticeable among the Walloons, where the separatist movement might be compared with the Scottish Home Rule movement. Ther. is, that is to say nowhere in Belgium any problem as serious as that which called either for Lord Runciman's mediation or Herr Hitler's "protection." There are, however, seriou, problems to be solved. The budget has to be balanced. new industries must be created, exports must be expanded- and social legislation revised. But there is nothing insoluble here. These problems are common to the Flemings and to the Walloons. After the election the Maertens case will be as forgotten as the " Zinovieff letter." And Belgium will again " drop out of the news."