Bhutto prepares to die
Victoria Schofield
Islamabad Pakistan Day was the occasion for a splendid performance on the race course at Rawalpindi. In brilliant spring weather, hot by English standards, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq arrived in a glittering coach lined with blue velvet, driven by a team of horses, to review Pakistan's combined forces — the navy, the army and the airforce. It was a spectacle reminiscent of the British Raj — more modest, perhaps, but equally full of pageantry. Pakistan's military ruler emerged trom his chariot on to the red carpet and took his position on the raised dais, facing the troops but with his back to the crowd of both Pakistanis and diplomats.
As an annual event to celebrate the day when members of the Muslim League met on 23 March 1940 to demand the establishment of a country called 'Pakistan', a pure land for the Muslims of the Asian subcontinent, this Pakistan Day was to herald a new era for the Pakistan of the Seventies. After nearly two years of military rule, General Zia made the long awaited announcement that general elections would be held in November 1979. In a speech lasting half an hour, which was broadcast to the nation and reprinted in the press, General Zia once again solemnly announced that I nsha'Allah (God willing) elections would be held, thus dispelling speculation by his opponents that he would never hold elections and would merely use the political instability in the country to retain his own hold on power.
Nobody, of course, envisages that Zia will depart from the limelight. With the introduction of Islamic laws in Pakistan in February — a project which has been dear to his heart ever since he assumed power in the military coup which overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government in July 1977 — Zia looks very much as though he will want to stay and see what happens. Many believe that he will retain his office, as president of the country, while allowing the elected representatives to take up their respective positions.
Nor does he want the office of president to be just a figurehead. In his speech he gave a clear indication that there should be a division of powers between the prime minister and the president so that one 'does not turn into a dictator' and make the other 'powerless and ineffective.' Whereas the prime minister will remain the chief executive and have all the powers necessary for the running of the country, Zia declared that the president will be the 'symbol of the Islamic republic and the guardian of the Constitution'. Many believe that Zia sees himself as well qualified for this role, with the experience of the past 18 months behind him. They are also fairly sure that he will not want to see any of his cherished reforms — particularly the stringent Islamic ones — reversed: and the best way of seeing that they are kept is indeed for him to remain as the symbol of them.
Zia has been alternately called hypocritical and sincere. Certainly since he assumed power he has been the subject of great controversy, and a certain amount of derision. As a soldier, he is thought to lack the astuteness of the politician. ManY believe that, if he were to stay in power too long, he would bring upon himself the same sort of downfall as his military predecessors, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. But with the announcement of elections, he has given people fresh hope that they will not be perpetually ruled by a military regime. To all intents and purposes, therefore, Zia ul-Haq is home and dry.
On another front, Zia also looks as though the problem which has beset his tenure of office ever since he took it upon himself to rule the country, is about to reach its final solution. Zia's announcement of elections came on the eve of the Supreme. Court of Pakistan's dismissal of Zulfikar All Bhutto's review petition against his conviction. Consistently Zia has tried to absolve himself from any part in the protracted proceedings against his former leader, disregarding both internal and external requests to show clemency and maintaining all along that he would abide by the decision given by the judiciary. Now he has that decision in his hand. He has the former prime minister sentenced to death by a High Court, with that sentence confirmed by the majority decision of the judges of the Supreme Court. With the rejection of the review petition, all legal avenues have been exhausted and it is up to the Executive authorities to decide whether or not to spare the life of the former head of state, a man who at the time they all professed to revere. As an extra bonus the government can claim that the review petition was unanimously rejected, since the three dissenting judges refrained from expressing their views in accordance with `judicial dignity and the practice of the court.' Bhutto's lawyers and supporters now regret that they did not ask for a reduction of sentence at the appropriate time during the appeal, since they now have to turn to an Executive which has never shown much love for Bhutto since his downfall. Defence lawyers had believed, optimistically, that they would get an acquittal or re-trial, and so they failed to Plead extenuating circumstances, in order to secure a lesser penalty, until the review Petition stage; and by then, according to the law, it was too late.
Until he goes ahead with the execution, of course, Zia will not be able to test Bhutto's own claim that his death will cause the break-up of Pakistan. But there are Other considerations involved. Those who hope that Bhutto will be spared, and confined to life imprisonment, are secretly antieyating his return once the promised elections are held: if not this time round, then the next time. This is precisely why they fear that his life will not be spared. Others maintain that the military leaders are not concerned about the possible disintegration of Pakistan and that they are concerned only for their own necks; these men cannot fail to he aware that sooner or later revenge for the death of Bhutto will be taken in some form or another.
Bhutto himself is prepared for death, and IS adamant that he will not ask for mercy, thereby admitting guilt. Ever aware of his own place in history, he has long had it in mind that he ,would die in what he terms a 'revolutionary' manner.
He feels his destiny is still implicated with that of the people, the 'toiling teeming masses', and it would therefore not be inappropriate for him to die on their behalf, ousted as he believes by the vested chauvinist elite, which was opposed to his policies of socialism and democracy. For all Bhutto's own faults and the grotesque allegations laid at his feet in the past months, when the government propaganda machine was trying to besmirch his reputation, many people still regard him as a hero and leader who has been victimised. He himself has said that history will be his final judge.
To his supporters and his family the prospect of execution is horrific. They see not only a member of a family, be it father or husband, uncle or cousin, being executed, but a leader of the people and the man who gave Pakistan a name on the map after its debacle in Bangladesh. Inevitably they will fight to carry on his work and perpetuate his name, as a martyr who died for the people and as an innocent man falsely convicted. Bhutto's supporters believe that, sooner or later, Zia or his successors will have a revolution on their hands, if Bhutto hangs. They believe, therefore, that, whether it be for self interest or the national interest, the granting of mercy is the only solution. But will Zia entertain the possibility of upsetting his electoral apple-cart with the emergence of 'Bhuttoism', which will inevitably be more powerful if Bhutto is alive — even if he is alive in jail? Or will he take a longer look at the consequences which execution could have on a country already subjected to a great deal of bloodshed since that first Pakistan Day thirty nine years ago?
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