THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1873.*
GENERAL VINOY, one of the soldiers who came out of the late war with an augmented reputation, has written a book on the French Army in 1873 which will probably disappoint most readers. It absolutely lacks the literary and historical element which characterised Trochu's famous brochure. The sometime Governor of Paris was renowned for his talking and writing power ; but while Vinoy has the solid, he has few of the showy qualities which are so attractive and deluding in many Frenchmen. The present, like preceding works by Lord Clyde's old friend, is remarkable for its close adherence to the subject and its thoroughly business-like character. Indeed it might be styled a memorandum for a Minister of War or a civil President of the Republic, rather than a book coming within the ordinary literary categories. Its yellow covers contain a solid mass of information, a formidable array of details in the most repulsive form they can assume, that of figures. Nor could this be well avoided, since, from one point of view, figures constitute the essence of an army. General Trochu dealt with the moral aspects of the question, and so far went deeper than General Vinoy; for numbers without organisation, unless animated by an effective military spirit, avail little except against weaker forces of a like kind. Nevertheless, although the first requisite is still quality, and that high training, physical and moral, which makes the soul of armies, historical developments have ren- dered quantity also essential, and it is with this branch of the momentous theme that General Vinoy deals. His book inquires into the past and present state of the Army, but only with intent to arrive at conclusions respecting the future ; what forces will France have under the new law, and when she has got them, how, in time of need, are they to be brought together effectively,—in other words, how can the reserves be promptly mobilised and embodied.
As to the present. This portion of the interesting theme may be speedily dismissed. So far as we can gather from General Vinoy's pages and from other sources, and quite independently of the financial situation, France does not at this moment possess an army which, either in respect of quality or quantity, would enable her rulers to wage a successful war. The actual force afoot looks large on paper, for an array of 455,000 men has a large appearance. But those figures include everything, and in nowise represent the available fighting men. In order to arrive at the net disposable number, we must deduct the garrison of Algeria and the colonies, the home garrisons, the depots, and what we should call the army services. Probably 250,000 is an outside estimate for a campaigning force ; and although there are behind, in the population, large reserves, they are not formed reserves, nor does the machinery exist which would make them readily available. In an unprovoked defensive war, this number, handled as Napoleon would have handled it, could make a stout fight, and endure long enough, perchance, to enable an energetic minister and strong government to call up, equip, and organise a second army. But as matters stand, the French, even if their finances were not so heavily handicapped, are not in a state to undertake a war, having for its object the recovery of territory, the imposition of a swingeing indemnity, or even the restoration of the temporal power. General Vinoy tells us nothing of its moral, of its training, of its arms, or of the merits of its officers. From other sources we infer that, in every respect, the character of the force is slightly superior to what it was in 1870, but that it is still below the standard of the best French armies in the earlier days of Napoleon I., though quite as good as the armies trained under the July Monarchy, and the finest which ever gathered under the eagles of the Second Empire. Relatively to Germany, or to the exigencies of a political war, the Army is inferior, and thus at this moment France is without an aggressive weapon. As to the future. The numerical strength of all armies formed on the basis of conscription, whether with or without compulsory
* L'Arniefe Franfaise en 1873. Par le G6n6ral Vinoy. Etude ear lee Renounces de is France et lea !doyens de s'en Servir. Paris: Plea.
service, depends on the population. If all the male children born every year grew up to man's estate in health, strength, and height sufficient for military purposes, the actual force under arms at any period would be enormous. Even allowing for deductions caused by death, disease, malformation, stunted growth, the annual total of young men is very great. In France the gross average of young men whose names are down on the list is about 306,000 annually. As a maximum period of five years' service has been adopted, if all were taken and survived, there would at the end of a quinquennial period be a maximum of 1,530,000 men. But when a government comes to deal with the annual average, large reductions become inevitable ; and out of the 306,000 men who go before the district councils, more than one-half escape. It is estimated by General Vinoy, after an exhaustive inquiry, that the probable annual contingent under the new law will give about 144,697 men for the active army, and 48,573 who are left at home, and supposed to be drilled more or less. In five years, of course, if all survived, these numbers would give a total of nearly 725,000 actually under arms, and 243,000 partially drilled. Practically, the result is very different, but the causes which determine reductions of strength, though well known, are so various and apparently capricious in their operation, that no law exists whereby the diminution suffered in five years can be cal- culated. General Vinoy, however, assumes that the total nomin- ally available at the end of five years would be no fewer than 891,000, that is, 411,000 under arms and 480,000 in reserve. This so-called reserve, of course, is made up of men sent home on leave before their term has expired, and the men who were not incorporated in the army, but still subjected to some training. It is plain, therefore, that the resources of France in men are very slightly less than they were before 1870, and it is as possible as ever it was to form a very:powerful army. Of course, at any period after five years have elapsed, the number of thoroughly-drilled soldiers in the country will go on increasing up to a certain point ; but even 800,000, as General Vinoy shows, is almost as many as any State can profitably employ. In fact, increase of numbers is not necessarily increase of force, and 800,000, well-organised, trained, and directed, is quite sufficient for any State. The great point is to get possession of them at once. The moral of the late war for General Vinoy is that rapid and complete concentration in the first stages of a war is an almost awaited guarantee of victory ; and certainly, if your opponent is quicker than you in bringing up a superior effective force, his first blows, if well aimed and re- solutely delivered, shatter your inferior and less compactly- organised force. The General is, therefore, right in insisting at some length on the:necessity of providing beforehand adequate means for the promptest possible concentration of the largest avail- able numbers. "La premiere de toutes lea necessites, c'est d'arriver vite," he says. And again, in a chapter on certain marked defects visible at the outbreak of the war, he puts the case emphatically thus :—" La premiere partie de la guerre s'est faite avec des cadres excellents, sans un nombre suffisant de soldats ; la seconde, avec des soldats qui n'aurait ete inferieurs 4 leurs camarades, si l'on avait pu les encadrer comme 11 l'aurait fella." In short, the book shows that, at least, some French officers have learned the true lesson, and now desire an army every man of which has been trained in its ranks ; strongly knit and easily mobilised ; the advantages secured by the Prussians, but obtained by such pro- cesses as may suit the French national character. There is no reason, save such as is to be found in the weakness of that character, why the future armies of the nation should not be as redoubtable as those which, born under the old Monarchy, reached such a high standard under Napoleon I. One fact is very remarkable. General Vinoy points out, in strong terms, a great danger ahead, which the Legislature and Executive will have to deal with effectually. It seems that short service in France, together with other causes, has led to a dearth of non-commissioned or " sous-officiers." The best men take their discharge when the time is up, go to their fields, or State employ, or find places in commercial houses, and are known to the Army no more. The number who have more than five years' service grows less every day, the alarming evil is signalised by all the Colonels, and it is:one that must be met, for the sous-officier is simply indispensable. Perhaps it may console General Vinoy to know that the great and admired German Army labours under the same malady, finds its resources in men to fill these posts diminish daily, and does not see at present how to remedy the evil. Why not make appointments to these ranks real prizes, by giving very much higher pay and privileges than are accorded to the men, and a better social status than they obtain now ?
Previous page
