31 MAY 1884, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS.

TT is not difficult, after Mr. Gladstone's careful answers of Tuesday night, to understand the position of the negotia- tions about Egypt. There is, in the first place, to be a Con- ference of Europe to settle the needful modifications of the Law of Liquidation. As that law was sanctioned by all Europe, with the exception of Russia, this Conference is indispensable ; but it will be limited strictly to finance, and will rather meet to record decisions than to devise a method of extricating the Egyptian Treasury. That method may possibly not be the one generally assumed—the mere absorption of the Sink- ing Fund—the rumoured strengthening of the "Caisse of the Debt" pointing rather to a new guarantee offered to the Bondholders, in return for some considerable sacrifice of their claims. Continental Powers are greedy Powers when their sub- jects' pecuniary interests are concerned ; and if " Europe " can collectively enforce certain payments, the Bondholders will think they are more sure of their money than before. They will have, in fact, a European guarantee. The arrange- ment is hard upon the fellaheen, who lose their right of repudiation, conceded even to States like Costa Rica and Honduras ; but it would not embarrass any ultimate posi- tion assumed by Great Britain. If she annexes Egypt, or pro- tects, or governs directly, she must compromise with the Bond- holders or pay them off ; and no strengthening of the Debt Commission can impede such a solution as that. All that new strength to the " Caisse" ensures is that no further reduc- tion can occur without the consent of Powers who on such points think of nothing but the content of their own dealers in loans. Upon this point, however, ne official information is given in Parliament, nor can be given, unless the British Govern- ment is to play into the hands of the international jobbers, who use all information for purposes of gain. But the Premier on Tuesday made another statement, which was rightly under- stood to be important. He admitted unhesitatingly that com- munications not limited to the subject referred to the Confer- ence were passing between England and France ; that should those two Powers agree, their agreement would be placed before the Great Powers, which have international rights whenever the future of Egypt as a Turkish province is in question ;" and that if their opinion was favourable, the agree- ment would be submitted to the Houses in such a way as fully to protect the privileges and prerogatives of Parliament. Nothing could be stronger than Mr. Gladstone's declarations on this point,—he going out of his way to point out how much, how unusually much, he had conceded, and to call his state- ment, as he did twice, not only a declaration, but an "engage- ment."

We do not like this announcement, but for reasons very different from those pleaded by some of our contemporaries.

We do not believe that Mr. Gladstone means any trick, or subterfuge, or subtlety at all. The notion that he is going to make a treaty binding England to quit Egypt on a specific date without the previous assent of the country, and without respect to circumstances, is to our minds nothing less than absurd, Such an arrangement would not only be contrary to common- sense,—for the Mahdi may be at Siout with a hundred thousand Soudanese, and Mussulman India craning its neck to watch the result,—but to Mr. Gladstone's reiterated pledge that he would provide Egypt with a stable and reasonably trustworthy Government, and to his repeated promise or threat, call it which you will, that the English people should not accept responsibilities in Egypt without a full understanding of what they were about, and a full control over the decision. So far from suspecting a trick, we believe that the Government is going to be much too consistent and straightforward,—is going to repeat to Europe its constant promises to depart as early as possible, possibly even to fix a conditional day, and to ask Parliament and the country whether it ratifies that arrange- ment or not. If Parliament refuses, which is quite possible, and is we fancy, the reason of Mr. H. Gladstone's refusal on Tuesday to discuss Egypt Proper in public, the country will be con- sulted,—the Premier sincerely holding that its future will be so implicated that the people, and no lesser authority, ought to pass a final decision. No course more thoroughly straightforward and above-board could be imagined, or one more fully in con- sonance both with constitutional tradition or with that new deference to the people which, whether it is for good or evil, has for years marked, and will hereafter still more mark, the

conduct of public business. The representatives are to be consulted, and the country is to be consulted ; and the Govern- ment submits to their judgment, before it either ratifies agree- ments or passes into the Conference at which one of them, the strengthening of the Caisse of the Public Debt, must formally be confirmed. The most extreme Republican could ask no more ; and there is not a Republic in the world in which any- thing like such a direct arbitrament would be accorded to the popular branch of the controlling power. There is nothing whatever in the Premier's promise for Radicals to raise the smallest cavil about,—though, if we were Tories, we should argue that too much deference was shown to Parliament ;—and our only objection refers to a hypothetical case. We do not care about the strengthening of the Caisse, which can do no harm whatever while its treasury is filled, and if it is not filled, will be only a mouth- piece of Powers already entitled to protest ; but we do not like these repetitions of pledges to go away. Of course they are conditional, and must be conditional, Mr. Gladstone having no more power to control the future than any other Member of Parliament ; but they bar all wise action, and any action for the benefit of Egypt. It is not only that we cannot assume the protectorate which, in our judgment, will be ultimately essential if Egypt is not to be a battle-field of con- tending Powers, but that we cannot do anything that is neces- sary to be done for the benefit of Egypt itself. We cannot create a solid English Administration, to be dismissed in two years, or three years, or five years, to see all its pledges broken and all its institutions superseded whenever the country is restored. There would not be time even for the English civilians to master Cairene Arabic. We must work with native instruments, who do not want to work with us, who are seeking entirely different ends from ours ; who, if bad, will have our irre- sistible force behind them, and if good, will be fettered by the certainty that the day we retire they will be exposed to the vengeance of all the "interests," and personalities, and classes which or whom they will have inevitably offended. Our opponents, who will include every old official, will all be waiting for our departure, and exercising those arts of veiled obstruction in which every Oriental is the superior of Mr. Parnell ; while our nominees will all be half-hearted, unwilling to root out corruption, lest the corrupt men so soon to.be set free should turn upon and rend them. Time does not count in the East as it counts in London ; nor do Asiatics forgive like Englishmen. An honest Egyptian Premier, if we could find one, would be thinking, first of all, what he would have to live on when he fled with the British ; while an honest Prefect (Mudir) would be sure that at a time fixed beforehand his enemies would have ready the bastinado. The great rearrangements of rural taxation which are essential to the peasantry would either not be made, or made amid the secret belief of all classes that they could not last, while improvements like education and village communes would be mere disturbances of the air. The present provisional administration, which fails at all points except the prohibition of insurrection, must in fact continue : with this aggravation that whereas every one is now doubtful whether the English will go or not, every one will then be a little more inclined to believe that they are going. We shall, in fact, for two, three, or five years more continue to fail, as we have failed, in the only political task which Englishmen thoroughly under- stand,—the introduction of civilised order and civilised liberty among a semi-civilised people. If at the end of that time we depart, we shall have failed discreditably in a great contract ; and if we do not depart—and we regard departure as im- possible—we shall be where we were, with the additional difficulty that every enemy will be able to taunt us with making promises which from the first we knew it would be impossible to keep.

We have designedly said nothing of the contingency that Parliament or the country may refuse to ratify any renewal of pledges to depart ; for we do not believe in the con-

tingency. It may occur ; and if it does, of course all things will be changed ; but we do not believe in its occurrence. With

the average elector, Egypt, as Mr. Gladstone said, "is quite a

secondary question." The wavering classes do not know where it is ; and the Liberals, even when they do know, are not going

to buy Egypt at the price of six years' government by Lord

Salisbury and Lord Randolph Churchill. They will, we are convinced, let the Government lead, and turn, whether con- tentedly or sulkily, to other matters nearer home. If Mr. Gladstone proposes to maintain the existing Provisorinm on the Nile for another three years, the country will wait to see what three years will bring forth ; and the whole penalty will fall, not upon us, but on those unlucky Egyptian peasants for whom even England, with all the heart in the world, and with their destinies absolutely dependent on her, seems unable to do aught.