BOOKS
Anthony could not do it
David Carlton
THE FAILURE OF THE EDEN GOVERNMENT by Richard Lamb Sidgwick & Jackson, f16.95 It is a cruel fate, even by the harsh standards of politics, to be remembered by one failure and not by numerous achieve- ments.' Thus wrote the historian Sidney Aster of Anthony Eden in 1976 when the principal architect of the Suez Affair was still alive. Now, more than a decade after his death, we are attaining a greater sense of perspective about Eden and inevitably placing less exclusive emphasis on Suez. This does not mean, however, that as a consequence his standing at the bar of history is inevitably in the process of improvement. For when the searchlight is played on other aspects of his career the result more often than not is merely to confirm how undeserved was the high reputation with which he came to the Premiership in 1955 and how essentially unfitted he was to assume the mantle of Winston Churchill.
My own work on Eden, for example, stressed that in the 1930s he was far from the consistent anti-appeaser of popular legend; how he formed an astonishingly favourable view of Adolf Hitler in 1934, writing that 'without doubt the man has charm' and that 'I find it very hard to believe that the man himself wants war'; how he saw fit to resign in 1938 not over the German menace but over a relatively trifling difference with Neville Chamber- lain over policy towards Italy; and how he subsequently took care to dissociate him- self from Churchill's memorable philippics against Chamberlain's appeasement of Hit- ler and the Munich settlement in particu- lar. It thus seems clear that Churchill was engaging in hyperbole when he wrote in his War Memoirs that Eden was 'the one strong young figure standing up against long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender'. And it came as no surprise to learn from the diary of Sir John Colville, published in 1985, that by the time Chur- chill had to hand over the Premiership he had formed a 'cold hatred' of Eden and was opining that 'I don't think Anthony can do it'.
As for Eden's reputation as a great Foreign Secretary during Churchill's two Premierships, we are also now becoming accustomed to revisionist accounts that are generally unflattering. During the Second World War he appears to have been more a subaltern than a partner to the Prime Minister so far as the really major decisions were concerned. And during the period from 1951 to 1955, when he did indeed exercise a good deal of authority in cir- cumstances where Churchill was essentially senile, he by no means fully deserved his reputation as a world statesman of the first rank. This was amply confirmed in the diaries of Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh (pub- lished last year). Temperamental, vain and irascible, Eden emerges as an unpredict- able figure whose fitness for the Pre- miership is far from apparent. Perhaps, incidentally, it was anticipation that this is what Sir Evelyn's diaries would show that explains the remarkable and arguably un- professional decision of Eden's 'autho- rised' biographer, Mr Robert Rhodes James, to forgo the oportunity to consult and use them.
Now we have the first of what may be several studies of Eden's ill-fated Pre- miership made possible by the opening last January of the Public Record Office mate- rial for 1956. It must first be said that Mr Lamb shows every sign of having made unwarranted sacrifices for the sake of being ahead of the field. The only substan- tial source used is what is in the PRO. No private papers or diaries have been con- sulted. Likewise, the existence of consider- able American official documentation at Princeton (the Dulles Collection) and at Abilene, Kansas (the Eisenhower Collec- tion) has simply been ignored. And carelessness in preparation and proof- reading is all too evident, For example, can Mr Lamb really believe that King Faisal was the last Egyptian monarch? Yet he is so described in both the text and the index. And the serious reader seeking to follow the author's use of sources will probably despair on discovering that there are 55 citations for Chapter Seven (at the back of the book), whereas in the text itself there are only 53 notes. The correlation appears to break down quite early in the chapter. Yet for all its flaws the book will not be without importance in the evolution of Eden's reputation. And once again if one is looking for fresh judgments it is in the main to areas not related to Suez that one must turn. These judgments are of course rarely favourable.
Take, for example, the issue of mass immigration from the New Common- wealth. The new material reveals for the first time just how determined to im- pose curbs was Eden's prescient Home Secretary, Gwilym Lloyd George. He was strongly supported in Cabinet by Lord Salisbury who asserted that there was 'a real danger that over the years there would be a significant change in the racial character of the English people'. And an Interdepartmental Committee of civil ser- vants, under the chairmanship of William Cornish, Under-Secretary at the Home Office, produced a report in August 1955 making it clear that the country had a problem which was on the brink of becom- ing critical and that legislation relating to West Indian immigration was necessary. In Mr Lamb's words, 'it seemed inconceiv- able that the Eden Cabinet would flout the civil servants' advice. But that is what happened'. Under pressure from Alan Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, Eden persuaded the Cabinet to postpone indefinitely the introduction of any legisla- tion. In Mr Lamb's view, 'Eden loved his own rhetoric about a multi-racial Com- monwealth, but disliked the prospect of controversial legislation which might spoil his image as a moderate in home politics'. He adds that otherwise 'the nation might have been spared many tears'.
Eden's indecisiveness was equally appa- rent in the matter of trade union legisla- tion. He personally canvassed a suggestion for introducing secret ballots for the elec- tion of trade union officials and before strikes could be held. But he retreated when faced with opposition from his Minis- ter of Labour, Sir Walter Monckton. Mr Lamb's judgment is again severe: 'A great opportunity for trade union reform was missed in 1955, because at the time the union leaders were moderate and might well have agreed or made little opposition to a sensible package deal.'
Eden's role in preventing his country from taking part in the Messina discussions that led to the creation of the EEC is already well known. And it is right to add that in taking this line he was in tune with the prevailing opinion among most of his compatriots. For years, however, the Brit- ish declaratory line was to wish the West Europeans well in their efforts to achieve unity but to insist that Great Britain, because of its Special Relationship with the United States and its Commonwealth ties, must remain aloof. What is new in Mr Lamb's account is evidence that Eden's Administration deliberately set out to sabotage the Messina initiative. In particu- lar, a secret attempt was made to persuade the Americans to oppose it. This clumsy ploy was not only a predictable failure but news of it got back to horrified West European leaders. Mr Lamb hints that their resentment on this account may have played a part in making it politically possible for President de Gaulle to block British bids for membership in later years.
As for revelations about Suez, the press was able last January to prove how mis- taken were rumours that most of the records had been wantonly destroyed. Accordingly many detailed accounts appeared at the time. What was pub- lished then (and more) is now placed between hard covers for the first time. Welcome though this is, it must be said that little is added that alters the estab- lished broad picture of Eden being guilty of much indecisiveness followed by the reck- less gamble of colluding with the French and the Israelis in a fashion that effectively destroyed his credibility. By way of ex- planation Mr Lamb offers only this rather unpersuasive excuse: 'His doctors pre- scribed him amphetamines to buck him up when he felt tired, and barbiturates to help him sleep. Thirty years ago top physicians prescribed these dangerous drugs in a way that would shock modern practioners. I am convinced that these drugs flawed his judgment during the three months of strain after the Suez Canal was nationalised.' The problem with this explanation is that Eden himself during two further decades of life always maintained that his course had been broadly correct and was not affected by his health. In short, Mr Lamb's defence would have been more repugnant to him than many an attack.
Finally, Mr Lamb investigates the cir- cumstances which led to Eden's resigna- tion in January 1957. He hints at political pressures from disloyal colleagues being no less important than ill-health as an ex- planation for the timing. I agree with this. But I also venture to wonder whether a part may not also have been played by the Sovereign herself.
David Carlton is the author of Anthony Eden (Unwin Paperbacks, f8.95)
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