nib SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.
MR CHAMBERLAIN'S speech at the dinner to Sir Alfred Milner has been called unwise and pro- vocative. We do not find it so. Rather we regard it as a statesmanlike expression of the facts of the situation. If Mr. Chamberlain acts up to his speech, and moulds his policy in South Africa upon it, we do not believe that those who, like ourselves, regard the prospect of war with the Transvaal with aversion will have any cause for regret. We desire that every consideration shall be shown to our Dutch fellow-subjects at the Cape, and we should be loth to take any important step which, though sound per se, did not commend itself to them. But though we feel this most strongly, and though we desire that the Colonial Office should no more show itself the special supporter of the English party at the Cape than it shows itself the special supporter of the English in Canada, we cannot consider it otherwise than wholesome that the people of South Africa, Dutch and English, should be made to understand exactly the realities of the present situation. These realities were in effect strongly, and as we think, wisely, brought out by Mr. Chamber- lain. They will bear reiteration and amplification. The first reality of the situation is that we must remain the paramount Power in South Africa, and that no aspirations inconsistent with this can or will be tolerated. Of course by " we " must be under- stood not merely the people of these islands, but the British Empire as a whole. This is a matter in which the people of Canada, of Australasia, and in- deed of South Africa, are just as much concerned as we are. They are all constituents of the British Empire, and it is part of the vital and essential interests of the British Empire that South Africa shall remain part thereof, and not break away and fall under foreign influences. It is true that the Government of the United Kingdom would, if necessary, have to enforce this "reality," but it would do so from no selfish or insular interests, but apting as a trustee for the British Empire. If we were to allow South Africa, or any portion of it now under our ultimate influence and authority, to place itself in a position in which the British Empire were not acknowledged as the paramount Power, what account of our stewardship should we be able to render when perhaps fifty, perhaps a hundred, years hence the time arrives for the Empire to be bound (as Mr. Chamber- lain, in his speech at the Colonial Institute, declares it will be bound) by closer ties than those existing at present ? Let no one suppose that the rest of the Empire cares nothing about South Africa. Depend upon it, if we were to show any active signs of vacating our position of paramount Power in South Africa, Canada and Australasia would be certain to protest ; as would, of course, the Government of India, which has never ceased to regard the Cape as a necessary outpost on the road home. The Colonies, like America, have a Monroe doctrine, and it is to the effect that if they are to stay within the Empire the Empire must be worth staying in,—an Empire which is strong and growing, and not an Empire on the crumble. But this being so, we cannot tolerate any tendency in South Africa which makes for the overthrow of the British Empire as the paramount Power, and allows the possibility of the influence of a foreign Power being substituted for our own. Time is on our side, and we can, and ought, to endure the statue quo even when it seems most disagreeable. But though we can tolerate standing still to almost any extent, we can- not allow the slightest movement in the wrong direction. Anything, then, that makes for a Dutch or a German hegemony in South Africa must be at once disallowed. This of course does not prevent the widest and fullest autonomy in the Transvaal, but it does put a complete prohibition upon the indulgence of certain of the extremer aspirations that have found favour at Pretoria.
The next of the realities of the situation is the fact that the Imperial Government, the people of this country, and the English at the Cape cannot regard with satisfaction the refusal of the Transvaal Govern- ment to treat the Outlanders in a more just and reason- able spirit, and in a manner that is more consistent with the principles of popular and democratic government. As our readers know, we regard with extreme aversion the attempt made by certain external capitalists to produce a. coup d'etat in the Transvaal, and should condemn any attempt to pick a quarrel with President Kruger on mere technical grounds. At the same time, we cannot pretend that the policy and practice of the Transvaal Government in the matter of the franchise is anything but most disastrous when viewed in the light of the general interests of South Africa. The obstinacy, folly, and injustice of the Boers can be explained, and indeed in a great measure excused, but for all that the ferment and dissension caused by their impolicy remain one of the realities of the situation. A third reality of the situation is the fact that, subject to the full preservation of our position as paramount Power, it cannot be worth our while to move in the direction of abating the evils existing in the Trans- vaal unless and until we have the tacit or express consent of the Dutch Afrikanders. As long as we know that they would view our action with hostile feelings, or at best with only sombre acquiescence, we must be content to let things be as they are. After all, the Dutch Afrikanders will suffer far more than we shall if they prevent our taking any action. If they postpone the union of South Africa for fifty years, it is they, not we, who will be injured. We do not, of course, blame the Dutch Afrikanders for being hurt and suspicious. Though it may not be wise of them, they have every right to be hurt and suspicious after the way in which they were treated by Mr. Rhodes. It is, then, a reality of the situation that, as long as the Dutch Afrikanders are unwilling we should do otherwise, we must maintain the status quo. There is only one possible modification of this principle, but one which, fortunately, is not likely to be called into action. It is this. If the Cape Dutch were to support President Kruger too vehemently and too recklessly, and were to take up the position of "the Transvaal, right or wrong," they might drive the English in the Cape and in Natal into so violent a mood of sympathy with the Outlanders that the Imperial Government would be obliged to inter- vene to prevent civil war, and to intervene, of course, by insisting on the grant of popular rights in Johannesburg. Fortunately, however, we do not think there is any real risk of this. The Dutch Afrikanders in the Cape are, we feel sure, far too sensible and far too loyal to the Empire —for loyal in the best sense they certainly are—to allow their present most natural indignation to force them into a position so disastrous.
By bringing out the realities of the situation, we hold that Mr. Chamberlain did wisely and well, and we believe that the effect of his speech will be in favour of peace rather than of war. The plain utterance of realities can seldom, indeed can never, affect a situation but for good.
War comes far more easily out of verbal misunderstandings than out of plain speech, even when the plain speech sounds disagreeable. We believe, then, that the situation has been improved, not impaired, by the speech. Before, however, we leave the present subject we should like to address a word of warning to the men of Dutch blood at the Cape. Mr. Schreiner, in a very impressive passage in his evidence, told us that the Dutch at the Cape had a favourite proverb, "If you are weak you must be clever." This means that the man who is weak must make up for his weakness by what the Elizabethans would have called "policy." He who is weak must be politic. Considering their past history, it is not unnatural that the Dutch Afrikanders should have acted on this proverb. But they are weak no longer, and should now abandon any dependence on this maxim. Mr. Schreiner declared that to acting on this proverb was due the behaviour of a section of the Dutch towards Mr. Rhodes. They thought it wiser to treat him in a politic spirit. We want to point out that if the Dutchmen at the Cape pursue this policy to any large extent they are certain to get us and themselves into trouble. If, that is, they first growl at the Imperial Government, applaud President Kruger, and lend no sort of sympathy to the claims of the Outlanders, and then, mindful of the need to be clever, "hedge" by half- supporting Mr. Rhodes, or at any rate by not voting against him and his nominees, they will greatly perplex and disturb the situation. The first thing that is wanted is a House of Assembly which will really represent the feeling of the Colony. But this is not likely to be obtained if the Cape Dutch adopt the policy of "being clever" at the polls, and then salve their consciences by grumbling at Imperial or English dominance. The Cape Dutch must remember that the decisions of the Cape Parliament will be accepted here as genuine indications of Cape feeling, and that unless they refuse to place Mr. Rhodes or his nominees in power, they will be held to have condoned the Raid and the policy of which it was the outcome. In other words, if the Cape Dutch are so " clever " that they allow Mr. Rhodes, either visibly or in effect, to regain his power at Cape Town, they must abide by the consequences. England, rightly or wrongly, will judge by the voice of the Cape Parliament. If the Cape Parliament again accords Mr. Rhodes or his friends their support, there will be no getting Englishmen to doubt that Mr. Rhodes has once more got the whole Colony into his hands. If the Dutchmen at the Cape want their views to be understood here, and to be given their due weight, they must abandon the policy of "clever."
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