3 APRIL 1909, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE NEW FACT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

WHEN the first German Emperor lay dying be sent for his grandson, the present Emperor William, in order that he might talk to him on the foreign policy of the Empire. Above all things, he charged him that be should never quatrel with Russia. The maintenance of friendly relations with that great Empire was, he declared, esseutial to the welfare of Germany. A good understanding with Russia had been the keystoue of

German foreign policy in the past, and must remain so in the future. That was the message of the departing head of the house of Hohenzollern to one who, through the Emperor Frederick's mortal illness, was his successor in fact, if not in name. The policy was no mere personal predilection of the old Kaiser's. It was held quite as strongly by Bismarck. That great statesman again and again went. out of his way to show Russia that she would never be attacked by Germany. Some, indeed, of Bismarck's most pithy sayings—as, for example, his remark about the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier— were meant to advertise to the whole world. Germany's determination not to quarrel with Russia. The revelation of the secret Treaty with Russia, which caused so much scandal in Europe, was indeed but a proof of Germany's guiding principle in foreign relations. No sooner had the Triple Alliance been placed upon a firm foundation than Prince Bismarck negotiated a Treaty with Russia which be termed a Treaty of reinsurance,—a Treaty intended to remove anything from that Alliance which might seem hostile to Russia. ]3ismarck's fall and death made no change in German policy ; and for the last twenty years the Kaiser has consistently followed his grandfather's injunction to do nothing that would forfeit the goodwill of Russia.

Tea days ago an absolute revolution took place in the relations between Germany and Russia. However much the act was, and may be, concealed by diplomatic forms, Russia received from Germany a blow so sudden and so staggerieg that even now the statesmen of Europe are hardly able to realise what has happened. The facts arc very simple. On Thursday week—it is difficult to be precise, but Thursday appears to have been the day— the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg requested the Russian Foreign Minister to recognise forthwith the annexa- tion of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- Hungary, though this was the very thing which throughout the past six months Russia had refused to do, except in concert with the rest of Europe, and at a Conference formally summoned to deal with the matter. If Russia refused to take the step required of her, it was intimated. that Germany would consider the refusal an act of hostility to her Austrian ally, and therefore to herself, and that her troops would at once cross the frontier. Further, Russia was made aware, in what form we do not know, but no doubt with all the politeness possible in the circumstances, that a large portion of the German Army had already been mobilised on the Polish frontier, and that if the Russian Government did not submit, the German troops would be in possession of large tracts of the Russian Empire before there would be time for orders for Russian mobilisation to take effect. Russia is stated to have asked for time to consult the Powers with whom she had. been acting throughout,—nainely, France and Britain. To this request a peremptory, if polite, refusal was given. Russia was told that if she decided to yield she must yield at once. Russia yielded. This version of the facts is denied by the official Press in Germany, but in our opinion those denials merely amount to an assertion that all the diplomatic courtesies and formalities were observed. Of this we have no doubt. The Czar and his Ministers held that no other course was open to them, partly because they had been placed at what they believed to be an enormous disadvantage by the sudden and secret action of Germany, and partly because they realised that the internal condition of Russia, her financial position, and still more the condition of her Army, would make it impossible for her to wage a success- ful war against Germany and Austria-Hungary combined, even though she received support from outside.

The situation, in fact, was very much like that which has often been described in novels of adventure in the American

Wild West. A man, anticipating the likelihood of a deadly quarrel arising, suddenly draws his revolver and covers the man next him with the words :—" You must agree to my terms here and now. If I see your hand move towards your revolver-pocket, I fire instantly." In such circumstances time man who cannot get his band to his revolver-pocket without courting instant destruction gives in. No doubt the analogy is not in reality exact, because it is by no means certain that the Russian Army is so inferior to the German as the Russians in their present pessimistic mood are inclined to believe. After all, they have some eight hundred thousand men available who have seen active service. What is more, these men, notwithstanding exceedingly bad strategy, acquitted themselves in a remarkable way when face to face with some of the bravest and most efficient infantry in the world. In spite of Japan's military prowess, and in spite of the terrible strain to which the Russian troops were exposed, no Russian force ill the late war was ever defeated in a manner which brought disgrace upon it, or enabled any person cognisant of the facts to say that the Russian soldier was a bad fighting unit. On the contrary, the most competent critics, including those of Japan, were obliged to admit that the Russian soldier qua soldier is almost. unconquerable. Russian armies could be again and again defeated in the technical sense, pounded with shot and shell and forced to ‘retire, but their moral was never destroyed. The sound- ness of the Russian Army, however, is not the point with which we are now dealing. What we are concerned with is the fact that the Czar and his Ministers felt obliged to yield to the pressure exerted upon them. No Englishman will feel disposed to censure them for yielding. In the first place, no Englishman can regret that the peace of the world was not broken, and, further, no Englishman can do more than guess at the circumstances with which the Czar was confronted. We are sure, however, that the Czar, who has proved himself again and again a man of the most scrupulous honour in international affairs, did nothing which the Powers who are acting with him have any right or any desire to resent. Neither in France nor Britain has there been the slightest tendency to blame Russia for not consulting the other Powers of the Triple Entente.

We have headed our article "The New Fact in Inter- national Relations," and so the action of Germany unquestionably is. Great Powers forget and forgive much, and it is wise that they should ; but the one thing which a Great Power finds it difficult to overlook is when advantage is taken of her temporary weakness by a neigh- bour whom she had previously believed to be not unfriendly. If, for example, after the North Sea incident, we lied demanded our pound. of flesh from Russia, she might have been forced to pay it, but our action would Intro left an indelible impression on our relations with the great Empire of the North. The fact that we did not take advantage of her momentary diffi- culties made it possible for us shortly afterwards to put our relations with her on a friendly basis. We do not desire to say a single word which may look like inciting Russia to revenge herself. To do that would be to incite to war, and peace is as much now as ever it was the greatest of British interests. As students of foreign affairs, however, we are bound to take cognisance of the fact that Russia's pride has been wounded to the quick, and wounded in the one direction where her people may almost be said to think and act as one man. For a great deal of Russian diplomacy the ordinary Russian cares nothing. He eared, for example, very little about the check to Russian aspirations in the Far East. He does not trouble himself very greatly about Persia. There is, however, one thing which he does care about, and that is that Russia shall play the part of a great Slav Empire, and be the protector of Slav interests and Slav culture throughout Europe. But what Germany did on Thursday week, when translated into the language which is underefood by the plain man, was to forbid Russia to play that part, or to lift a finger in support of what she considers Slav interests. Germany forced her to acknowledge before the whole world that she can do nothing to help the South Slays utiless she is allowed to do so by Germany and Austria-Hungary. That was bound to seem n terrible humiliation to every Russian who has pro-Slav aspirations, and it is impossible to think that the Russian people will forget, or allow their Government to forget, 'what has happened. To put it Plainly, the new fact in international affairs is that the old policy under which Germany was governed by the deter- mination never to quarrel with Russia is dead and done with, and that we have entered upon a fresh epoch in European diplomacy. , In making these remarks we are far from asserting that Germany, in spite of the momentous consequences of her acts, has behaved foolishly from her point of view. It may well be that the able men who control her affairs had come to the conclusion that they must choose, and choose irre- vocably, between friendship with Austria-Hungary and friendship with Russia, and that, after a full review of all the circumstances, they decided to choose Austria- Rungary. No doubt the tremendous blow they have struck for Austria-Hungary places her under obliga- tions which cannot be disavowed. For the present, and Probably for many years to come, we must regard -Austria-Hungary and Germany from the military and diplomatic point of view, and also, we should add, from the naval, as one. At the Jubilee banquet last autumn the German Emperor declared that a word from the Emperor of Austria could set German armies moving. That was a splendid compliment. We expect that it will be truer to Bay that henceforward a word from Berlin will set Austro- Hungarian regiments and ships in motion. In the matter O f, ships, if, indeed, not of men, this is a significant fact for us. Some few weeks ago we requested Sir William White, one of the ablest of living naval experts, to estimate for our readers the capacity of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet. He showed us that that Fleet was strong and efficient at the moment, and that a programme was being carried out which would make it still more formidable in the future. That Fleet must now in any calculation of com- parative naval strength be added to the Fleet of Germany. This means that in the event of war we could not even temporarily abandon the Mediterranean, but must keep there a fleet sufficiently strong to seal up the Austro- Rungarian Fleet if it remained in harbour, or to destroy it if it came, out. Otherwise Malta, Egypt, and Cyprus, and the whole of the British shipping that passes through the Mediterranean, would be at Austria's mercy. This, again, means that when we are contemplating the necessity of keeping a 'force at home sufficient to leave no doubt as to our capacity to meet and overcome the German Fleet, we must permanently deduct a strong force for use in the iterraueau.

But though this is an important lesson for Britain, there is one far more important to be found in the secrecy, suddenness, and efficiency with which the German military force on the Russian -frontier was mobilised and held ready for instant use. The Germans did not show any diplomatic sloe of the action they were going to take an hour before they took it. There was no wordy debate in the German Reichstag in which Russia Was warned that she must not do this or that, or Austria-Hungary was assured that Germany would take such-and-such action. German official newspapers maintained their old policy of saying nothing to provoke ill-feeling in Russia or to give any warning of the coming blow. Germany outwardly maiutained the most perfect calm till the very moment When she struck, and struck with all her strength. The only news in regard to the frontier was what we may call a contra-indication. A great many telegrams were ecattered, throughout the Continental Press at the he'einning of the week in which Germany acted describing how Russia had mobilised her forces on the Prussian frontier. Russia had done nothing of the kind. But While Russia was alleged to be doing what in fact she was not doing, Germany was doing that very thing so efficiently and so secretly that the first news of it to etteli St. Petersburg was the polite communication made ny the German Ambassador to the Russian Minister fOr Foreign Affairs. Very possibly no such communica- Cell will ever be made to us. We can be almost sure that it will never be made provided we adopt the policy we ventured to press upon the nation last week,--;to organise our resources for the building and equipping cf Ships to the utmost, and then to make the most com- plete use of those resources. If, however, we fail in this ,respect, we may be sure that action similar to that taken °Y Germany towards Russia will some day be taken towards US, end, from the German point of view, quite rightly. Then we shall have to choose between the alternatives of fighting at a tremendous disadvantage and national humiliation. We will not discuss whether in such circum- stances it would be wise or not to accept the humiliation. Such discussion is idle. An autocracy may be able to choose the humiliation. A democracy, and least of all a British democracy, can do no such thing. The people in such a dilemma will always choose the sword.