THE SITUATION IN MOROCCO.
IIHE situation in Morocco, serious and difficult enough before, has been rendered doubly serious by the news received on Thursday that a massacre has taken place at Casa Blanca, the well-known port on the Atlantic• coast of Morocco, in which five Frenchmen, two Italians, and a Spaniard were killed. It appears that the tribes invaded the town on Tuesday, proclaiming a Holy War, and at once began slaughtering Europeans and pillaging the shops. If the facts are as stated—and we see no reason to doubt their authenticity—they are most menacing. Not only is there anarchy in a seaport town which for three or four centuries has been accustomed to the presence of European traders, but that anarchy is marked by a desire to slaughter Europeans, and, what is worse, to slaughter them under the influence of the most dangerous, because the most contagious, form of Mohammedan fanaticism,—a religious crusade or Holy War.
Apart from the outbreak at Casa Blanca, the condition of Morocco is, as we have just said, a cause of grave anxiety. To begin with, the brigand chief Raisuli still has in his possession Sir Harry Maclean, and refuses to give him up except on impossible terms. It is asserted, indeed, that he has declared his intention of killing his prisoner unless Britain immediately compels the Moorish Government to accede to his terms and guarantees their execution. As the Tangier corre- spondent of the Daily Mail points out, these terms, if acceded to, would destroy what little prestige still remains with the Sultan's Government. The Sultan would have to recall his troops, which at the moment have nearly surrounded Raisuli, and are pressing him hard, and to hand over the governorship of the Northern tribes to the arch-kidnapper. While the Sultan is confronted with these two difficult problems, the movement headed by the Pretender to the Moorish throne goes steadily on. If the rebels do not win very many or very great victories, they are, on the other hand, never really beaten, and the latest telegrams seem to show that they are making considerable headway in the neighbourhood of Fez. It is, of course, possible that once again the crisis will pass off for a time. Bluejackets and Marines may be landed from the French cruiser which has gone to Casa Blanca, and they may be able to suppress the disorder, and protect the remaining Europeans and Jews, the Sultan at the same time making what reparation he can, promising a money indemnity to the relatives of the victims, and agreeing also to the French occupation of the port till such reparation is made. Again,it is possible that, as on former occasions, terms may at the eleventh hour be arranged with Raisuli which will free his prisoner, and even for a time send the captor into exile. Lastly, the insurrection may go on as before with no particular result one way or another. But though all these things are possible, it is also by no means impossible that the general conflagration so long expected may at last begin, and that we shall see the tribes throughout Morocco rise, and in a certain sense combine in a Holy War. That is, an attempt may be made to slaughter, or at any rats to drive out, all the Europeans in the country. Time, however, alone can show whether things are to go on a little longer in a condition of unstable equilibrium, or whether the catastrophe has at last been reached. In either event the anxieties of the Great Powers must be considerable, and especially must this be so in the case of France. France has demanded and accepted from Europe a special position and special duties as regards Morocco. Since she has told the world (with the direct support of Britain and Spain, and with the indirect support of several other of the Powers) that she cannot tolerate the control of Morocco by any Power other than herself, there rests upon her a special responsibility for maintaining law and order throughout the Moorish Empire. Here, as else- where, special rights involve special duties. If, then, it should be proved that occasion has arisen for providing armed protection for the Europeans of various nationality scattered throughout Morocco, the work will have to be done by France. This need not, of course, mean the immediate occupation of the Moorish dominions by France ; but we fear it will mean something a good deal more than that "peaceful penetration" which is what France herself has always hoped might be the extent of her liabilities in Morocco.
For ourselves, as friends of France, we confess that we should be exceedingly sorry to see her committed to any- thing in the nature of a serious campaign in the Shereefian Empire. Such campaigns, though they may have small beginnings, often end in very serious military obligations. A war waged even in the name of the Sultan, and with his nominal sanction, might force France to mobilise some seventy or eighty thousand men, and to employ them in a mountainous country without roads, and filled with a population thoroughly accustomed to all the devices of guerilla warfare. The Germans in a less difficult country found trouble enough in dealing with the Hereros, yet they hardly numbered more than some two or three thousand. If France were to become embroiled in Morocco, she would be dealing, not with thousands, but with millions of hostile natives. What is worse, if the war took the form which it almost certainly would take—that of a Holy War—the native population of • Tunis and Algiers would almost certainly be affected. In these circumstances, we sincerely hope that the French—though undoubtedly they must do something—will do as little as possible, and will not be tempted, except under provocation which is absolutely intolerable, to penetrate far from the coast or from their own frontier. We say this without the slightest shade of jealousy as regards France. As far as we are concerned, we should be delighted to see the whole of Morocco placed under her direct tutelage. She would govern it well, and give security to the unfortunate men who now till the soil and sow the crops. As friends of France, however, we do not desire to see her military power weakened, and such weakening could hardly but take place in the event of a Franco-Moorish War on a large scale. The final decision must, we realise, of course rest with the French Government and. the French people. To the policy adopted by them it will be the duty of our Government to give all the sympathy and support that is in their peter. At any rate, we may feel sure that if the French are forced to take action on a large scale, it will not be with a light heart. Nothing could possibly be more unpopular just now in France than a war, whether African or European. What the French people desire above all things is to be allowed to develop their industries and their agriculture in peace, and to show the world that Fra,nee can do as great things in commerce as even her rivals on the Eastern Frontier or across the Channel.
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