3 DECEMBER 1870, Page 5

THE RUSSIAN DISPUTE.

I'VE have every consideration for the difficulties which

impede the action of the British Government in any very serious foreign question. Those difficulties are in truth enormous. A British Cabinet has to negotiate almost publicly, in the face of a population extremely sensitive and extremely peaceful, jealous of the smallest concession, yet liable to fits of exasperation at any appearance of willingness to precipitate war. It needs the support of public sentiment, which in all such matters is singularly ill-informed, and is liable at any moment to find that it has transgressed the line up to which the people are willing to advance. This difficulty, which is permanent, is increased just now by accidental circumstances, —the absence of Parliament, the existence of war in Europe, and the excessive complication of our foreign relations. A single false step might land us in a war with half the world. Never- theless, we are compelled to confess that we cannot view the policy which the Cabinet has adopted in this Russian matter without deep anxiety, and even discontent. Clear as it is, it is not without a trace of the special kind of weakness which has so often brought misfortune upon the country. Up to a certain point the action of the Government was decisive, and, if fairly considered, strong. Prince Gortschakoff had announced with unusual plainness of speech that his " august master " did not intend to be any longer bound by the Treaty of Paris. Thereupon the British Government informed Prince Gort- schakoff that his august master must keep the Treaty, for that England could not permit its violation. At the same time, steps were taken to ascertain whether the new German power approved this high-handed defiance of engagements to which Prussia had been a party. The reply, we believe, was that Germany disapproved, and would press Russia to modify her course by consenting to a Conference, to be held in London. Lord Granville, then, it would seem, addressed a reply to St. Petersburg, which cannot be published just yet, but which is in substance a repetition of his former Note. Great Britain cannot permit the repudiation of the Treaty of Paris, and -should that repudiation pass from words to acts, will, on her part, be also compelled to maintain by every means in her power respect for its obligations. In other words, the Cabinet has decided to resist any infraction of the Treaty by force, but to wait until the infraction becomes actual before declar- ing war. We greatly fear that decision will be misinterpreted abroad. The statesmen of Europe, it is evident, are once again victims to the old delusion which produced the Crimean War, the fancy that because the Government of Great Britain dreads and dislikes war, therefore it will in the long run refuse to fight on any provocation short of direct attack. Mr. Gladstone, it is believed, will maintain a high moral attitude, will protest against wrong-doing, and even, it may be, -threaten hostilities, but he will refrain from actual fighting. Russia or Germany have only to be civil, and offer Conferences in which there may be " full discussion " and no resolve, and they will in the end be left free to do very much as they please. If, in addition, America can be induced to threaten, the Govern- ment and people of Great Britain will very gladly seize the op- portunity of avoiding a costly and disagreeable undertaking. This, we fear, is the calculation of the Continent, and we fear it will be justified to Continental statesmen by the character of the British reply. England, they will think, is seeking a loophole out of her annoying obligations. She never would subject her trade to an indefinite yet inevitable risk of war, but if she meant war would prefer it at once. She is not arming. Her Government has not called Parliament together. We may therefore go on, and after a decent amount of proto- coning may act as if the Treaty of Paris had never had any existence. This, we say, is the conclusion which a Govern- ment like that of Russia, accustomed to expect untruthfulness, and profoundly impressed with the idea that England is weak, will draw from the despatch ; and this conclusion is, of all others, the one which must lead most directly to war, possibly to more wars than one. The interests of this country are so vast, and impinge so closely on those of so many different States, that any exhibition of weakness, or hesitation, or divided counsels helps to encourage half the world in demands which, were the kingdom only strong, would never be put forward. We shall have to fight in the end, and fight under circumstances far less favourable than at present. Suppose that, with the Army of the Loire extinct and Paris surrendered, Germany affirms that the Russian demand is entirely in accord with common-sense, and must be supported. Are we, then, to recede, or to fight without an ally against allied Powers disposing of nearly two millions of men ? This last considera- tion must have engaged the attention of the Cabinet, and we cannot avoid the suspicion that its resolve has been only a compromise between a party of war and a party of submission, the party of war accepting the policy because it yields nothing, the party of submission approving it because any postpone- ment of hostilities may avert the necessity for having resort to them.

Lord Granville may know, must know, many facts of which we are ignorant ; but on the face of those known to everybody, there is too much appearance in the German suggestion of a desire to gain time, and shift the subject-matter of quarrel.

A Conference may be made to occupy weeks, during which Germany and France may finally decide the tremendous struggle in which they are now engaged, and which may, and probably will, leave the German vote irresistible in any Con- ference ; Austria and Italy equally finding it their interest not to provoke an opposition,—which to Great Britain thus isolated may seem too terrible a calamity to face. France, defeated and prostrate, or released and exhausted, will be in no position to afford us any aid, even in the Coun- cil-room, and we may be compelled to register here in Lon- don new treaties which will really be decrees imposed upon us by force. This is the more probable, because if the Conference is to meet at all, the ground of quarrel to be dis- cussed cannot be the obligation of treaties. upon which we could, or should, take a decided line ; but merely what treaty will, on the whole, serve best as law for the East, a subject upon which there is among ourselves an almost infinite differ- ence of opinion. We say the subject-matter cannot be the obligation of treaties, because that must be assumed, and the Russian Note therefore withdrawn, before a Conference can have any substantial meaning. We cannot confer about a treaty already declared to be of no binding force, or make a new agreement because agreements, old or new, are no longer to be respected.

Yet this seems, at all events, what we are about to do. There is not a sign anywhere that Russia intends to recede from her position. Prince Gortschakoff, in his extremely courteous reply to Lord Granville, point-blank refuses to do anything of the sort, and inserts among his profuse civilities a paragraph reasserting the right of the Czar to annul any clause of any treaty which he or his people may dislike. Here are the actual words :—" It was impossible that Russia should agree to remain the only Power bound indefinitely by an arrangement which, onerous as it was at the time when it was concluded, became daily weaker in its guarantees. Our august Master has too deep a sense of what he owes to his country to force it to submit any longer to an obligation against which the national sentiment protests. We cannot admit that the abrogation of a purely theoretical principle to which no immediate effect is given, and which simply re- stores to Russia a right of which no great Power could. consent to be deprived, should be considered as a menace to peace ; or that in annulling one point o f the Treaty of 1856, there is any implication that all are annulled." What does this mean, except that the Russian Government, which is inviting addresses from all Russia, urging troops to the south, and buying artillery, adheres to its resolve, and though perfectly willing to join in any diplo- matic gossip in London, intends that the Black Sea Clause of the Treaty of Paris should come to an end I We care nothing about the clause, holding that the freedom of the Black Sea to all vessels-of-war would be a much better security for us and for Constantinople than its neutralization ; but we cannot, like our contemporaries, hail with delight the con- donation which our Government has given to the Russian breach of faith, or think that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, because an infraction of public law has not resulted in war, and an outrageous insult has been endured. without expense to the British taxpayer.