* * * A Franco Offensive ?
Reports • from the Spanish front suggest-that the weeks- of inactivity are at an end, and the eve of General Franco's r much advertised €' final " offensive has arrived. And there are many indiCations that. outside Spain, and not only in Italy or Germany, its Success is taken for granted. Yet the renewal air attacks on Madrid suggests that General Franco may direct his offensive at the one point where it is most likely to• fail. From _the map of the front, the most favourable objective appears to be at Teruel, where a successful offensive might 'carry the rebels to the sea and divide Barcelona from Madrid ; but here the nature of the country offers immense obstacles. And the final question must be whether General Franco, though superior in strength, has the superiority which is generally reckoned necessary for a successful offensive. The answer is doubtful. In numbers he has no advantage, while all observers agree as to the high quality and morale of the newly trained troops of the Republic. But there is a serious lack of good officers and technicians, and there is a danger that their food supplies may be threatened. Yet the Government awaits the attack with confidence, and believes that the war will last for two more years and that the tide of victory will be turned by its new armies' first offensive in the spring. * * * *
