How to save the Union

George Gale

The devolution proposals now before Parliament could easily end up destroying the unity of the United Kingdom, against the wishes of the great majority of Scotsmen and Welshmen, not to mention the English. It is not impossible that in such a process, the union between England and Scotland would not only be broken, but also that between England and Wales; in which event the Northern Ireland connection would almost certainly go also.

Now here we have a very grave situation indeed, posing great problems, constitutional and political. An independent Scotland would be dominated by Clydeside and would be likely to have a permanent majority of left-wing Scottish socialists. The long-term threat of a communist Scotland ought not to be discounted. The Scottish National Party would itself either totally dissolve, its objects fulfilled, or split into left-wing socialist and right-wing nationalist factions, with those liking neither calling themselves Scottish Liberals. The Conservative Party in Scotland could become a Unionist rump, pleading for re-union • but unable to secure sufficient electoral support in a Scottish Parliament to bring this about.

Should Wales follow Scotland into independence a somewhat similar development is to be expected, with the South Wales industrial and mining complex dominating the country politically and economically.

In a residually independent England, the Conservative Party would be the most probable inheritor of power, with Labour gravely, though probably not mortally, injured through the loss of its Scottish and Welsh seats. None of this would damage the English Conservative party. Why, then, does it hesitate to support wholeheartedly plans for Scottish devolution and proposals for a Scottish assembly possessing real and extensive powers?

The reasons why the English nonsocialists wish to preserve the union, despite the party political and economic advantages they can be presumed to derive from any break-up, are the only responsible reasons involved in the entire process, apart from those of the Scottish and Welsh nationalists who genuinely believe that independence will lead to Scotland's and Wales's economic and cultural revivals.

These English reasons involve the integrity and defence of the realm. The union has served all of us since it was established, and the benefits are incalculable. The great Scottish renaissance of 17891820, to take the most shining single example, was in part a consequence of the union. Had we not had political union on the British mainland, there would have been con tinual bickering; and, in particular, that civilising process we call the Empire would probably not have taken place (although that other great historical process begun in this island, the Industrial Revolution, would probably have proceeded in any event). British world influence, without the union, might not have occurred.

However, the economic strength of England, without the union, would not have been greatly affected, although an independent Scotland and Wales might have remained unindustrialised. To threaten the integrity of a realm, from which virtually everyone in it (and untold millions outside it) has benefited, for the sake of very doubtfully presumed party political advantage in Scotland, and to a lesser extent in Wales, is political irresponsibility of the greatest order.

The defence of the realm, after a breakup, would become the defence of Scotland, Wales and England. Scotland and Wales might, or might not, opt out of NATO, could choose the join the Warsaw Pact, and would in all probability adopt a 'neutralist' or 'pacifist' (or even Third World) stance. But an independent Scotland, like an independent Wales, would not possess the wealth, and probably not the will, to do anything serious about defending itself. The burden of defence would fall where it now chiefly rests, on England. England, lacking Scotland and Wales, and probably Northern Ireland also, would be almost indefensible.

It was this strategic imperative which brought about the union with Wales and which secured the union with Scotland in the first place. To ignore this strategic imperative, and the possible consequences which could flow from it should England feel excessively threatened, is political irresponsibility of the greatest order.

Instinctively, the English know this, as do almost certainly majorities of the Scottish and Welsh. It is this instinct, or this true knowledge of practical politics, which I believe is now preventing the English nonsocialist majority from calling the Scottish and Welsh nationalists' bluff, and saying to Scotland and Wales, 'All right; go your own way if that is what you want. We will be better off without you.'

Scottish and Welsh nationalists can afford to behave irresponsibly, secure in their knowledge that the English will not follow their example. But the English, if sufficiently angered, could change their colours, and start acting as nationalists themselves. Some will think that it would serve the Scotch, Welsh —and even the Irish — right, if the English did so. But this is unlikely, such (I believe) remains England's political maturity. It follows that if, as it must, a way out is to be sought, it is the inescapable duty of the English, together with the responsible Scottish and Welsh, to seek it.

The problem of giving more control over its affairs to Scotland, or to Wales 'devolution' — rests on the relationship between a Scottish, or Welsh assembly and executive and the British or United Kingdom, assembly and executive. It is presumed (rightly) that the Scottish and Welsh assemblies and executives, whatever their respective powers, will often be at loggerheads with Whitehall and Westminster; that in such conflicts the Scottish, or Welsh, would not always feel inclined to bow to the superior assembly and executive; and that sooner or later the frustrations and hostilities engendered could lead to secession.

There is nothing necessarily wrong with lower and higher assemblies or executives being at loggerheads. It happens all the time, in federal states, and in unitary states with devolved local government authorities. The problem here is because it is felt that, when men or their institutions are at loggerheads, one nation (England) will use its dominance in the superior assembly or executive to lean on and to coerce the other nations (Scotland and Wales). There is the ever present risk, which some would say was a near-certainty, of Scottish and Welsh majorities being constantly at loggerheads with an English dominated British assembly of an opposed party political persuasion. Further, the more powers that are actually , devolved upon Scotland and Wales, the greater will be the injustice as far as England is concerned, if Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster continue to participate in legislating for England on matters devolved upon Scotland and Wales. This problem is not avoided by excluding Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster front voting on such matters: for to do so would be confound confusion, There would then be created two different majorities in the one House of Commons (i.e. a majority Of all MPs, and a majority of the English MPs); and these two majorities could, and some': times would be made up of different parties, and would in any event, often themselves he at loggerheads. It follows that the mere setting up of Scottish and Welsh assemblies, whatever powers be given to them, will not satisf.Y Scottish and Welsh aspirations, for it 01,1 not remove the weight of England, except a' the expense of imposing severe injustice upon the English; and it will lead, in all likelihood, to frustration, and possiblY te secession. This, does not mean that the Scottish and Welsh cannot be given inc!re control over their affairs without breaking up the kingdom. It'does, however, forciblY, suggest that the present policies, unalterea contain the seeds of disaster.

England is already divided up, for mall administrative purposes, into regions; these regions have to do, largely, with central rather than with local government. We Should now consider devolving upon them the powers devolved upon Scotland. To devolve powers on the regions, without doing anything about the existing structure of local government, would create a third tier of government in England, which would he excessively expensive and cumbersome. If power were devolved to the regions, this process should therefore be accompanied by the abolition of the present eounty councils, whose powers would mainly fall downwards to the district councils, although some would rise into the regional assemblies. This scheme would produce local government in the district councils, regional government in the assemblies, and central (British) government in Parliament. The English regions would need to be delineated to take account of the considerable regional loyalties which already exist. The general object would be to keep their size within the Scotland-Wales range, although Greater London would be unavoidably larger than Scotland, and the South-west somewhat smaller than Wales.

The powers to be devolved should be those required by Scotland. These powers Might be expected to include those over education (perhaps excepting the universities), health and social services, housing (insofar as this is not already devolved Upon the district councils), food and agriculture (excepting imports and EEC matters), industrial development, industries (includMg 'regional industries', being the nationalised industries situated within each region), Police, tourism and the arts. The power to raise and to spend taxes should also be devolved.

The powers to be retained should be those required by England. These powers Would include those over foreign affairs, defence, customs and excise, transport, Perhaps higher education, and currency. The central government would also have the power to raise and to spend taxes. In order that the richer regions might continue to assist the poorer, it would make sense if the central government raised its revenues through income tax (which, being progressive, would in effect redistribute income as between the regions, given the appropriate spending of central government Orders), and the regions either through their own additional income tax, or through sales laxes, or in other forms left to themselves to decide. Scotland, Wales and the English regions would, of course, be free to represent themselves abroad for the purposes of tourism and trade. The District Councils would benefit from these constitutional rearrangements, eeoming housing and planning authorities in their own right. They would require access to funds of their own, either through rates or some other form of suitable local taxation permitted by the regional author la order to prevent any region, in its excessive zeal, from governing in such a manner as to reduce the existing liberties of Scotsmen, Welshmen and Englishmen, a Bill of Rights would have to accompany the proposed constitutional changes, so as to entrench the basic rights and liberties. Such a Bill of Rights would require a Supreme Court to uphold it, and also to arbitrate in issues between Scotland, Wales and the regions, and between any of them and the central, or federal, United Kingdom parliament and government. The American experience would not come amiss here; and we should be prepared to learn from the United States' successful written constitution.

Such a constitutional rearrangement could be made to meet the demands of the Scottish and the Welsh for more say in the conduct of their affairs; and would meet in advance demands from the English regions which will be bound to follow any other form of devolution anyway. The would give very considerable regional autonomy; and they would remove the 'English dimension' while at the same time preserving the integrity and defence of the realm.

This rearrangement would not satisfy those who want independence and nothing else; but it would satisfy the rest. The Scottish identity, expressed in a Scottish assembly with far-reaching powers, would not be weakened by the existence of several English regional assemblies with identical powers; and there would be no English political identity as such, able to lean on Scotland or Wales. • As far as the United Kingdom Parliament is concerned, the potential problems of England v. Scotland, or of England v. Wales, would largely disappear. The interests of Scotland would often coincide with those of some of the English regions; likewise with the interests of Wales. It is likely that the northern and western regions of England as often as not would combine with Scotland and Wales to pull against the excessive weight of the Midlands and South-east. The cultural dominance of London would be reduced, to the general advantage. The English regions themselves would benefit, fferhaps as much as Scotland and Wales, from having much more say over the conduct of their affairs.

Some such scheme will involve constitution-making, and -writing, and will involve another upheaval of local government. But we have been adept at writing constitutions for others. Now that our present unwritten constitution shows signs of wear and tear, and now that on other grounds the demand for a Bill of Rights is raised, it may be suitable to consider rewriting that which is unwritten. In any event, devolution as presently proposed involves constitution-making. To regionalise England will cause an upheaval of local government; but it will lead to a reduction in the size of local government: the county councils disappearing entirely. Their members and officials will protest; but there is much to be said for admitting the mistakes involved in the past reorganisation. The present system is wasteful and inefficient, and does not correspond to what people want or understand.

The purpose of this argument, and the proposal it contains, is to outline a workable arrangement which will satisfy powerful and legitimate demands mainly (but not entirely) coming from Scotland and Wales, without producing a system so unstable as to be likely to bring about the break-up of the union which has been so beneficial to almost all of us. I believe a break-up is threatened by the present legislative programme of the Government. J do not believe it to be practical politics for the Government to pull back; and for them to attempt to do so would be to run the risk of losing Scotland altogether, We look as if we are about to muddle ourselves through to an ultimate conclusion hardly any of us wants: the end of the union and the consequent impoverishment and depopulation of a Scotland and Wales, existing alongside and under the increasingly influential shadow of a comparatively rich and independent, but essentially defenceless England.

If however, the devolution legislation were to be followed by a reform of local government in England which involved creating regional assemblies and devolving powers on them equivalent to those devolved upon Scotland, and at the same time abolishing the county councils, then the very legitimate desires of Scotland and Wales to have more control over their affairs would be met without creating the double dangers of Scotland and Wales being pulled continually further out of the union and of England suffering increasingly from a justified sense of grievance. Scotland and Wales could, if their inhabitants wished it, continue on the road to socialism, and England could be left to develop its mixed economy, with its different regions doubtless developing in different directions. The constitutional set-up would be not unlike that of West Germany, although it would contain lessons learned from America.

For many years we have complimented ourselves on our lack of a written constitution; but the present devolution legislation is constitutional and confused and seems certain to create bitterness and dissension in the United Kingdom in the future. To avoid such dissension, and to minimise the risk of the break-up of the kingdom, far more serious attention should be given to the constitutional question. For Scotland and Wales to be governed one way, to their advantage, and England to be governed another way, to its disadvantage, cannot be expected to work out in the long run.

The purpose behind the regional proposals here made would allow the entire kingdom to be governed one way, would remove constitutional advantages and disadvantages, would satisfy most demands of Scotland and Wales, and would, incidentally, improve the government of England.