THE SITUATION IN TURKEY.
THE situation in the East has not seriously changed. The publication of the protocol of the proceedings in Con- ference and of the debate in the Grand Council adds nothing to the development of the plot, though much to the dramatic interest of the dialogue, and the few rumours received all point to the speedy outbreak of war. On the one hand, Russia is rapidly but quietly strengthening her movable army, collect- ing equipage, and making through General Ignatieff arrange- ments at Athens which will end, we trust, in inducing the Greeks to assume their proper share in the liberation of Tur- key from its oppressors. The army in Bessarabia now includes 250,000 men, of whom one-half will, we presume, commence the attack in March, while the other half is encamped in Roumania, to act as a reserve. According to a telegram of Thursday, the Guards have at last been mobilised, a move- ment which in Russia, as in England, always indicates that the Government is in immediate earnest, but the statement as yet requires authentication. On the other hand, the Turks show no disposition whatever to recede from their attitude of armed expectation. Midhat Pasha—who, it should be remem- bered, has to secure his own position, as well as that of his caste—is collecting his Assembly, the members of which are nominated by the local authorities, and which will contain a
great majority of Mahommedan candidates for place and pro- motion. This Assembly is to meet in March, and will, in the Grand Vizier's judgment, at once embarrass Western Europe and secure himself against any Palace intrigue. On the latter point he is possibly deceived, as any aspirant who could master either the mob or the garrison would soon extort from the Assembly a vote restoring the dictatorship of the Sultan ; but is yet Midhat Pasha is master, and he awaits the next European move. His offer of peace to Servia and Monte- negro may have been sincere. The Pashas have nothing to get in either country, and peace with them would paralyse a certain number of soldiers, restore Turkish authority in the Herzegovina, where the Pashas could then inflict any extent of punishment on the unhappy people, who would, of course, being outside any treaty, be delivered up to the Bashi-
Bazeuks ; would give over Bosnia to its armed Mussulman popu- lation; and above all, would release the corps de arme'e formerly
under Moukhtar Pasha for service in Epirus, where the Greek movement is expected to break out. Russia can enter Servia
whether peace is made or not, but she will not enter Bosnia or the Herzegovina, and the paralysis of Monte- negro is, therefore, of much importance to Constantinople. The Grand Vizier, therefore, offers endurable terms to Servia, and most acceptable terms to Nikita, who, however, has not yet accepted them, and who, ambitious as he is, will probably yet hesitate to abandon the unhappy insurgents who have trusted to his protection. He will, we think, finally decline, more especially if it be true, as is stated, that the Magyar Chancellor of Austria, who dreads Nikita's reputation with the Dalmatian Sclavs, has protested against his receiving any accession of territory. If, however, the negotiations fail, the Grand Vizier will not greatly care. It is Russia he is thinking about, and he is convinced that sooner or later his Consti- tution, and his offers of peace, and his protestations of his intention to compromise with the bondholders will isolate Russia, till he has only a long and indecisive campaign to dread, —a campaign of which he probably forms an idea very different from that entertained by German observers. It is quite possible that Midhat Pasha, who is no soldier, may be a self - deceived man about the resources of Turkey. His speech to the Grand Council looks very like it. He was trying, if the report is not a mere romance prepared by some clever Greek, to tell the Council how completely devoid of friends the Empire was, and he is praised in Europe for his "almost cynical truthfulness." But in the same speech he made the monstrous assertion that Turkey had "an army" of 500,000 men, and it is just possible that he believes it, that he accepts the paper returns of the War Department, and does not know the difference between his 100,000 Osmanli Nizams, who are good European troops, and the motley multitude of Asiatics, cer- tainly not equal to ordinary Sepoys, who make up the remainder of the Imperial Army. This suggestion, if it is correct—and it may be correct, for we see that the same illusion is prevalent here—would account for a good deal in his conduct, and especially for his very curious speech, which would then mean, "We have opinion against us ; we have no allies ; but we have a sufficient army, and neither opinion nor allies matter one straw, unless indeed they should interrupt the arrival of our American cartridges."
The lull will last a good deal longer yet, unless Midhat, weary of waiting, suddenly makes a plunge, which, if he is pressed by palace intrigues, may happen at any moment. Russia is in no hurry. Her armies cannot advance till March, her expenses till it actually moves are not excessive, and her statesmen must by this time be pretty confident that, time being granted, the Turks will in some way or other reveal themselves, it may be by breaking up the successful settlement in the Lebanon, or by an explosion in Jerusalem, which would drive all Greek Christians and all Catholics nearly mad. Time fights for Russia, and the overtasked Czar, who pledged himself to his father to avoid war, who thinks of abdication, yet does not abdicate, and who is probably at this moment the saddest and loneliest man in Europe, over- weighted with the grandeur of a destiny which yet he cannot shun, is just the man to stretch his use of time to the uttermost. He will wait while he can, and while he waits the least-known factor in the whole problem, the decision of the British Parliament, will become clear.
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