THE CRISIS IN MOROCCO. T HE crisis in Morocco may possibly
prove the most momentous event of the year that is before us. No doubt things in the East—Morocco is morally, though not physically, in the East—move with astonishing quick- ness, and the apparently successful Pretender of to-day may conceivably be to-morrow a hunted fugitive. All the signs, however, seem to point in the other direction, and to foretell his success, and either the complete over- throw of the present Shereefian dynasty, or, at best, a long and bloody civil war which may involve Morocco for the next five or six years in anarchy. For ourselves, we find it difficult to accept any other conclusion than that the Pretender will be successful. At any rate, the best-equipped portion of the Sultan's army has been hopelessly routed and twelve guns taken, and the Sultan is now besieged in Fez by the rebels. To make things worse, the water supply of Fez has been cut off, and the mass of the population in the capital is stated by the specially well-informed corre- spondent of the Times to be disaffected towards the Sultan. Again, the tribesmen who have been summoned to the assistance of the throne appear to be holding back,—a sign that popular feeling, as far as it can be said to exist in Morocco, is with the Pretender.
Perhaps it will be asked,—" Why should a revolution in Morocco affect the rest of the world ? In a country so back- ward and so barbarous and so cut off from Europe, what does it matter whether it is the present Sultan or another who reigns ? " In ordinary circumstances there would be good ground for this attitude, but unfortunately the revolt in Morocco cannot be regarded as can many Oriental political revolutions,—i.e., as a mere change of dynasty. If the Pre- tender in Morocco wins, he will win as the representative of the fanatical, anti-Christian and anti-European feeling which has always been so strong in Morocco. What has given him his power, and what has weakened the hold of the reigning dynasty, is the belief that the present Sultan has fallen under the influence of the hated infidel. Victory for the Pretender would mean the seating on the Shereefian throne of a Sultan who embodies the fiercest form of Mahommedan fanaticism,—a Sultan who, if not actually pledged to a Holy War, is at any rate one to whom the Moors look to vindicate the sacred rights of Islam in North Africa, against the forces of Europe. But if such a situation arose, almost all the Great Powers of Europe would become involved. On Spain would fall the first effects of the blow, for Spain actually holds two settle- ments on the coast of Morocco—Melilla and Ceuta— and also two islands just off the Mediterranean shore. Again, Spain claims a protectorate over a portion of the West African coast which brings her into dangerous contact with Morocco. If a new and fanatical Moorish Government were to determine that the soil of Morocco must be freed from Christian intruders, Spain might find herself engaged in a war which would tax her strength to the utmost. She found it difficult to hold her own at Melilla when only face to face with the Riff tribesmen, and when the Shereefian Power was engaged not against her, but actually on her side. Again Britain, Italy, France, Germany, and the United States, as well as Spain and Portugal, would be deeply involved if Tangier and the other coast ports with which a large trade is done were in the hands of a Power which did not respect the elaborate system of treaties—analogous to those made with China—which are now in operation. Tangier has a very large European population beyond the occupiers of the beautiful villas with which it is surrounded. There are some four or five thousand Spaniards in the town engaged in all forms of labour, besides the French, Italian, and German shopkeepers and traders ; and there are also the large number of natives who under the system of " Pro- tection " have become " nationals " of the various States, —including a, certain number of citizens of the United States. All these could not be taken off in steamers, and yet if the Government passed into the hands of a ruler pledged to a Holy War, they would have to be protected. But if a mixed force were to be landed at Tangier repre- senting a dozen Powers, it is by no means certain that the Moors would make so poor a stand as did the Chinese. The Moors are born fighters. And even if these complica- tions were avoided, and the status quo were respected at Tangier—it does not, of course, necessarily follow that the Pretender, though he may have gained power by con- ciliating anti-European feelings, would when in power insist on attacking all the Powers at once—there would still remain a very serious point of danger. We must never forget when thinking of Morocco that one of the most important provinces of Algeria " marches " with Morocco for many hundred miles, and that France has lately, with " the sombre acquiescence " of the Moorish Government, " rectified " her frontier in the interior, to the disgust of the local tribes. Not much more than a year ago the French and the tribesmen of the oases near Figig and Igli were in actual conflict, and all along the frontier the fanatical Mahommedans on the Moorish side fear and hate the " red-trousered infidels." France, in fact, owing to her proximity and power, is an object of special dread to the fanatical portion of the Moors just because they know her best. In the inland portions of Morocco the French are the only Europeans who count at all, and hence the religious prejudice tends to be concen- trated on them as the infidels who desire some day to take the whole country. Another cause of friction with France is due to the way in which she has accorded French citizenship, and so French protection, to many powerful persons in Morocco. The Shereef of Wazan and his brothers, though half English by blood, are now by nationality Frenchmen, i.e., French protected subjects. This fact may increase the difficulties that France will experience in keeping out of the struggle if Morocco falls into the hands of a fanatical Sultan. In a word, then, the affairs of Morocco are so intermixed with the interests of the Powers that any considerable anti-European movement undertaken with the sanction and under the direction of the Moorish Sovereign would be as certain to produce serious trouble as did the patronage of the " Boxer " movement by the Chinese Empress.
But though the overthrow of the Shereefian Government by a fanatical usurper is bound, if it takes place, to have very serious results, it may be hoped that at least one source of trouble has been provided against, —that is, the outbreak of dangerous jealousies among the Powers in regard to the future. It seems probable that Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, the four Powers most closely concerned, have come to something in the nature of an understanding as to the future disposal of Morocco should anarchy and a general break-up of the present system occur, such as would be the case if a victorious Pretender were to pro- claim a Holy War, or to refuse to recognise existing treaties, and should intervention by the Powers thus unhappily become a necessity. What the nature of the understanding is, if it. exists, we do not know. We can only say what we hope it is,—namely, that we are to take nothing, that France is to be allowed a free liana in all parts of. Morocco with the exception of Tangier, Tetuan, and a district included between the sea and a line drawn from, say, Attar to El Arish, and that this re- served district is to be occupied by Spain, but with a pledge that she is to erect no fortifications. At the same time Italy should be allowed to occupy Tripoli. Such an arrangement ought to satisfy us, Spain, and France. France, of course, would benefit mostby receiving the right of annexing or forming a protectorate over the richest and most valuable piece of Africa, either appropriated or unappro- priated. Spain's aspirations for a share of Morocco would also be fulfilled. We. though gaining nothing material, should see the other side of the Straits of Gibraltar in the hands of a Power not hostile to us, and also not strong enough to close the Straits. Europe would not allow us, as the great naval Power, to hold both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar. That being so, we could not see the other side in better hands than those of Spain, and Spain pledged not to fortify. Such a pledge Spain would probably be glad to give, as she would not care to spend millions on military armaments outside the Penin- sula. But as we have said. we have no right to assume that this is the agreement which has been made. We can only hope that it is, and point to the favourable indica- tions that an undertakinc, of some kind as to the future of Morocco is in existence.
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