THE EFFECT OF THE NAVAL REVIEW ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS.
IT is, we think, quite clear that whatever the effect abroad of the Jubilee celebrations generally, the Spithead. Review will tend strongly towards peace and amity, more especially as regards the two Powers whose friendship or neutrality is most important to Great Britain. An American Admiral is said to have given it as his opinion that "this Review means peace," and we know of no reason why an American sailor should be less shrewd than the majority of his countrymen. They can all look facts in the face, and they are just as sentimental as we are, and for once sentiment and calculation tell in the same direction. Americans, if we understand their occa- sionally inconsistent utterances, might rejoice to give us a thrashing just as a hint that the aloofness and arrogance of the old squire are felt by his country cousins to be intolerable; but they have no sincere wish to see us grow weak or descend in the scale of nations. Our bankruptcy would not increase their credit. They like to feel that they also descend from those whom Macaulay described as "the hereditary aristocracy of mankind," and that " the family," however much too much it may take on itself, is maintaining its ancient position in the world. Blood is thicker than water, however angry one may be at times; and very few people are really rejoiced at evidence that their immediate ancestors are braggarts or persons of no account. The sentiment of Americans, unless Mr. Smalley misrepresents it altogether, is one of pride in the Spithead Review, the glory of their kinsfolk and rivals being, they feel, very directly reflected back on them. They are, besides, calculators, and to this side of their heads the Review makes a very special appeal. Those Americans who enjoy twisting the Lion's tail enjoy it all the more because they know that if the beast should at last show his claws it might be possible to drive him back to his cage without too intolerable a risk. In other words, the position of America, in the event of a war with Great Britain, would, by land, be a very favourable one. It would be simply impossible for Great Britain to invade the States, while the States could, if the war were popular, throw into Canada half a million of men whose imperfect training would not prevent them fighting as they fought in the great Civil War,—that is, as soldiers who made up for everything by their readiness to face death when it was poured on them, in showers. The Canadians are only five millions, their frontier is fifteen hundred miles long, and though they can fight as well as Americans, they would be terribly overmatched. " The independence of Canada," said one of them to the writer, " is a cause to die for, but not in the last ditch." It is the British Fleet which must restore the balance, and the certainty that it is strong enough to restore it, that even the Union could not hope to defeat it on the ocean, tends strongly to develop that sense of the fighting equality of the great nations which, as we are all seeing in Europe just now, operates so greatly to prevent an armed peace from exploding into a sanguinary war. " Suppose we leave the Lion alone while he leaves us alone, or even respect him as the head of the felidm, to which we ourselves belong,"—that is, we fancy, the genuine conclusion of our formidable and rather touchy relations on the other side.
The feeling in France is different, but not the less noteworthy. A Frenchman is a Celt differentiated from every other Celt in the world by the peculiarity that when he perceives a fact he must acknowledge it—where- fore Franee survives all calamities—and the Spithead Review being a big fact, no Frenchman endeavours to explain it away. It has to be reckoned with like a hill or a river or a gorge that one meets on the march,—either by a vast expenditure of money and energy, which is M. Lockroy's plan; or by a grand alliance, which is M. Faure's plan, and is taking him to the banks of the Neva; or by a reconsideration of French causes of quarrel with Great Britain, which is the plan of most French Liberals and of a great number of thoughtful Frenchmen not classified in politics. The first class are hampered by the feeling that in a struggle for maritime supremacy the maritime people, as it is also a rich people, is certain to win the game, and the second class have a growing doubt whether the '` great ally " has not rather too many pur- poses and interests of his own, is not, in fact, too independent, to be of much use to France. The third class, therefore, increase, and have, we fancy, had recently a great deal of food for reflection. Events have occurred which suggest to thoughtful Frenchmen that under certain quite possible circumstances France might be left in an isolation which even if " splendid" would also be alarming. There is no Channel between Germany and France. The German Emperor admits that he has been making serious offers of friendship to Paris, and that they have not been received with any cordiality, and the German Emperor is not a man who loves those who reject his honourable advances. He wants a great many things, a great colony for one of them, and wants them all at once ; but he wants, first of all, to relieve his country of a very dangerous position, and failing on one side, he is more than likely to make overtures on the other. Those over- tures, too, might be accepted, for though the friendship of France is always valuable, the very life of Russia is bound up with the Eastern question ; in that question she dreads Austria first of all, and if the German Emperor could be won Austria. might consent to sit quiet or to compromise. In the event of Germany and Russia coming- to a solid agreement based upon affairs in Eastern Europe, France would be left absolutely alone, quite safe, no doubt,. while the German Emperor asked nothing from her, but not safe a moment longer. Germany and France would,. in fact, be face to face in a roped arena, and that is a. position which a Frenchman at his heart does not like. It is not a pleasant position even for a brave people, and we do not wonder that many able Frenchmen, seeing how things are going, and discerning through the haze of prejudice that the power of Great Britain is quite real, are asking themselves whether, after all, Egypt signifies so very much, and whether Napoleon III., " the heir of Waterloo," was not justified in his steady desire for alliance with Great Britain.
Should this line of thought ever conquer the French- Foreign Office, and more unlikely things have happened,.. the English people would, we can assure our French friends, receive all overtures with a great deal of business-. like sense. British diplomatists are not unnaturally vexed and irritated by the "policy of worry" in all quarters of the world which France has kept up for the last few' years, but there is no rancour against Frenchmen left among the British people. They understand France very- well after the struggles and agreements of six hundred . years, and are perfectly willing, if she is willing, to be friends with her once again. They have not forgotten that Napoleon III. kept his engagements in 1855, or that in 1857, when an unexpected military calamity fell upon this country, his friendship enabled her to send nearly her whole available Army without danger into Asia. They have no dislike of France because it is a Republic, not caring much, if truth is to be spoken, how foreigners govern themselves, and they have a very strong dislike to the idea that as a consequence of the next war France might cease to exist in Europe. Why, with their history.. they should entertain this feeling is a mystery to every German, and indeed to most of our own people ; but of its existence there can be no doubt whatever. If France disturbs Europe, let her be controlled or- fined or punished, but death penalties are not even to be thought about in the case of France. That: was the feeling in 1876 when it was supposed that Germany might renew the war ; and we can assure Frenchmen that, despite the bickerings of the last few years, bickerings which have never begun on this side of the Channel, that feeling is in existence as strong as ever. There is no popular objection here to an alliance with France if circumstances required one; and above all, no suspicion that in such an alliance Great Britain. would be safe to be tricked. There is no enthusiasm of friendship, no belief that England and France are at all the same, or have the same interests or aspirations ; but; there is a good solid confidence that Frenchmen can be trusted in business, and have too much head to believe- that in national affairs treachery ever pays. An esteem of that sort is a very good foundation for a partnership. intended to work a particular business ; and M. Hanotaux' may rely on it that, so far as the body of the people is concerned, it exists here.
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