Waiting for Mr. Rhee
Mr. Walter Robertson and President Syngman Rhee are, at the time of writing, still talking. Mr. Rhee threatened to withdraw his forces from the United Nations command. Then, uncertain, perhaps, of the loyalty of his own Commander in Chief, or disturbed by the 90,000 shells that the Chinese fired at him in a single twenty-four hours, or impressed by Mr. Robertson's threat to withdraw economic aidāfor all or none of these reasons, he seemed to think better of it. He implied that if the United States would give him the promise of a security guarantee before the truce was signed, he might go along with them quietly. Peking radio then denomiced such a suggestion as " tying American soldiers to the decrepit war chariot " of South Korea. Nobody took much notice, but Mr. Rhee, for one reason or, another, thought better of it again. It is impossible, at this stage, to say how it will end. President Eisenhower is apparently determined that Mr. Rhee shall not involve him in an extended war with China, though Ile has not yet revealed just how tough, or how conciliatory he is prepared to be in order to avoid it. If it is true that Mr. Rhee has demanded and received a pledge that the United States would support him in the subsequent political con- ference, it suggests that the United States has been inclining more to conciliation than to toughness. But it may be as dangerous to delay dealing with the inconsistencies between 4 reasonable United Nations position and the position of Mr. Rhee, as to expose them and face them now. Meanwhile, it is still not clear what effect even the present suspense is having on the Chinese. General Clark has asked them to accept that he is not responsible for the prisoners' escape and cannot recapture them. If the Communists accept this, they must want a truce in earnest and everything will turn on what impact Mr. Robertson can make on Mr. Rhee. If the Com- munists do not accept this position, or if they do not believe that America can control South Korea whatever Mr. Rhee may promise, or if Mr. Rhee finally refuses to promise any- thing which the allies can accept, then, and only then, is there a case for calling a meeting of the United Nations.
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