Divided World
Survey of International Affairs, 1949-1950. By Peter Calvocoressi.
THANKS to Mr. Calvocoressi's unwearied labours the Chatham House Surveys seem to be catching up in their race with history in the making; and the latest volume (together with the companion volume of documents which follows its internal arrangement) brings us to the end of 1950; and is intended to pave the way for future volumes covering a single year only, as in the case of pre-war series. Mr. Calvocoressi's work.is again of an amazingly consistent standard of accuracy and fairness, and goes far to prove the case for the view that, given certain standards, contemporary history can be written without becoming a branch of polemic. Nevertheless the necessity of choosing a point of view is gone from which the contemporary historian cannot escape, and is to some extent dictated by the form into which the narrative is cast. The curious thing about the present volume is that Mr. Calvocoressi's treatment scarcely substantiates the general verdict on this period put forward by Professor Toynbee in his introduction. According to Professor Toynbee the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States which dominated world affairs in these years was caused not by greed but by fear. "Owing to the invention pf the atom bomb, a world in which, on the economic plane, there was still elbow-room even for two colossal great Powers to live and let live side by side, had contracted on the military plane to so small a compass as to bring the two giants within point-blank range of one another. Their mutual fear was a conse- quence of this revolution in military technology."
But although Mr. Calvocoressi in fact treats world politics in terms of this conflict, the evidence which he amasses and analyses does not suggest that the fear of the military potential of the other side was really a determining factor in the policies of either of the two Powers. What lent the peculiar tension to world politics in both Europe and Asia was the fact that one of the two Powers was possessed by, or thought to be possessed by, an expansionist ideology hostile to the social structure and fundamental beliefs of the other. The Americans might argue certain aspects of their policy in purely strategic terms. A good example of this was the question of Forniosa. But as Mr. F. C. Jones, who contributes excellent chapters on China and Japan, shows quite clearly, this argument was not really serious enough to explain the intensity of American feeling on this issue. It was the commitment to Formosa as the surviving relic of an anti- Communist Cbina, not the few. of Formosa as an anchored aircraft- carrier, that dominated American minds; and events since the end of 1950 have suggested even more powerfully the conclusion that it is not Russian armaments but the fear of ungaimilable ideas that is still the key to what seems to many EuropeanTilhe more questionable side of the American attitude to current problems. Although Professor Toynbee's thesis is reinforced by the maps appended to this volume which show the extent to which world strategy has been altered by the long range aircraft, it is still the case that conflicts of ideas produce races in armaments and not that races in armaments produce conflicts of ideas.
Given this approach .in terms of the Russo-American rivalry, the arrangement of the volume is the logical one: an analysis of American and then of Russian policy; a study of their conflict over Germany; a study of the two halves into which Europe was divided by their respective policies, and a similar study of Asia. Certain other problems largely focused on the United Nations Organisation are relegated to a final section. The survey lacks completeness because the Middle East has again been left for a separate volume, and because of the omission of Latin-America which did not figure prominently in world politics at this time. The latter omission is not important since the story can be taken up again in a subsequent volume; and the Middle East is also eventually to be brought within
, the general survey. On the other hand it appears to be a permanent policy to exclude what Mr. Calvocoressi calls the "domestic affairs of the British Commonwealth." The reasons for this latter omission are understandable, but one wonders whether the consequences have been altogether foreseen. One must face the fact that the survey cannot be written from some external planetary standpoint. There is not even an attitude common to the whole of the non-Communist world. Mr. Calvocoressi's highly balanced analysis of what we know about the origins of the Korean war would scarcely be accept- able in many quarters in Washington. The survey therefore must in fact be written from a British angle, though not necessarily from an official British angle; but by omitting the affairs of the Common- wealth as being essentially domestic, British policy, which after all is a not inconsiderable factor in world affairs, tends to be minimised and even to some extent distorted. Mr. Calvocoressi's rather sharp criticism of the British attitude towards the movement for European unity, as it is called, can hardly be judged in its proper context unless at some point British policy is treated as a whole.
• As it is, Yugoslavia.and Indo-China, to take two countries at random, both get considerably more space than is allotted.to Britain, or for that matter to France. Such considerations, which imply additional material for future Surveys, should not blind one to the argument that the Survey in its present form is possibly too long rather than too short. Despite Mr, Calvocoressi's skill as a narrator, it does not make easy reading, and there are pages which hardly anyone but the specialist is likely to read. In view of this fact and of the expense of such volumes Which must cut down their utility from the point of view of the student, it might be wise for the Institute to consider whether the present form of the Survey should not be modified. If there is to be an annual Survey it is arguable that it should concern itself only with an analysis of the rblations of the great Powers, and that it should endeavour to integrate the.economic with the political approgh to a greater degree than is done in the present volume by the inclusion of two short chapters by Professor R. G. Hawtrey on economic co-operation and on under-developed areas. Particular regions of the world and particular problems as they arise—problems which incidentally rarely fit themselves into the framework of the calendar—should then be handled in the form of separate studies by experts on the particular field. It is true that this would involve a departure from the tried procedure of the inter-war years; but with the growth of international independence and of the complexity of international problems the case for re- thinking the methods to be adopted in such a Survey is a very strong one. The documents volumes could remain on their present scale with perhaps the addition of a chronology of events so as to provide the necessary element of continuity and completeness. The Institute is fortunate in having two such accomplished practitioners of their separate arts as Mr. Calvocoressi and Miss Carlyle. The problem is how to use them to the best advantage. MAX BELOFF. is how to use them to the best advantage. MAX BELOFF.
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